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The dissertation offers a new reading of Karl Barth’s hermeneutics in relation to the 
task of the church in reading the Bible as Scripture. The study argues that the 
distinctiveness of Barth’s hermeneutics lies in its complex coordination of several 
doctrinal loci in construing biblical hermeneutics. In this reading, the church’s 
interpretation of the Bible is theologically located in the reality defined by the 
Trinitarian decision to be God in Jesus Christ. The relationship between the Word of 
God and the word of man is decided by God’s election of God’s being in Jesus 
Christ. 
As a contribution to Barth studies, the work offers a corrective reading of 
Barth’s earlier account of biblical hermeneutics in the doctrine of revelation by 
drawing the insights of Barth’s later theological ontology in the doctrines of election 
and Christology. The church’s reading of scripture is reformulated in the ontology of 
being in becoming in which the freedom of God in revelation is coordinated with the 
history of God in Jesus Christ. As such, it maintains the continuity and the 
discontinuity between the biblical natural history and the divine address to the 
church. 
The practical implication of this approach is not a method of interpretation 
but an ethics of biblical interpretation as a human response to God’s communicative 
presence. As an activity of listening to the Word of God, the church’s reading of the 
Bible is marked by moral freedom in obedience and responsibility to the Word of 
God. But the divine presence is not only communicative but also commanding, and it 
remains “a disruptive presence” that challenges the church to be faithful to her 






The dissertation offers a new reading of Karl Barth’s theology of interpretation. 
There are two major contributions of this dissertation to its academic community. 
First, it offers a new analysis of the structure and coherence of Barth’s theological 
hermeneutics as a contribution to Barth’s scholarship. Second, it offers a new 
analysis of the distinctiveness of Barth’s hermeneutics as a contribution to broader 
discussions of the conditions and aims of textual interpretation.  
In relation to the first, this work presents a synthetic account of Barth’s 
theology in relation to the task of the church to read the Bible as Scripture. It offers a 
new reading of Barth's hermeneutics by i) drawing upon the insights of earlier 
commentators on Barth's theology of the Word of God, but ii) reading 
and adjusting this material through the lens of Barth's subsequent work. Specifically, 
this work identifies and analyses the underlying intellectual commitments that forms 
Barth’s hermeneutics from its earlier development to its mature reformulation. 
In relation to the second, this work offers a new constructive account of 
Barth’s hermeneutics in sharp contrast to some other influential analyses of the 
dynamics of meaning and understanding. The work argues that the strength of 
Barth’s theology lies in its ability to coordinate several theological loci to formulate a 
complex account of human understanding. In this regard, this dissertation interprets 
Barth’s hermeneutics in his early theology, and analysed it in conjunction with his 
mature theology to provide a new constructive account. The synthetic result is 
strongly recommended for its theological specificity. The presentation of this new 
synthesis is structured as Barth’s ontology, theology and ethics of interpretation. 
The five main chapters of this study can be divided into two parts. Chapters 
2-3 survey the scholarship and the background of Karl Barth’s hermeneutics. The 
purpose is to highlight the distinctiveness of his hermeneutics and the interrelation of 
various doctrinal loci in his early formulation of theological interpretation. Chapters 
4-6 are a constructive interpretation based on a thematic reading of Barth’s later 
writings and a close examination of some important sections. The reading is an 
empathetic attempt to understand the logic of Barth’s hermeneutics within his 
theology as a whole, while also questioning and engaging Barth’s thinking in a wider 
context of hermeneutical and ethical theories. 
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Chapter I:  Introduction 
 
This study is entitled “Disruptive Presence: the ontology, theology and ethics of 
reading of the Bible as Scripture in Karl Barth’s theological exegesis.” There are two 
major contributions of this dissertation to its academic community. First, it offers a 
new analysis of the structure and coherence of Barth’s theological hermeneutics as a 
contribution to Barth’s scholarship. Second, it offers a new analysis of the 
distinctiveness of Barth’s hermeneutics as a contribution to broader discussions of 
the conditions and aims of textual interpretation. 
 In relation to the first, this work presents a synthetic account of Barth’s 
theology in relation to the task of the church to read the Bible as Scripture. We offer 
a new reading of Barth's hermeneutics by i) drawing upon the insights of earlier 
commentators (e.g. Webster, Jüngel, etc.) on Barth's theology of the Word of God up 
to CD I/1, but ii) reading and adjusting this material through the lens of Barth's 
subsequent work. Specifically, this work identifies and analyses the underlying 
theological commitments that forms Barth’s hermeneutics from its development in 
the Epistle to the Romans to its mature reformulation in the Church Dogmatics.1  As 
a new reading this study offers a corrective treatment of Barth’s early hermeneutics 
in CD I/1 by adopting an interpretative strategy of Barth’s theology, associated 
especially with Bruce McCormack,2 to demonstrate how Barth’s early account of 
biblical interpretation can be revised and refined by a theological-ontological 
construct based on his expositions of the doctrines of election (CD II/1) and 
Christology (CD IV). 
 In relation to the second, this work offers a new constructive account of 
Barth’s hermeneutics in sharp contrast to some other influential analyses of the 
dynamics of meaning and understanding. The work argues that the strength of 
                                                 
1 Hereafter, the acronym CD will be used. This work uses the new study edition of the Church 
Dogmatics that consist of 31 volumes published by T&T Clark in 2009, but paginated according to the 
standard edition. Accordingly, the citations are paginated according to the standard edition of Karl 
Barth, Church Dogmatics, 13 Vols, trans. G. W. Bromiley and Thomas Forsyth Torrance (Edinburgh: 
T&T Clark, 1956-1975). 




Barth’s theology lies in its ability to coordinate several theological loci to formulate a 
complex account of human understanding. In this regard, this dissertation follows a 
line of interpretation of Barth’s early theology, associated primarily with John 
Webster,3 and analysed in conjunction with his mature theology to provide a 
constructive account of Barth’s hermeneutics. The presentation of this new synthesis 
is structured as Barth’s ontology, theology and ethics of interpretation. The synthetic 
result is strongly recommended for its theological specificity. 
The word ‘presence’ in the title refers to the faith of the church that the divine 
presence accompanies the church’s reading of Scripture. Thus a more proper title is 
“Graceful Presence” rather than disruptive. But the title is used to convey the 
theological sense against modern hermeneutics which emancipates text from 
speaking, and how in particular, this emancipation assumes the absence of a 
discoursing author. We claim that this notion does not apply to the biblical text when 
it is read as Scripture. For modern hermeneutics, the presence of an author is 
disruptive to a process of interpretation.4 It works on the assumption that reading a 
text is different from listening because, as a discourse fixed in writing, a text cannot 
interact with the reader in the way a speaker interacts with the audience. The 
relationship between author and reader through the text is completed when the author 
cannot interrupt the event of interpretation. The reader can read the work as an 
isolated text without the disruptive presence of an author. In this construal, the 
presence of an author who constantly evaluates the process of interpretation based on 
authorial intention constrains a reading experience.5 A free reader requires the death 
of the author. In other words, the emancipation of writing from speaking is the birth 
of a text in modern hermeneutics.6 
In contrast, according to Barth’s theology, a reading of the Bible as Scripture 
assumes the divine communicative presence, in which God is not only speaking but 
also commanding the church in and through the text. The speaking God is the 
                                                 
3 On John Webster’ contribution to Barth’s early theology, see our discussion in chapter 3.  
4 Paul Ricœur, Hermeneutics and the Human Sciences: Essays on Language, Action and 





theological condition for such reading to be possible. Rather than emancipating the 
text from God’s speech, Barth’s theology binds the text of Scripture to the divine 
communicative presence. Whenever the church reads the Bible as Scripture, she 
encounters God’s ‘disruptive’ presence that challenges her understanding and 
commands her ministry. This faith calls for a theological exploration and a 
hermeneutical task of accounting for God’s presence in biblical interpretation. This is 
the task that this study seeks to explore. But in what follows I will specify further the 
subject matter and the aim of this study. 
 The subject matter of this study is Karl Barth’s theology in relation to the 
church’s reading of the Bible as Scripture. I assume that the Bible can be read merely 
as a literary product (as a letter, a poetry, a story, a history, etc.), but such readings 
are not necessarily a reading of the Scripture. Different interpretations of the Bible 
are a result not only differing methods but also different construal of the Bible as a 
text. As a text, the Bible can mean different things to different people: a story, a text, 
a tradition, a history, a library, etc. Our study focuses on the Bible as Scripture 
which, in the theological sense, is inclusive of these categories. As a theological 
exploration, this study does not disregard what in Barth’s theology is called the 
humanity of Scripture (its history and linguistic reality). However, to read the Bible 
as Scripture assumes that it is read by the church in an act of theological exegesis. It 
is not a particular instance of a general reading, but an act of reading sui generis. It is 
different from a reading of a scholar, an Asian man/woman, a Westerner or any other 
forms of human existence. Specifically, a reading of the Bible as Scripture is an act 
of a community of faith, which is inclusive of these forms of human existence, but 
which is ultimately defined by her being as the creature of the Word of God. 
However, because the church consists of human readers and the text is written by 
human authors, biblical interpretation involves the humanity of the Scripture. It 
responds to the complex hermeneutical questions of human understanding. 
Nevertheless, it does not assume that it deals with these questions exhaustively, but 
only limitedly, i.e. from the point of view of Barth’s theology. In this sense, this 
study explores the questions of human understanding in its relation to the text, reader 
and author in biblical interpretation and offers a constructive proposal of a theology 
of reading the Bible as Scripture. 
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The aim of this study is to construct a theological hermeneutics of the Bible 
with and after the manner of Barth’s theology. The question this study seeks to 
answer is the question of God’s communicative presence in the church’s 
interpretation of the Bible: what are the meaning, the implications and the practical 
consequences of the claim for hermeneutics. The questions of the text, the author and 
the reader will be explored only from the point of view of the church’s faith in God 
who speaks in and through the Bible. 
From a methodological point of view, this study offers a corrective and 
constructive reading of Barth’s theology of interpretation. Since his theology 
underwent developments throughout his theological career, following the common 
sense, we will read his earlier theology to understand the development of his later 
hermeneutics. However, at the critical point of his theological-ontology, it is his later 
theology that will be used to reinterpret his earlier ontological presuppositions 
(McCormack’s thesis). Specifically, this way of reading will be used with regard to 
Barth’s ontology of interpretation and how in particular Barth’s Christology and 
election provide a revised ontology to his earlier expositions. After a constructive 
reading of Barth’s ontology of interpretation, we will propose a theology of 
interpretation and the practical implications of the construal. As such, the study is 
structured under the themes of the ontology, theology and ethics of interpretation.  
Specifically, the study offers the insights of Barth’s theology in presupposing a 
different reality (ontology), focusing on the Word of God (theology), and 
recommending a particular morality of interpretation (ethics) for the task of reading 
the Bible as Scripture. 
There are alternative readings of Barth’s theological ontology in relation to 
the development of his theology, particularly the ontological relationship between the 
election, Christology and Trinity.7 This work does not seek to propose a new way of 
                                                 
7 The primary alternative reading (“weak reading”) is associated with Paul Molnar and George 
Hunsinger. For an introduction to the current debate, including the papers and responses by 
McCormack, Molnar, Hunsinger and other alternative readings, see collective essays in Michael T. 
Dempsey, Trinity and Election in Contemporary Theology, ed. Michael T. Dempsey (Grand Rapids: 
Eerdmans, 2011). This work follows McCormack’s “strong reading” on the ontological relationship 
between election and God’s being. The terms “strong” and “weak” have nothing to do with the 
strength of the argument but rather in view of the significance of God’s election to God’s being. A 
“strong” view means that election logically precedes God’s being, and as such construes God’s being 
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resolving the debate, but rather to highlight and to draw the insightful implications 
that results from the line of interpretation associated primarily with Bruce 
McCormack. From practical reasons, to do justice to the debate, the scope of the 
work would be too extensive and would eclipse the main arguments that we offer. 
Secondly, in relation to the subject matter of the thesis, it is McCormack’s line of 
interpretation that offers the possibility of a new reading to Barth’s earlier account of 
biblical interpretation. The alternative reading offers no material change to the 
ontology of Barth’s Dogmatics, and in this respect, offers no substantive correction 
to his earlier theology of interpretation. 
 The five main chapters of this study can be divided into two parts. Chapters 
2-3 survey the scholarship and the background of Karl Barth’s hermeneutics. The 
purpose is to highlight the distinctiveness of his hermeneutics and the interrelation of 
various doctrinal loci in his early formulation of theological interpretation. This 
twofold message is explored in the schematic presentation of the three aspects of 
Barth’s hermeneutics: the ontology, theology and ethics of theological interpretation. 
Chapters 4-6 are my constructive work based on a thematic reading of the CD and a 
close examination of some important sections in CD. My reading is an empathetic 
attempt to understand the logic of Barth’s hermeneutics within his theology as a 
whole, while also questioning and engaging Barth’s thinking in a wider context of 
hermeneutical and ethical theories. 
 Chapter Two contributes to scholarship by providing a map of contemporary 
studies of Barth’s hermeneutics. With the growing number of studies in Barth’s 
hermeneutics, it can be a challenge to get a sense where one may place an approach 
in comparison to the others. This chapter provides an orientation to various 
                                                                                                                                          
in actualistic ontology, i.e., God is the Lord of God’s being. A “weak reading” means that the being of 
God precedes God’s election, and as such it is more in line with the essentialist approach to God’s 
being, i.e., God’s election is the expression of God’s being. For the main articles of “weak reading” 
see, inter alia, George Hunsinger, "Election and the Trinity: Twenty-Five Theses on the Theology of 
Karl Barth," Modern Theology 24, no. 2 (2008): 179-98; Paul D. Molnar, "Can the Electing God Be 
God without Us? Some Implications of Bruce Mccormack's Understanding of Barth's Doctrine of 
Election for the Doctrine of the Trinity," Neue Zeitschrift Fur Systematische Theologie Und 
Religionsphilosophie 49, no. 2 (2007): 199-222. For McCormack’s response see inter alia Bruce L. 
McCormack, "Election and the Trinity: Theses in Response to George Hunsinger," Scottish Journal of 
Theology 63, no. 2 (2010): 203-24; Bruce L. McCormack, "Let's Speak Plainly: A Response to Paul 
Molnar," Theology Today 67, no. 1 (2010): 57-65. 
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approaches by considering the main proposals in the scholarship. We divide the 
studies into five approaches: the non-hermeneutical proposals that argue that Barth 
does not have a hermeneutics, the hermeneutical proposals that construe Barth’s 
theology of interpretation from a hermeneutical point of view, the exegetical 
proposals that construe Barth’s hermeneutics from his exegesis, the genetic-
theological proposals that interpret Barth’s hermeneutics in the context of the 
development of his theology, and the theological-historical proposals that attempt to 
understand his hermeneutics from the internal logic of his theology. While the final 
two approaches are significantly intertwined, we differentiate them for the purpose of 
highlighting the difference in emphasis and how these approaches contribute to our 
study in construing ontology and theology of interpretation. In this context, we are 
situating our approach as a dogmatic proposal that sees Barth’s hermeneutics as an 
insightful coordination of Christian doctrines arranged as the ontology, theology and 
ethics of interpretation. The three themes are defined from a theological point of 
view, and they are constructed to provide a schematic arrangement of the material 
dogmatic. In some ways our approach will resemble the genetic-historical and the 
historical-theological proposals, but we offer a new way of coordinating Barth’s 
theological ontology with his theological hermeneutics and ethics of interpretation. 
In other words, we offer a constructive reading of Barth’s theology of interpretation 
that is shaped by his later theological ontology and which recommends a theological 
ethics for reading the Bible as Scripture. 
 Chapter Three narrates the development of Karl Barth’s hermeneutics as the 
result of two important aspects of his life and work in the early period: biblical 
exegesis and the studies of reformed theology. In this chapter we argue that what was 
crucial for the formation of his reading of Scripture was not some novel ideas and 
methods such as dialectics, Hegel’s philosophy, Neo-Liberalism/Orthodoxy, German 
Idealism, etc., but a quiet but steady development in exegesis and his study of 
reformed theology. Barth spent most of his time in the final period of pastoral work 
in Safenwil and in the early period as a professor of New Testament Exegesis and 
Reformed Theology in Göttingen, doing and teaching biblical exegesis, and studying 
and teaching reformed confessions and theologies. His intense engagement in these 
activities helped Barth to reformulate his thinking on how to account for the presence 
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of God in the church’s reading of the Bible, and how this theological conviction must 
inform and form the practice of biblical exegesis. The chapter notes that during this 
formative period, the distinctiveness of Barth’s hermeneutics was taking shape in 
coordinating several doctrinal loci to provide an account of biblical interpretation, 
and this proposal can be structured by a threefold dimension of his theological 
hermeneutics: the ontology, theology and ethics of reading the Bible as Scripture. 
 Chapter Four explores the first dimension, Barth’s ontology of interpretation. 
In a way, this chapter is the material groundwork for Chapters Four and Five, and we 
offer a new reading as a theological exploration into the ontology of hermeneutics 
with and after the manner of Barth’s theology. While this chapter has greatly 
benefitted from recent discussion of Barth’s theological ontology, it moves beyond 
the insights of such studies and offers a constructive work on Barth’s ontology of 
interpretation. We do not claim that our discussions on the theological ontology of 
Trinity, Christology and election are an original contribution to the field, but rather 
that by drawing up this work we can offer some original insights into Barth’s 
ontology of Scriptural interpretation.   To this end, we offer a proposal that the 
Trinity is being as self-interpreted being, Jesus Christ is the being of language, Jesus 
Christ is the primal history, and election is the foundation of being. In this way we 
engage in the study of hermeneutics at the ontological level by using Barth’s 
theological ontology as a metacriticism of general hermeneutics. This engagement is 
born out of a conviction that general hermeneutics is shaped by certain 
anthropological doctrines in relation to the question of reality, specifically human 
reality. Ontology in this sense is a philosophical reflection on human existence. In 
turn, the doctrine of the human as historical being brings about a historical study of a 
text, and similarly the doctrine that a human being is a cultural being results in a 
cultural approach to the text. Understanding as such is not merely knowing, i.e., 
standing in a subject-object relationship to the text, but a deeper level of existence, 
something deeper and more primitive than knowledge. It is seen as a primordial 
experience of human existence. But such a construal relies heavily on a specific 
anthropological doctrine, i.e., that the human being is the originator of authentic 
understanding.  It is against this conceptual indebtedness of a general hermeneutic to 
anthropological doctrines that we offer Barth’s theology as the basis of an ontology 
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of interpretation.  Our contention is that the decision of God to be God in Jesus 
Christ defines the reality in which the church exists and acts, and by implication 
reads the Bible as Scripture. We propose that this theological ontology has a 
profound hermeneutical consequence. This means that the history of Jesus Christ as 
witnessed in the gospel is not alien to the being of God, and that because there are 
the political, historical, cultural, linguistic and existential dimensions in the life of 
Jesus, as witnessed by the gospel, the church can approach the Bible from these 
points of view. The difference is that now these approaches are theologically 
grounded, and thus can be theologically explored and elucidated. But more 
importantly, our proposal places God as the originator of textual meaning, and as 
such replaces the human being as the locus of the hermeneutical problem. In our 
proposal, the locus of the hermeneutical problem is the being of God, not the being 
of the human. Meaning and understanding have their roots in the Trinitarian life of 
God who elects Jesus Christ as the being of God for humanity. He is the true Word 
of God. 
 In Chapter Five, we argue that such ontological construal requires a 
perceptive response to the divine communicative presence in and through the biblical 
text. The specific elaboration of this approach to the text comes through Barth’s 
theology of interpretation as a sachlich hermeneutics. A sachlich hermeneutics is an 
approach where the purpose of reading is not to understand the author or the text, but 
the subject matter that the authors witness and the text conveys. In other words, it is 
to understand what the author of the text understands. This is certainly not an original 
idea of Barth’s theology. The originality of Barth’s theology lies not in the so called 
method of Sachkritik but rather in Barth’s elaboration of the Sache of Scripture. This 
chapter not only elaborates the threefold Word of God in relation to Barth’s 
understanding of the Word of God, but also explores the threefoldness of God’s 
speaking in his sachlich hermeneutics. Since, for Barth, God and the Word of God 
are not two things but one, Barth’s theology suggests that the nature of the Word of 
God is God himself in the speech, action and mystery of God’s presence in the 
church. In this context the history, the human language and the linguistic dimensions 
of the text are the Christological implications of the Word of God as the being of 
God. The human dimensions of biblical interpretation (history, language, text) are 
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witnesses of the Word because God elects them as the enactment of what is taking 
place in the inner life of the Trinitarian God. 
 Chapter Six argues that the concrete articulation of this hermeneutical 
construal comes not in the form of a method of interpretation but in an ethics of 
interpretation. While it may sound strange at first, a method is an instance of ethical 
deliberation in which one wants to ensure a truthful process of acquiring knowledge 
or a proper way of understanding something. In this way, a method of interpretation 
is closely connected to the ethical convictions of an interpreter. But more 
importantly, in Barth’s dogmatics, ethics is an integral part of the theological 
reflection. His dogmatics is inherently ethical; and ethics is an integral part of his 
dogmatics. Barth’s ethics of interpretation in this regard is informed by an ethics of 
freedom, and takes the forms of the church’s responsibility and obedience in her 
theological interpretation. A church reading of the Bible as Scripture as such is not 
only an instance of a hermeneutical event but more importantly an ethical 
deliberation that makes moral demands upon the reader, and specifically upon the 
church, where she encounters the commanding grace of God. Our proposal on 
Barth’s ethics of interpretation highlights the fact that it is not just any text that the 
church is exploring, but the Word of God in the reality created and sustained by the 
divine commanding presence. It identifies the space of the reality of Christ within 
which the reading takes place. This is not only in contrast to the academic setting 
within which a method of interpretation acquires its existence and justification, but 
more importantly, it shows that the church is mostly defined by its theological 
existence as a creature of the Word of God. The church is in Christ, understood 
ontologically and theologically, and an act of scriptural reading is not only an act of 
worship, rife with the risk of irreverence, but also a communication of the divine 
truth that requires both the church’s understanding and obedience. 
 This study does not undertake specific exegeses in Barth’s writings.  There 
are several studies along this line, and they can be consulted in our survey in Chapter 
Two. There are two reasons why this study does not embark in this direction. For a 
pragmatic reason, we lack space and time to undertake such a study. But more 
importantly, Barth’s exegesis is marked by creativity that each exegesis is executed 
in view of a biblical text’s particular way of witnessing and the point of view in 
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which the subject matter of Scripture is presented.  Rather than dealing with specific 
exegesis, we are exploring the salient features of his exegetical practice, specifically, 
the theological reading and dogmatic presuppositions that shape his interpretation. 
Nevertheless, having studied these features, the interaction between exegesis and 
theology (exegesis in theological reflection and theological reflection in exegesis), 
both in exploring biblical passages and in reflecting on theological questions, is the 
proper sequel to what we are attempting in this work. Such exploration will benefit 
from and be complemented by the groundwork we have undertaken in this study.
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Chapter II: Perspectives on Karl Barth’s Hermeneutic and Exegesis 
 
1. A Survey of Approaches to Karl Barth’s Hermeneutics 
Various scholars, in one way or another, find Karl Barth a profound reader of 
Scripture.1 Whether they agree or disagree with his exegesis, they cannot but 
acknowledge that Barth understood the Bible in the way that resembles the insightful 
meditation of the church fathers. A few examples will suffice. Commenting on 
Barth’s the Epistle to the Romans, Brevard Childs remarks, “When you read Barth on 
Romans, whether you agree or not, you know you have confronted someone who 
understands Paul. It reminds one, again, of Augustine or Chrysostom.”2 Reflecting 
on his theological growth in reading the Bible, theologian Thomas F. Torrance 
testified, “When I opened the pages of Karl Barth’s books and read the Holy 
Scripture in the light of the startling questions he asked about the strange new world 
within the Bible and dynamic nature of the Word of God, my study of the Bible 
changed into a higher gear.”3 
According to his life-long closest friend, Eduard Thurneysen, Barth must be 
understood primarily as a student and a teacher of the Bible that “whoever tries to 
understand him as other than this will not understand him at all.”4 But what is it 
exactly that makes Barth’s reading of the Bible so insightful? And in what way 
should we understand his reading that we could learn from Barth, not only in the way 
                                                 
1 On the other hand, even from the beginning of the dialectical theology movement, there were 
scholars who did not think that Barth was a good interpreter of Scripture, for example, Ernst von 
Dobschütz, "Die Pneumatische Exegese, Wissenschaft und Praxis," in Vom Auslegen des Neuen 
Testaments: Drei Reden (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1927), 50; also Johannes Schneider, 
"Historische und Pneumatische Exegese," Neue Kirchliche Zeitschrift 42 (1931): 728. Cf. Bruce L. 
McCormack, Orthodox and Modern: Studies in the Theology of Karl Barth (Grand Rapids: Baker 
Academic, 2008), 97. 
2 Brevard S. Childs, "Karl Barth as Interpreter of Scripture," in Karl Barth and the Future of 
Theology: A Memorial Colloquium, ed. David L. Dickerman (New Haven: Yale Divinity School 
Association, 1969), 35. 
3 Thomas F. Torrance, Karl Barth: Biblical and Evangelical Theologian (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 
1990), 83. 
4 Karl Barth and Eduard Thurneysen, Revolutionary Theology in the Making: Barth-Thurneysen 
Correspondence, 1914-1925, trans. James D. Smart (Richmond: John Knox Press, 1964), 13. 
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he approached the task, but also in the theological presupposition and critical self-
understanding of the task? These questions have generated studies that attempt to 
grasp the hermeneutics and the theological convictions of Barth’s engagement with 
Scripture. By way of survey and critical engagement with some of the major 
proposals, we propose that there are five ways of approaching the question at hand. 
There is always a risk of simplification and generalization in mapping various 
positions in relation to a complex topic such as Barth’s hermeneutics. The purpose of 
our mapping, however, is not to provide a comprehensive taxonomy that exhausts the 
approaches and contributions of the scholars under consideration. Rather, each of the 
scholars we list here explores a wider terrain, and continues to explore the subject, 
and in various degrees, merits a more detailed engagement than the scope of our 
study permits. The purpose of this survey is to place our study in relation to the state 
of the scholarship on Barth’s exegesis and hermeneutics. With this in mind, we 
propose that there are five types of descriptive conceptualization to Barth’s exegesis 
and hermeneutics: the non-hermeneutical proposals, the hermeneutical-oriented 
proposals, the exegetical-oriented proposals, the genetic-theological proposals and 
the theological-historical proposals. The following survey provides a short 
description of the insights and the critical engagements with the approaches to 
Barth’s hermeneutics and exegesis. This survey will also clarify the argument that 
will be pursued in the remainder of the thesis. 
1.1. The non-hermeneutical proposals 
There are some scholars who see in Barth’s theology little or no room for 
hermeneutics. Barth’s theological description of the divine activity, it is argued, 
suggests a subversive attitude to the insights and the constructive roles of 
hermeneutical theories in biblical interpretation. Edgar V. Knight argues that, for 
Barth, “the identity of the subject matter (God, Christ, grace, etc.) of the text of the 
Bible… solves the problem of distance and makes meaning possible in the present.”5 
In similar fashion, Peter Stühlmacher notes that “Barth’s conception of the principle 
of revelation, and his opposition to an exclusively historical-critical analysis of the 
                                                 
5 Edgar V. McKnight, Meaning in Texts: The Historical Shaping of a Narrative Hermeneutics 
(Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1978), 66. 
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text hindered him from seeing the hermeneutical problem in its full breadth.”6 
Accordingly, Barth is prevented from proposing a method that actually might help 
the exegetes to focus on the theological subject matter of the Bible.7 The root of 
Barth’s theological attitude, according to Anthony C. Thiselton, can be identified in 
the conviction of the discontinuity between human knowledge and the reality of God 
because “no natural point of contact already exists between man and the Word of 
God, and that this discontinuity, therefore, can and must be bridged not by 
hermeneutics but by the work of the Holy Spirit.”8 Thiselton argues that the 
discontinuity between hermeneutics and theology is so strongly emphasized that he 
seems to downplay that “the Spirit works through the normal processes of human 
understanding and neither independently of them nor contrary to them.”9 As a result, 
Barth’s theological attitude to the problem of hermeneutics implies that “there would 
be no need for hermeneutics.”10 
 To be fair to this approach one must recognize that it is commonly a 
comment on a side note of comparative study between Barth and other theologians 
(e.g. Bultmann or Schleiermacher), and mostly does not come from a close reading 
of a particular Barth text. This indicates the impression of general scholarship, which 
is quite imprecise in describing the relationship between Barth’s theology and 
hermeneutics. However, it also shows that Barth’s theology may appear to be quite 
unsatisfactory in helping to formulate the contribution of hermeneutics for the 
interpretation of Scripture, which is at the heart of the concern of some theological 
engagements with general hermeneutics. This is correct to the extent that Barth 
refuses to submit theology to the agenda of modern hermeneutics, especially to the 
question of method and understanding. But the estimation that Barth’s theology 
creates a discontinuity between the normal process of understanding and the 
                                                 
6 Peter Stuhlmacher, Historical Criticism and Theological Interpretation of Scripture: Toward a 
Hermeneutics of Consent, ed. and trans. Roy A. Harrisville (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1977), 51. 
7 Ibid. 
8 Anthony C. Thiselton, The Two Horizons: New Testament Hermeneutics and Philosophical 
Description with Special Reference to Heidegger, Bultmann, Gadamer, and Wittgenstein (Exeter: 
Paternoster, 1980), 88. 
9 Ibid., 90. 
10 Anthony C. Thiselton, New Horizons in Hermeneutics (London: HarperCollins, 1992), 231. 
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theological content of the Bible is off the mark. Barth does not reject that the Holy 
Spirit works through the natural process of understanding, but raises a deeper 
theological question, i.e., in what way this natural process must be understood in 
relation to the living reality of the Word of God. Thiselton suggests that by correct 
analysis of the natural process of understanding, with the insights of general 
hermeneutics, we can arrive at a clear understanding of the theological content of the 
Bible. Barth, however, questions this conviction insofar that the theological content 
in question is not simply a collection of theological ideas, human symbolic meanings 
or even the profound new horizons created by symbolic fusion between text and 
human understanding, but the living reality of God in relation to God’s decision to 
address humans in their sinfulness. Furthermore, Barth’s strong emphasis on the 
freedom of God makes his proposal open to the criticism that hermeneutics has little 
or no room in his dogmatics. But to emphasize too strongly on this side, is to ignore 
the other side of Barth’s theology, i.e., the role of human activity in Barth’s 
theological anthropology. We cannot conclude Barth’s reflection on the human 
process of understanding simply by the implications made from his theology of 
revelation. We must explore parts of his theology where he actually discusses the 
topic extensively. Barth’s emphasis on the divine activity will be understood in a 
more nuanced way, particularly in relation to the human process of understanding, 
but only once the dialectics of divine discourse and human activity is understood 
properly. 
1.2. The hermeneutical-oriented proposals 
If the previous proposals see little contribution from Barth’s theology to 
hermeneutics, the hermeneutically-oriented proposals, on the other hand, see that 
many insights can be gained from Barth’s hermeneutics. Thus this approach explores 
Barth’s writings from the standpoint of current hermeneutical theories and compares 
Barth’s ideas with certain prominent thinkers in theology or in a wider academic 
context such as Bultmann (Werner G. Jeanrond), Paul Ricoeur (Mark I Wallace, 
Stephen H. Webb), and Derrida (Graham Ward, Isolde Andrews).11 These proposals 
                                                 
11 Inter alia, Werner G. Jeanrond, "Karl Barth's Hermeneutics," in Reckoning with Barth, ed. Nigel 
Biggar (Oxford: Mowbray, 1988), 80-97.;Werner G. Jeanrond, Theological Hermeneutics: 
Development and Significance (New York: Crossroad, 1991), 120-57; Mark I. Wallace, "Karl Barth's 
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engage in a critical conversation that aims at a new constructive proposal by 
combining the insights of the participants under consideration. In the following we 
will provide some important examples of such engagement and consider the value of 
their respective proposals on Barth’s theological hermeneutics. 
Werner G. Jeanrond concentrates his studies on the early part of the Church 
Dogmatics (I/1 and I/2) and argues that Barth’s hermeneutics emphasizes the 
material content of theology, and the hermeneutical question is essentially a question 
of “God’s revelation in history.”12 In his estimation, Barth’s hermeneutics is “a 
passionate hermeneutics” that reads the text of the Bible through the axiom of 
epistemological disjunction between God and man, and combines this insight with 
the conviction that Jesus Christ is the ultimate revelation of God’s love.13 Within 
these convictions, Barth then proposes that the subject matter of the text will be able 
to make itself known to the reader.14 According to Jeanrond, Barth’s hermeneutics 
bears a similarity to Gadamer’s hermeneutics which proposes that the truth will 
reveal itself to the reader.15 But this emphasis, according to Jeanrond, has made 
Barth unable to appreciate the important insight of hermeneutics into the conditions 
of human understanding. According to Jeanrond while Barth is correct that 
methodological reflection cannot guarantee the material content of the Word of God, 
Barth is wrong in underestimating its role for responsible hermeneutics.16 The best 
way to proceed, according to Jeanrond, is to appreciate both Barth’s emphasis on 
material content of theology and the hermeneutical insights for proper method of 
interpretation. 
                                                                                                                                          
Hermeneutic, a Way Beyond the Impasse," Journal of Religion 68, no. 3 (Jul 1988): 396-410 ; Mark I. 
Wallace, The Second Naiveté: Barth, Ricoeur, and the New Yale Theology (Macon, Ga.: Mercer 
University Press, 1995); Stephen H. Webb, Re-Figuring Theology: The Rhetoric of Karl Barth 
(Albany, N.Y.: SUNY Press, 1991); Graham Ward, Barth, Derrida and the Language of Theology 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995); Isolde Andrews, Deconstructing Barth: A Study of 
the Complementary Methods in Karl Barth and Jacques Derrida (New York: Peter Lang, 1996); 
George A. Lindbeck, "Barth and Textuality," Theology Today 43, no. 3 (1986): 361-76. 
12 Jeanrond, "Karl Barth's Hermeneutics," in Reckoning with Barth, 84. 
13 Ibid., 90. 
14 Ibid. 
15 Ibid., 93. 
16 Ibid., 94. 
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Mark I. Wallace concentrates his studies on the Epistle to the Romans and 
certain exegeses in Church Dogmatics. He compares Barth and Ricœur, and argues 
that both of them share a common interest in the text’s subject matter and attempt to 
reach a second naiveté that moves beyond a critical exegesis to a post-critical 
hermeneutic. In this sense, both affirm a strong claim that the Word of God confronts 
the readers in the interpretation of Scripture.17 Furthermore, both attempt to move 
beyond historical criticism that explores textual meanings in the historical artefacts 
and their reconstruction, and beyond literary criticism that locates textual meaning in 
the intra-linguistic sphere. These shared convictions correspond to their similar 
methodological procedures that interpretation begins with an understanding of the 
subject matter of the text, followed by an explanation of the hermeneutical circle 
between part and whole, and finally, reaches the fusion between the worlds of the 
text and of the reader in the appropriation of the subject matter to the reader’s life-
world.18 Wallace, however, realizes that the two also have their important 
dissimilarities. First, while Barth sees the world of the biblical text in a more 
anthropocentric horizon, Ricœur sees it in a cosmocentric horizon; and second, while 
Barth’s understanding of the Word of God is too Christocentric, Ricœur interprets 
the Bible from the perspective of a universal human possibility with its polyphonic 
and polysemy possibilities of understanding.19 Ricœur’s insights, Wallace argues, 
can help Barth’s Christological concentration and its anthropocentrical horizon, be 
broadened for constructing a post-modern approach to the reality of revelation by 
recognizing the plurality and diversity of meanings within the facticity of the biblical 
text.20  In this way Wallace hopes to offer “a new possibility in… hermeneutics, a 
new suppleness in… understanding of what it means to say and experience that God 
reveals God’s self to us”.21 
Graham Ward, although not strictly discussing the problem of hermeneutics, 
presents a complex analysis in comparing Barth and Derrida on language. Ward 
                                                 
17 Wallace, The Second Naiveté: Barth, Ricoeur, and the New Yale Theology, 51. 
18 Ibid., 52. 
19 Ibid., 118-19. 
20 Ibid., 118. 
21 Ibid., 119. 
17 
 
reads Barth across various writings, but behind his complex presentation the basic 
thesis of his book is that Barth and Derrida are struggling with the same 
philosophical problem: i.e. the “ineradicable otherness which haunts discourse and 
yet the impossibility of transcending metaphoricity and positing a real presence.”22 
To this problem, according to Ward, Barth’s answer is strikingly similar to Derrida’s 
once Barth’s thinking is interpreted in the context of Derrida’s philosophy of 
language.  Barth’s “ultimate concern is to move on from a theology of Scriptural 
discourse to a theology of discourse itself.”23 In this context, Barth sees that language 
operates in two modes which are antithetical to each other: the communication model 
and the semiotic model.24 According to the first, language has its origin in God and 
its operation as such follows the analogy of faith where God uses it in a perfect 
harmony between thought, word and reality. But, on the contrary, according to the 
second mode, language operates in a constructivist manner which construes the 
relationship between words and reality as practically arbitrary. According to Ward, 
Barth fails to provide a satisfactory explanation how these two antithetical models 
could be resolved, and he only offers a Christological analogy which does not 
provide a coherent answer to the question of how to account for the presence of the 
divine Word in the human words.25 To this problematic question in Barth’s theology 
of language, Ward proposes that Derrida’s ‘economy of différence’ provides an 
analytical device on how this problem can be resolved. In Ward’s view Barth’s 
theology of language should be understood as “a rhetorical strategy presenting both 
the need to do and the impossibility of doing theology”26 and the “goal is to hold 
open indefinitely a space beyond human language for the eschatological appearance 
of a God who, here and now, is absent.”27 With Derrida’s insights to how language 
                                                 
22 Ward, Barth, Derrida and the Language of Theology, 247. Cf. Bruce L. McCormack, "Graham 
Ward's Barth, Derrida and the Language of Theology," Scottish Journal of Theology, 49, no. 1 
(1996): 93. 
23 Ward, Barth, Derrida and the Language of Theology, 21. 
24 Ibid., 29. 
25 Ibid., 30. 
26 Ibid., 247. 
27 McCormack, "Graham Ward's Barth, Derrida and the Language of Theology," 101. 
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functions, Barth’s problematic linguistic construct can be accounted for how the 
divine Word can be made coherent with the semiotic nature of the human discourse. 
These proposals have a distinctive sophistication in employing complex 
hermeneutical insights and analyses for describing Barth’s potential contribution to 
hermeneutics. The merit of these approaches is in their appeal to non-Barthian 
audiences who have limited familiarity with Barth’s theology and his rather 
perplexing way of thinking and writing. This approach is also quite fruitful because it 
serves a comparative purpose in a broader academic context, i.e., to understand Barth 
as one of the great figures in modern culture. They are also correct in showing that 
Barth’s theology is not an isolated discourse but find common themes that have been 
the quest of other important thinkers. They show that theology shares the same 
questions with broader intellectual engagements in its particular dogmatics 
expositions. Barth believes that it is the call of a Christian theologian to engage in 
such conversations and be confident that only by entering them from the particularity 
of Christian dogmatics can Christian theology make a fruitful contribution.28 
Nevertheless the common limitation of this approach is the general lack of 
attentiveness to the inner logic of Barth’s theology in relation to his hermeneutics. It 
does not mean that those who study Barth along this line have not noticed the 
prominent role of theology in Barth’s hermeneutics, but this feature is eclipsed by the 
interest to compare Barth with others and to focus more on Barth’s ideas that are 
deemed hermeneutically significant. 
Jeanrond’s evaluation of Barth’s hermeneutics is based on non-theological 
convictions, i.e., his transcendental anthropological assumptions of human 
understandings and its conditions with its root in existential phenomenology.29 It is 
the role of these assumptions as a transcendental theory that have pre-empted the 
merit of Barth’s consistently theological approach to hermeneutics. In a similar vein, 
Wallace’s attempt to bridge Barth and Ricœur is an attempt to supply an assumed 
hermeneutical deficient in Barth’s theology by Ricœur’s phenomenological 
                                                 
28 CD I/1, 11. 




hermeneutics. This attempt fails to give full weight to Barth’s theological concerns 
because Wallace has already set himself within the multiple symbolic meanings of 
revelation in human existence. Furthermore Wallace miscalculates the relationship 
between history and meaning in Barth’s hermeneutics which stands in a closer 
relationship than Wallace’s proposal is suggesting. In regard to Ward’s analysis, 
while the work has much to say on the wider intellectual problem of language, his 
attempt to construct Barth’s theory of language is quite unsuccessful because Barth’s 
theological description of the Word of God is, in its core, a theology, and not an 
attempt to construct a theory of language. Barth’s concern is on the Word of God, 
that is, language in the freedom of God to address humanity, and not in providing a 
general theory of language from which the communicative and semiotic aspects of 
language could be put into a coherent conceptuality. 
1.3. The exegetical-oriented proposals 
Generally, the scholars in this group do not share the confidence of the previous 
approach. In contrast, they perceive that Barth’s approach to hermeneutics is ad hoc 
and does not entail a hermeneutic in the fuller sense of the word. But this does not 
mean that Barth has nothing to contribute to the study of hermeneutics. However, 
this contribution must be explored from a close study of Barth’s exegesis rather than 
from Barth’s scattered remarks on hermeneutics. Among the studies along this line is 
that of Mary Kathleen Cunningham who explores Barth’s hermeneutics from his 
exegesis of Ephesians 1:4-5 in the light of John 1.30 Cunningham argues that the only 
way to honor the pattern of Barth’s thinking is by exploring the genius of his 
exegesis because Barth’s hermeneutical remarks are ad hoc comments arising from 
specific engagements with specific texts, and as such there is a methodological flaw 
of reading back Barth’s hermeneutical remarks into his exegesis.31 In this context, 
Cunningham proposes that the study of Barth’s exegesis is the best way to appreciate 
Barth’s insights to hermeneutics, and to concentrate on his hermeneutics will only 
distract one’s attention from “the tremendous creativity [Barth] actually exhibits 
                                                 
30 Mary Kathleen Cunningham, What Is Theological Exegesis: Interpretation and Use of Scripture in 
Barth's Doctrine of Election (Valley Forge, Pa: Trinity Press, 1995), 12. 
31 Ibid., 14. 
20 
 
when working with specific texts.”32 Cunningham argues that in contrast to the 
historical study, which commonly focuses on the layers of tradition behind the text, 
Barth reads the Scripture as a unified whole and as a coherent witness, thus, 
confident enough to read Ephesians in the light of the Gospel of John.33 Furthermore, 
Barth interprets the Bible from a canonical perspective and explores the unified 
theme that reflects the common witness of its authors.34 Barth believes that the true 
subject matter of the Bible is Jesus Christ, and this theological presuposition is very 
different from the common presuposition of the historical approach. Thus "while 
Barth insists that there cannot be any question of sealing off or abandoning 
historical-critical investigation, he does suggest that there should be a radical 
reorientation concerning the goal to be pursued by this scholarship."35 
In a similar vein, Paul McGlasson, whose work primarily explores Barth’s 
exegeses in the Church Dogmatics, argues that Barth’s hermeneutical remarks are 
“generated by the intramural concern of Barth’s theological explication; they are not, 
therefore, easily converted into the practiced and disciplined world of contemporary 
theological hermeneutics.”36 In relation to his exegesis, McGlasson observes that it 
cannot be put into a single category but is “irreducibly pluralistic methodologically,” 
but within these varieties of approaches, one could recognize the presence of some 
kind of “conceptual analysis”.37 In conjunction with conceptual analysis, McGlasson 
argues, there is also found a narrative exegesis which has various forms such as saga, 
realistic story, narrative of revelation, God’s story, and events of common history 
between God and humanity.38 These analyses, conceptual and narrative, are 
interconnected to shape Barth’s hermeneutical practice, and it can be recognized in 
the dialectics between his exegesis in theology and his theology in exegesis.39 
                                                 
32 Ibid. 
33 Ibid., 70. 
34 Ibid., 59. 
35 Ibid., 75. 
36 Paul McGlasson, Jesus and Judas: Biblical Exegesis in Barth (Atlanta, Ga.: Scholars Press, 1991), 
2. 
37 Ibid., 8. 
38 Ibid., 123-26. 
39 Ibid., 133. 
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Nevertheless, in McGlasson’s estimation, Barth’s narrative reading leans to a 
dominant side of his exegesis, that is, the conceptual analyses of the text.40 This 
conceptual analysis resembles a kind of close textual reading where the text in its 
unified theme witnesses to the divine revelation i.e. “the text depicts its object.”41 
This ‘object’ is God which as such created a problem of epistemology, not primarily 
in view of the human sinfulness or the inferiority of human language, although these 
are also included, but primarily because of the unbridgeable glory of the living God 
which can only be known to the readers by the gracious presence of God, or by what 
McGlasson calls, the “analogical depiction.”42 The concept of witness gives shape to 
Barth’s focus in his exegetical procedure,  that is, the “Christocentric exegesis,” 
where in various ways the texts are interpreted conceptually (“in the light of 
Christological concepts”) or personally (“in the light of the person/character Jesus 
Christ”).43 This Christocentrism, however, creates a theological pressure on Barth’s 
exegetical decisions, such that at times it can be the source of his exegetical genius, 
but at other times, in McGlasson’s estimation, the root of his exegetical disaster.44 
Another important study along the same line is David F. Ford’s exploration of 
Barth’s interpretation of biblical narratives (under the themes of election and 
creation).45 Ford proposes that Barth’s interpretation of the narratives shapes his 
theology and provides many of its important ingredients. Ford’s work provides a 
richer account, compared to McGlasson, of Barth’s theological dynamics and 
methodological approach, and argues for the thesis that Barth’s “procedure has much 
in common with literary criticism of the genre of realistic narrative.”46 In literary 
criticism there is an insightful attempt to recover the sense of historical reality 
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without reducing it to its ostensive reference, i.e., the realization of the sense of “the 
‘Here and Now’ of our daily experience, the ‘Then and There’ of memory,… the 
deep sense of ‘happening’… which has struck, and strikes, reader after reader.”47 
This sense of factuality and actuality cannot be reduced to the meaning of the story 
or its illustrated ideas while ignoring its essential form as a narrative, and Barth’s 
approach is commendable for its quality which overcomes the methodological 
reduction of modern historical criticism.48 Barth’s “way of rendering reality is one in 
which form and content are inseparable…. The meaning is built up cumulatively and 
in an irreducible temporal form, and amount to a rich reality to which abstractions 
and generalizations cannot do full justice.”49 But while Ford highly appreciates this 
narrative rendering, he questions Barth’s Christocentric concentration of the biblical 
narratives, circled around the death and resurrection of Christ, which in his opinion 
have to do with Barth’s unnecessary theological rejection of the natural theology and 
of the role of some forms of historical falsification for theological construction.50 
Furthermore Barth’s theological concentration creates a tendency “to load the story 
of Jesus Christ with significance in such a way that it twists under the strain of its 
main character” and in this way Barth may at times, obscure the realistic or even the 
literal sense, and is restrictive in his discussion of the possibilities of the meaning of 
the biblical narratives.51 
 The strength of these proposals lies in its parallel with Barth’s engagement 
with Scripture who gives “priority to actual exegesis over hermeneutical reflection” 
and who at one time “refused to involve himself in a discussion which was purely 
about the method of exegesis.”52 Through a detailed analysis of Barth’s exegesis, one 
observes carefully the creative and insightful interactions between theological 
questions, biblical narratives, and Barth’s constructive work on Christian doctrines 
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within the context of canonical interpretation or intertextuality. However, the main 
limitation of this approach is that one cannot offer a substantial explanation on the 
way Barth’s theology can be the inner logic of his exegesis. As such one is tempted 
to search for a non-theological comparison to make sense of Barth’s hermeneutics. 
Furthermore, one may overlook a considerable body of material where Barth 
interacts with the hermeneutics of his time, and that Barth responds to the criticism 
of his exegesis hermeneutically, and reflects theologically on the task of 
interpretation. Also, as Richard E. Burnett notes, in German-speaking scholarship 
“much more serious attention has been given to Barth’s hermeneutics,” where there 
is a greater emphasis on the relationship of Barth’s hermeneutics and the way of 
understanding God’s revelation understood from within his theology.53 
More specifically, while Cunningham is correct when she warns about the 
methodological weakness of reading back Barth’s hermeneutical remarks into his 
exegesis, her proposal that Barth’s hermeneutics is simply ad hoc is not an accurate 
depiction of Barth’s hermeneutical principles. It is true that Barth’s hermeneutics 
might not bear all the characteristics of modern hermeneutics, but it is the conviction 
of our thesis that Barth’s dogmatics is not hermeneutically less sophisticated 
compared to modern hermeneutics in its depiction of what it means to read Scripture 
theologically. Also, Cunningham’s description of Barth’s attitude to historical-
critical scholarship does not give a proper emphasis of the importance of history 
because Barth’s theology is, in fact, insistent that history has a significant role in his 
theological exegesis. It is not the historical study that Barth was primarily against but 
the historicist biases commonly found among the historical approaches and the over-
confidence in its ‘scientific’ quality.54 In McGlasson’s study, the major contribution 
is his argument on Barth’s pluralistic approaches in his exegesis, and especially his 
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observation on the interrelation between narrative and conceptual analyses. But what 
makes one wonder when reading McGlasson’s analysis, however, is his 
identification of a kind of theological pressure in Barth’s exegesis, which is due more 
to his bifurcation between theology and exegetical procedures rather than in Barth’s 
theology of interpretation. This identification reflects more of McGlasson’s ideal of 
exegetical procedures which assume a non-theological presupposition to 
hermeneutical situations in the task of exegesis. It is his hermeneutical conviction of 
the plurality of meanings that makes McGlasson identify the theological pressure that 
otherwise should be recognized as the theological subject matter of the Bible as it is 
in Barth’s theological exegesis which is open to both plurality or otherwise. The 
same skepticism is found in Ford’s essay. Although his comparison between Barth’s 
approach to biblical narrative and literary criticism of realistic narrative provides an 
insighful perspective to Barth’s hermeneutics, Ford’s theological commitment to 
natural theology and historical method have made him miscalculate the theological 
integrity and originality of Barth’s hermeneutics in relation to the question of 
meaning. In this way the insight of his analysis is also its own predicament because 
he attempts to understand Barth’s narrative reading from a literary point of view 
which shadows the role of ontology and theology in Barth’s hermeneutics and their 
capacity for accommodating varieties of exegetical procedures to biblical narratives. 
Finally, in relation to historical criticism, Barth, while recognizing its limits and 
aiming to trancend it, admitted the importance of the historical authors of Scripture 
and the place of their historical settings as an important part of a true theological 
exegesis.55 Ford’s criticism of the role of historical falsification is a misplaced 
characterization of Barth’s hermeneutical weakness, which on closer inspection, 
actually plays a greater role than Ford’s discussions suggest. 
1.4. The genetic-theological proposals 
If the previous approach explores Barth’s hermeneutics from his exegesis, the 
genetic-theological approach explores Barth’s hermeneutics from his historical-
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intellectual context and in the development of his theology.56 The proposals along 
this line generally agree with Hans-Georg Gadamer’s estimation that Barth’s early 
writings, especially the first edition of the Epistle to the Romans, stand as a 
hermeneutical manifesto.57 Along this line, Eberhard Jüngel in his essay on “Barth’s 
Theological Beginning”, explores Barth’s “Theology as Metacriticism: Toward a 
Hermeneutic of Theological Exegesis”, and argues that Barth’s hermeneutics is a 
kind of metacriticism which engages historical criticism at the level of 
methodological assumptions, particularly in relation to what Barth perceives as the 
German-liberal theological biases.58 The essay is based on an analysis of Barth’s first 
three forewords to The Epistle to the Romans which explore Barth’s theological 
beginning in relation to his hermeneutics.59 Jüngel argues that Barth’s foreword is a 
declaration of “a hermeneutic of simultaneity,” that is, a hermeneutic which by-
passes historical critical insight and reads Paul as a contemporary voice.60 The core 
of this approach is a Sachkritik which focuses its critical analysis on capturing the 
subject matter of the text and an interpretation that has universal applicability.61 The 
short form of this criticism is captured in the phrase “consider well,” that is, by 
asking the right questions of the text, we could arrive at the right answers if we 
consider well the subject matter in relation to our existence as a historical being 
(“consider yourself well”), which means that historical explanation and practical 
application of the subject matter must be considered as a unity in the interpretation.62 
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Additionally, Barth’s hermeneutics does not only differ from liberal scholars but also 
from the positivist scholars in the sense that, according to Jüngel, Barth aims not to 
repeat the biblical subject matter but to rethink it in his contemporary context.63 
Barth’s hermeneutics thus involves a critical self-reflection in light of the theological 
subject matter of the text in the contemporary self-understanding of the interpreter, 
and this means, in Jüngel’s words, “consider yourself well by considering someone 
else and opening yourself to the cause he advocates.”64 Thus “Barth’s principle of 
interpretation is a hermeneutical circle between that which is understood and that 
which is to be understood.”65 Specifically, in relation to Epistle to the Romans, it 
involves a theological assumption that Paul knows what he is speaking about when 
he is speaking of God, and in this way, opens to the interpreter a critical engagement 
with the text on the divine discourse which involves not only knowledge but also 
faith in relation to the question of God.66 This hermeneutic of involvement means 
that the correct interpretation demands of the readers to participate in the subject 
matter of the text and not to stand away from the text as an indifferent observer. 
Bruce L. McCormack argues that Barth’s Epistle to the Romans constitutes a 
revolution in biblical hermeneutics of his era because in it “Barth is seeking to show 
the limit of historical-critical study of the Bible in interest of a more nearly 
theological exegesis.”67 McCormack argues that Barth’s hermeneutics was born out 
of dissatisfaction with the then general philosophical and theological assumptions of 
the German theological context and attempted to show, particularly, the limitations 
of historical-critical study by arguing that, in itself, it has set up its own limitations.68 
This strategy was employed because Barth was facing a generation of scholarship 
that saw in the historical method the only guarantee for theology to have a scientific 
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character.69 The sharp discrimination between historical and dogmatic exegesis had 
failed to recognize that historical criticism has its own ‘dogmatic’ concerns. The key 
to Barth’s hermeneutics, according to McCormack, is to understand the proper 
relationship between the event of revelation and the historical sense of the Bible. If 
this relationship could not be substantiated from within Barth’s theology, the charge 
that he is an enemy of historical criticism would be established.70 However Barth’s 
use of the analogy of faith, according to McCormack, provides a framework for such 
relationship because there is an analogical relationship between the content of God’s 
revelation and the content of human hearing of the text in faith.71 This analogical 
relationship does not mean that divine meaning is similar to human understanding 
but that in the event of revelation human understanding is conformed to divine 
revelation.72 This event of understanding lies always in the sovereignty of God in his 
revelatory event and provides a framework for Barth to accommodate the plurality of 
possible meanings, which according to McCormack, places Barth in a different 
position from that of the literary critics in this matter.73 But against any free floating 
meanings, McCormack suggests, the historical senses of the text provide a limiting 
horizon that will guard against a subjectivist’s approach and arbitrary meaning-
making. Theological exegesis starts with the historical sense that must be rectified by 
the church’s hearing of the revelatory event, but the conviction from the revelatory 
event must be guarded by the limiting horizon of the historical senses, and in turn 
this limiting horizon will be substantiated again by the hearing of the revelatory 
event, and the process continues in an unending dialectic between the historical sense 
and the conviction from revelation.74 
McCormack’s thesis is explored further by Richard E. Burnett especially in 
relation to the German scholarship on hermeneutics, particularly in relation to 
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Schleiermacher’s hermeneutical tradition.75 Burnett’s study attempts to conceptualize 
Barth’s hermeneutics in the light of what McCormack describes as Barth’s break 
with liberalism in “a more or less continuous unfolding of a single material insight or 
intention,” that is, “to ground theology in the objectively real Self-speaking of God in 
revelation.”76 This insight is placed against Schleiermacher’s tradition of empathetic 
understanding, which Barth took as the primary conversation partner, and both are 
proposed as the key elements in the development of Barth’s hermeneutical principles 
in the period when the Epistle to the Romans was written.77 Burnett argues that 
Gadamer is correct in suggesting that the first edition of the Epistle to the Romans 
was a “hermeneutical manifesto” despite “all his disaffection for methodological 
reflection,”78 because “it challenged the hegemony of a reigning hermeneutical 
tradition, that of Friedrich Schleiermacher.”79 In fact, “an important part of Karl 
Barth’s attempt to break with liberalism was his attempt to overcome 
Schleiermacher’s hermeneutical tradition.”80 Burnett’s main arguments are not very 
different from McCormack’s, but he develops in further detail the genetic-historical 
contexts of the role of the subject matter and interpreter’s involvement in the 
interpretation. He also elucidates in detail Barth’s idea on the hermeneutics of love 
(giving proper attention and respect to the author) and the role of the text of Scripture 
in the event of revelation (the concept of Scripture as witness). 
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The conclusion of these studies stands quite close to what we will attempt in 
our understanding of Barth’s hermeneutics. The great advantage of these studies is 
their ability to present Barth’s hermeneutics from within Barth’s doctrinal 
development in its original context, i.e., in the broader German intellectual tradition, 
before translating those insights to the Anglo-American scholarship, and to non-
western scholarship in general. It also grasps the detailed nuances of Barth’s 
hermeneutical remarks in the encounter, dialogue and criticism implicit within 
Barth’s hermeneutical reflections. Furthermore, while we specifically term this 
approach as the genetic-theological approach, it is quite sensitive to the inner 
dynamics of Barth’s theological thinking especially in the development of Barth’s 
theology over that early period. If there is a limitation to this approach it is that less 
attention is given to Barth’s explicit concern, i.e., to read Barth’s commentary as a 
commentary and to read Church Dogmatics as a reflection of Barth’s reading of the 
Scripture, and an understanding of the Word of God in the process. Barth’s scriptural 
expositions are more often seen as part of his theological development rather than as 
a reflection of doing the task of reading the Scripture.81 This does not mean that this 
approach does not see the theological dimension of the task, but that this theological 
dimension is not given priority or explored from within Barth’s inner theological 
dynamics. It is thus eclipsed by different concerns of the interpreters. Furthermore 
because of the focus on Barth’s historical contexts, a constructive dialogue with 
contemporary hermeneutics is given less attention.82 This is not to discount the great 
merits of this approach but only to recognize its priority, and in this sense, the limit 
of inquiry taken in comparison to other studies, as seen in focusing on the genetic-
theological aspects it has to refrain from exploring the inner dynamics of Barth’s 
theology. For example, while Burnett’s work is an excellent piece of research in 
exploring the historical context of Barth’s exegesis from the prefaces of the Epistle to 
the Romans, its attention to the prefaces limits its results from an understanding of 
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Barth’s actual exegesis in the Epistle to the Romans and Barth’s theological 
reflection on the task of interpretation. Additionally, Donald Wood questions 
whether “empathetic” is really the central theme of the Romantic tradition against 
which is the best way to explore Barth’s hermeneutics, and whether to construe 
theological exegesis over against Schleiermacher’s tradition really is the best way to 
understand Barth’s theological dynamics of what it means to read Scripture 
theologically.83 Finally, as a genetic-historical piece of research, Burnett pays little 
attention to Barth’s pastorate and its socio-political context that influenced Barth’s 
approach to the text in a substantial way. 
1.5. The theological-historical proposals 
If the previous approach concentrates on the development of Barth’s theology to 
highlight the formulation of his hermeneutical thinking, the theological-historical 
approach concentrates more on Barth’s inner theological dynamics in relation to the 
church’s task to read the Bible as Scripture, i.e., as the Word of God. This approach 
and the previous one are quite difficult to differentiate because both approaches take 
into consideration the theological and historical aspects of Barth’s hermeneutics. 
There is, however, a clear difference in their basic priority, because, while the 
genetic-historical approach concentrates its exploration on Barth’s hermeneutics in 
his historical-intellectual context and the development of his theology, the proposals 
under consideration  read Barth’s exegesis and hermeneutics primarily in the context 
of the theological understanding of the task.84 They are not particularly convinced 
with Gadamer’s estimation that Barth’s prefaces to the Epistle to the Romans 
constitute a hermeneutical manifesto. John Webster, for example, argues Gadamer’s 
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assessment on the hermeneutical manifesto is “at best only half-truth.”85 The 
concrete implication of this is to read Barth’s hermeneutics not primarily in the 
context of his historical setting, but in the context of his theology and its inner 
dynamic. The main strategy is through a close reading of Barth’s theological and 
exegetical texts, especially attentive to Barth’s immediate context that gives occasion 
to the particular text rather than to its wider cultural backgrounds. Furthermore, this 
approach takes into consideration Barth’s self-descriptive remarks that when he is 
writing a commentary, he is indeed writing a real commentary, and not a theological 
program in the form of biblical commentary.86 
 John Webster argues that Barth’s reading of Scripture was formed into a 
consistent theological exegesis through his reflection on Calvin’s theology in which 
he found a good model of theological interpretation.87 During the 1920s Barth 
realized that God “is not only textual content but also primary agent of the text’s 
realization before us.”88 The essence of Barth’s hermeneutics lies in his theology of 
Scripture especially in his reflections of the Reformed Scripture principle. As such, 
the concern of his hermeneutical remarks against historical criticism is not primarily 
a rejection of its historical method but “their expansion into a sufficient explanation 
of Scripture, their failure to envisage Scripture in terms of the relation of revelatory 
divine speech and obedient human attentiveness, and their promotion of a false 
anthropology of interpretative activity.”89 According to Webster, for Barth, 
“Exegesis is an aspect of sanctification.”90 This means that Barth’s exegesis 
maintains the two sides of Scripture, i.e. a word of witness to revelation and a 
sanctified human word. Thus the divinity and the humanity of Scripture are held 
together, because as witness “it is not identical with revelation, but an instrument 
through which the testimony of the prophet and apostles is set before us,” but as a 
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human word “it is caught up into revelation, though in such a way that it does not 
surrender its humanity.”91 Thus exegesis must conform to the nature of the Bible as a 
divinely-appointed human document with its historical character. Theological 
hermeneutics, then, is a matter of recognizing the theological discourse on the 
identity of the divine communicator, which is, a grappling with the content of divine 
communication and a proper response of human readers in relation to the theological 
subject matter.92 
 Along the same line, but more focused on Barth’s commentaries and 
historical exegesis, Francis Watson argues that Barth’s exegesis and theology are so 
closely linked that “we cannot assess Barth as theologian without assessing Barth as 
biblical interpreter. And we cannot assess Barth as biblical interpreter without 
joining him in the attempt to read the biblical texts as divinely authorized testimony 
to God’s definitive saving action in Jesus and his Spirit.”93 In Watson’s estimation 
there was a change in Barth’s exegesis during the1920s especially when we compare 
Barth’s exegesis in the Epistle to the Romans and the Epistle to the Philippians. In 
the former there is a strong emphasis on contemporary meaning at the cost of 
historical meaning, that the “interpreter must break through the historical limitations 
of [the] text in order to disclose its universal significance.”94 As a theological 
exegesis, the disjunction between what Paul said and what Paul says, is a major 
shortcoming of Barth’s earlier hermeneutics. However in the later, “the disjunction 
between then and now has been largely abandoned.”95 Not only is the scholarly 
apparatus more expansive and prominent, but more significantly, it is used to show 
that what Paul said is also crucial for what the letter speaks in the present.96 The 
subject matter of the text is now expressed in a more complex communicative action 
which involves interpersonal relationship, ethics and theological dimensions of 
Paul’s thinking in relation to his readers, which can be construed, as a movement 
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within the historical reality of the past, and then with the perspective of this past 
reality, must become a living movement again in the interpretative event of the 
modern readers.97 This living reality that continues from the past to the present, 
according to Watson, is what Barth was attempting to describe in his later 
commentaries and what he invites his readers to join in. 
 Paul T. Nimmo highlights the ethical dimension of Barth’s theological 
exegesis.98 Grounding his reading on Barth’s theological ontology and his actualism 
in biblical ethics, Nimmo proposes that exegesis, ontology and ethics are important 
ingredients for understanding Barth’s approach to interpretation. Barth’s exegesis 
gives priority to the role of divine activity which in a way disappoints any 
epistemological or methodological guarantee but also emphasizes the proper role of 
faith and hope in God’s willingness to speak afresh in the church’s activity of 
theological exegesis.99 Barth’s theological actualism means the specificity of spatial 
and historical location of God’s ethical demands, which preserves the individual 
locality and personal interaction between the exegete and God, entails that the 
relationship between the meaning of the text of Scripture and its individual ethical 
significance could not be established permanently.100 In this regard, Barth is insistent 
on the freedom of God in the text’s realization. But Nimmo argues that since there is 
no other way to construe a theological exegesis which is true to Barth’s conception 
of the dynamic encounter between the Word of God and an ethical agent, therefore, 
we must preserve both the continuity of the content of Scripture’s ethical command 
and the specificity of its application in the church’s ethical life and decision. The 
methodological shape of this way of reading takes the form of three moments of 
exegetical activity namely explicatio (observation), meditatio (reflection) and 
applicatio (appropriation).101 While distinguishing these three moments, Nimmo 
argues that, for Barth, it must be viewed as part of the totality of exegesis and none 
will be complete in itself. They are best seen in a “perichoretic” relationship with 
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one another.102 In describing this activity, Barth maintains, that in itself, theological 
exegesis is a spiritual-communal activity, which means that it necessarily coincides 
with prayer and ecclesiastical life.103 
 The most fully expanded study along this line is Donald Wood’s Barth’s 
Theology of Interpretation.104 Nevertheless, Wood does not try to provide a 
comprehensive study of Barth’s hermeneutics but simply an attempt to explain “what 
Barth had to say about the nature of the scriptural text, the identity of its readers and 
the relationship between them.”105 While Wood concentrates primarily on Barth’s 
earlier writings, his analysis concentrates on “Barth’s more explicitly hermeneutical 
moments-those places where he takes up directly the question of how we ought to 
conceive of the church’s interpretative freedoms and responsibilities before holy 
Scripture.”106 For this purpose Wood provides a close reading of Barth’s earlier 
writings on interpretation, his early commentaries and dogmatics lectures, the survey 
of modern Protestant theology and several chapters from Church Dogmatics which 
explore particular themes of theological exegesis. Wood’s main argument is that 
Barth’s approach to interpretation is theologically focused; therefore the best way to 
understand it is by concentrating on the dynamic of hermeneutical concepts internal 
to Barth’s theology rather than from a comparative study, either topically or vis-á-vis 
other hermeneutics.107 Thus in contrast to general hermeneutics and its 
methodological procedures, Barth’s hermeneutic emphasizes the importance of 
theological humility in anticipation of divine action.108 Furthermore, Barth’s 
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theology describes Scripture not primarily as a human text, with its hermeneutical 
implications, but theologically as a witness, which is the locus of divine discourse in 
God’s freedom and in God’s salvific action.109 In this context the reader is not 
construed as an autonomous agent, able to exercise a reading free from human 
distortions, but precisely as a creature under the judgement of God, who alone is able 
to strip off the idols of human imagination, thus, the most proper form of theological 
exegesis is prayer.110 
1.6. Conclusion: a dogmatic approach 
The line of analyses taken in the last proposals is the closest one to what will be 
pursued in our thesis. The strength of this approach is obvious. In giving priority to 
theology it patiently charts Barth’s exegesis within the dynamic of his creative 
theological moments. It takes seriously Barth’s exegesis as a real exegesis rather than 
a theology in the disguise of commentary and considers seriously the claim that the 
Church Dogmatics is a genuine theological reflection on Scripture rather than a 
philosophy in the disguise of theology. Various lines of analysis in the proposals 
along this line constitute the best way to construe Barth’s hermeneutics. The 
limitation of this approach is that it generally gives less attention to Barth’s actual 
dialogue with his cultural surroundings; a dialogue that may prove fruitful for 
Barth’s continuing contribution to wider issues in hermeneutics. Furthermore, there 
is one particular approach to Scripture we would like to move beyond some of the 
proponents of this approach. Watson and Webster construe their approach in what 
might be called hermeneutics within the concept of Scripture in relation to God’s 
economic act to humanity.111 We however will propose a theological analysis that 
engages with the ontological being of Scripture in relation to Barth’s Trinitarian 
ontology as has been suggested by McCormack.112 This ontology is formed by 
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112 See particularly, Bruce L. McCormack, "The Being of Holy Scripture Is in Becoming," in 
Evangelicals & Scripture: Tradition, Authority, and Hermeneutics (Downers Grove, Ill.: InterVarsity 
Press, 2004), 55-75. 
36 
 
theological material of Barth’s dogmatics and in turn informs Barth’s theological 
decisions. But certain aspects of this hermeneutical circle are best described from the 
point of view of ethics. While our argument will be structured as the ontological, 
theological and ethical, the material content of the argument is the distinctive 
approach of Barth’s theology in coordinating several doctrinal loci for construing 
biblical hermeneutics.   
 In this thesis we term our approach a dogmatic approach to Karl Barth’s 
hermeneutics. It aims to construe Barth’s hermeneutics by elucidating the way in 
which his theology coordinating several doctrinal loci for the task. Ontology in this 
sense is not a doctrine of being separated from theology. The doctrines provide the 
material insights for construing the vision of reality within which the act of scriptural 
reading is taking place. In this regard, the doctrines of Trinity, Christology and 
election in Karl Barth’s theology provide the formal and the material constitution of 
such ontological construal. The theology of interpretation is thus construed as an 
elaboration of the doctrine of the Word of God in relation to the witness of the 
Scripture. Since, for Barth, God and the Word of God are not two things but one, the 
Word of God as the subject matter of the Scripture is essentially the communicative 
and commanding presence of God in church reading of the Bible. Thus, such 
construal, while not restrictive of methodology of exegesis, is more appropriately 
elucidated in terms of ethics of interpretation. The dogmatic approach as proposed in 
this work shows how doctrines are coordinated in construing Barth’s theological 
hermeneutics and is structured as the ontology, theology and ethics of interpretation. 
Furthermore, there is a valid place for studies where the insights of Barth’s 
theology are brought into conversation with important insights of general 
hermeneutics. This conversation will certainly bring to light various dimensions of 
Barth’s hermeneutics that will be stay hidden without it. It can be suggested that 
Barth’s text itself anticipates some of the hermeneutical dialogues and it is not 
necessarily alien to the facticity of the subject matter of Barth’s theology.113 This is 
to say that we anticipate the limits of inquiry on our own analyses. Various 
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contributions and approaches are necessary ingredients for a complete picture of 
Barth’s hermeneutics. In this regard, our approach will be a contribution to a further 
conversation in this area. Specifically, our study is carried only along the line of the 
dogmatic approach with its own specific theological aims and with its own particular 
limitations. This not to say that the thesis will have nothing to say to comparative 
concerns in the study of hermeneutics, but insofar as it does, it will bear the mark of 
an engagement from a specifically theological perspective. In this way we hope to 
avoid what we often found in such comparative studies, that is, the flattening out of 
Barth’s dogmatic material to make it domesticated for easy comparison. Only with a 
true appreciation of Barth’s theological dynamic within his dogmatic exposition can 
a real conversation be taking place. This study is a first step toward such objective. In 
the next part we will define in more detail the sense in which we use the terms 
ontology, theology and ethics, and the theological imports of such terms in this work. 
2. Defining the task of theological interpretation of Scripture 
In the study of hermeneutics, the term ontology of understanding is primarily used as 
the phenomenological description of the human experience of understanding. It is 
viewed as a primordial event of existence. As Paul Ricœur argues, the primordiality 
of hermeneutical phenomenology lies in its ontology of being that is anterior to the 
subject-object relationship of the epistemology of knowledge.114 It explores human 
understanding at a precognitive level, i.e., a level of understanding prior to the 
conceptual formulation of the natural or human sciences and their respective 
methodological convictions. At the ontological level, it nullifies the competition of 
the two sciences, or the current priority given to the natural sciences. It attempts to 
grasp the horizon of experience in what it believes the primitive form of 
Lebenswelt.115 Either this ideal is achieved by a leap of the mode of being (as in 
Husserl and Heidegger) or by a semantic long-route, which gives room for the place 
of method to initiate symbolic senses (as Ricœur suggests),116 the aim is, 
nevertheless, the ontological description of the primordial experience of 
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understanding. This aim can be carried with either a full confidence of its plausibility 
or with a judicious reservation in its ability to describe reality at an ontological level.  
Barth, on the other hand, questions this form of transcendental ontology, 
specially its anthropological presuppositions, and describes an event of 
understanding that incorporates human understanding to the theological description 
of God-human relationship without neglecting its fullest and various human 
expressions. He does not reject the necessity of interpretation, but the reason for this 
necessity is not the subjectivity of human existence, but because “God’s Word has 
come to us in the form of human words.”117 This necessity enters reality by the 
eternal decision of God to become the God who incarnates, whereby, the Word of 
God enters creation, and places himself in the interpretative sphere of human 
discourse. For Barth, this is the most ‘primordial’ event because the event of 
understanding originates in the triune being of God, anterior even to the primitive 
form of human Lebenswelt. Thus meaning and understanding are not primarily the 
expressions of human symbols, meaning and imagination, but an expression of the 
freedom of God to be the God who presents God-self in the ordinary function of 
human language, while taking into consideration its irreducibly semantic, historical 
and existential field of meanings.118 
  Barth’s ontology of hermeneutical discourse is a theological description of 
reality which subsumes the whole dynamic of human understanding under a 
theological perspective of reality, that is, God’s created world. In its crucial sense, it 
is a reversal of the modern hermeneutics which begins with Schleiermacher that 
subsumes theological interpretation as a special application of general hermeneutics. 
Modern hermeneutics have pushed the church’s reading of Scripture into a situation 
where its confidence in the capacity of doctrine to guide its interpretation is not only 
questioned but mostly disqualified, and, as such, it is obliged to be supported by 
some sort of general hermeneutics.119  The critical problem of such a requirement is 
the problematic conviction that any theological thinking of God could not begin 
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without explicating first the conditions of human understanding and the modern 
prejudice that a preconceived theological conviction stands in the way of a truthful 
interpretation.120 While an exploration of such conditions has its own rightful place, 
its status as a prerequisite for church reading has given an unnecessary 
transcendental role to general hermeneutics and in many ways has a delimiting effect 
on the spiritual dimension of the act of reading as a theological exercise. In contrast, 
Barth argues that it is the theological reality of God that makes the church’s reading 
of the Scripture a particular event, which expresses the true nature of the church as a 
creature of the Word of God. John Webster argues that, for Barth, “the presence of 
Jesus Christ the risen one… undermines the necessity of large-scale hermeneutical 
theory as an essential prerequisite for making the gospel meaningful.”121 One’s 
reflection on human understanding must be carried with a healthy dose of 
seriousness, and theological description of interpretation must be fully confident with 
the role of doctrine in guiding the church’s reading of Scripture. 
The ethical expression of this theological conviction is not, as such, a 
repression of freedom that necessitates interpreters to have a rigid attitude by always 
being in agreement with the text.122 The response of modern-critical scholarship to 
this “theological” pressure was one of the original moral impulses behind the rise of 
liberalism. One of the ethical virtues of liberal theology is its “earnest search for 
radical truth,” that is, the freedom from ‘dogma’ by way of historical-critical 
research, that as such it hopes to arrive at the true knowledge of Jesus Christ and its 
implications for Christian faith.123 This important development, however, is not 
accompanied by the crucial awareness that historical research has only a “relative 
validity” and as such cannot serve as the foundation of faith and truth.124 It only goes 
half-way to the truth, that is, a freedom from dogmatic delimitations. It is this self-
awareness, of its liberal heritage and limitations, according to Bultmann, which had 
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driven Barth to a critical investigation of his liberal heritage and to a reconsideration 
of the Christian truth by a fresh examination of the relationship between faith and 
history.125 Barth later realized that liberalism was not free enough to consider the 
possibility of freedom under the Word of God, which aimed at a level of freedom 
purer than liberalism had been satisfied with. This helps make some sense of why 
Barth proposes the ethical foundation of Christian hermeneutics under the discourse 
on freedom, i.e., a purer freedom by the grace of God.126 This freedom has all the 
ingredients of what might be called the freedom of human conscience, but the 
essence of it is the freedom for the Word of God over against freedom from it. This 
does not mean that the interpreter must always agree with the text of Scripture but 
that the interpreter should have an ethical attitude to be always in agreement with the 
truth, or as Barth puts it, to be free under and for the Word of God, that is, a 
theological attitude born of a conviction that the divine grace is the source of the 
freedom and truth, and therefore that obedience and responsibility are the freest 
ethical forms of the interpretative ethos.127 
 These three great themes, ontology, theology and ethics, are presented here as 
constituting the structure of Barth’s hermeneutics. More importantly, our elaboration 
is materially informed by Barth’s first order dogmatic exposition, i.e., theological 
exegesis and more explicitly by his second order dogmatic expositions, i.e., 
theological analysis. As such, these themes are used as the structure of Karl Barth’s 
hermeneutics in a way that reflects the inner dynamic of Barth’s theology and at the 
same time generates a fruitful conversation on theological hermeneutics in which 
theology can also contribute to wider discussion on general hermeneutics.  The 
following part is devoted to the task of clarification. We will present elaborate 
definitions of what we mean by ontology, theology and ethics, and of hermeneutics 
and its sub-species. 
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3. Defining ontology, theology and ethics 
Ontology, as a field of philosophy, encompasses the study of reality, its features, the 
philosophical assumptions in describing such reality, and the way in which such a 
task can be achieved, i.e., its methodology and its limitations. In using this 
terminology to describe Barth’s hermeneutics and exegesis we do not propose that 
Barth has a separate ontology from which he constructs his hermeneutic. Barth does 
not have this kind of ontology,128 and it is his conviction that such an isolated 
ontology is not plausible as the task of dogmatics.129 Barth makes ontological 
description in response to the task of the theological exposition of the Word of God 
and other doctrines. In other words, it is a theological ontology that frames Barth’s 
hermeneutics as he describes the meaning of the Word of God. In this context, what 
we propose as Barth’s ontology of hermeneutics is the dogmatic exposition of the 
threefold form of the Word of God. It is termed “ontology” in our argument because, 
by implication, it describes the reality of meaning and understanding, though 
conceptualized from a strictly theological point of view. It is understood strictly in 
the context of the event of the Word of God, and as such explicates its nature in 
itself, in preaching and in Scripture. 
 A clarification of the term hermeneutics and its sub-species is in order. 
According to Werner G. Jeanrond, hermeneutics can be broadly defined as a 
“reflection upon the conditions and possible methods of the human understanding of 
texts.”130 It is quite common to differentiate between hermeneutics and interpretation, 
the subject matter of hermeneutics, and between hermeneutics and epistemology, 
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which is concerned with the method of acquiring knowledge in general.131 
Hermeneutics may include a discussion on epistemological method, and in recent 
development it took over a significant amount of epistemological responsibilities, but 
it is generally more focused on a discourse of understanding beyond methodological 
procedures.132 Hermeneutics becomes an important subject, not least in theology, 
because of the conviction that human understanding is ultimately textually mediated. 
Whether the text is written, verbal or non-verbal, Kevin Vanhoozer argues that “we 
have no non-linguistic access to the way things really are.”133 On the other hand 
exegesis is generally understood as a critical investigation of specifically written 
texts.134 At one level it involves the study of historical, cultural, and linguistic 
dimensions of the text, but at another level it also involves an attempt to understand 
the meaning of the text, its significance and relevance to the contemporary world. 
However, what is sometimes absent from such definitions is the fact that the term 
‘understanding’ does not mean the same thing to everyone.135 The same case can be 
argued in relation to the concepts of meaning, significance and relevance. On many 
occasions, these terms are used, whether consciously or unconsciously, with some 
sets of phenomenological assumptions that place themselves as the transcendental 
presuppositions of human existence.136 Theological hermeneutics, without ignoring 
the way hermeneutics is understood in general, aims at describing what it means to 
read the Scripture as the Word of God theologically without necessarily having to 
burden itself with the prerequisite of making a foundational inquiry into the 
philosophical construction of human understanding, but rather as Webster rightly 
argues, it is “a matter of making a Christian theological construal of the field of 
reality within which such reading occurs.”137 This does not mean our exposition of 
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Barth’s hermeneutics will not find continuity and discontinuity of themes and 
reflections in relation to the text, reader and author as commonly found in general 
hermeneutics, but such comparative interests will not be the main focus of our thesis, 
rather, it is a more theologically focused thesis on Barth’s hermeneutics. 
   “Theology” as it is used in this thesis refers primarily to the discourse on 
Christian critical self-understanding of its doctrines as it is initiated by the event of 
the Word of God. Theology is not simply a collection of theological propositions, nor 
simply an expression of human existence, nor simply a communal language in a 
specific faith-culture, i.e., a grammar of Christian community.138 It may have 
dimensions that could be described in such fashions, and it has been understood 
primarily so in some theological proposals.139 It is true that Christian theology 
contains propositional truth, but it is not proposition as a first order discourse 
summative of the gospel, but as a second order explication of the gospel and its 
ecclesiastical proclamation. Theology is not simply an existential description of 
human religious experience, although it describes the content of the divine discourse 
as the One who is for humanity, and therefore implies a theoretical description of 
what it means to exist as a human being i.e. to be human is to participate in God’s 
redemptive drama. Theology is not simply a description of the faith of the church, 
although it is properly called the ‘science’ of the church, with its unique theological 
grammar that as such does not need to oblige itself to satisfy the criteria of the wider 
modern scientific endeavour, though not necessarily be at odds with it, but it sets its 
own norms in accordance with the church’s function and responsibility as a creature 
of the Word of God.140 In our dogmatic description of Barth’s hermeneutics, we 
perform our work as a theological task which means that “theology demands 
theological perception, theological thought and theological involvement”.141 
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 The final term, ethics, is generally understood as a critical reflection of the 
noetic, deontological and telic dimensions of human dispositions and actions as a 
response to the question of what is good. As it is applied in hermeneutical studies it 
is generally more focused on the ethics of method that is defined as “a second order 
methodological reflection on the ethos and morals of biblical studies.”142 The point 
of the exercise is about the morality of legitimate interpretation for using particular 
approaches (methods) in biblical interpretation. Nevertheless, without ignoring the 
development in the dialogue between ethics and hermeneutics,143 our use of the term 
will be more restrictive to ethics as a dimension of dogmatics in Karl Barth’s 
theology. As such, ethics is not simply an implication of theological reflection, i.e. 
ethics that is inspired by theology,144 but ethics under the conviction that “Christian 
dogmatics is inherently ethical dogmatics.”145 Thus ethic is not as a supplement to 
theology, and it is explored within the conviction that “dogmatics, precisely because 
its theme is the encounter of God and humanity, is from the beginning moral 
theology.”146 In this context, the being and identity of God, as understood 
theologically, shapes the being and identity of the interpreter. As such human action 
is ordered around her identity as a person in the presence of God who addresses her 
in his decision to be God for humanity. Ethics is being-in-action as an 
implementation of a theological anthropology in response to God’s decision to 
address humanity in the salvific event. In other words, human moral action follows 
the Christological determination of God’s communicative action. To define ethics 
this way is not to ignore the themes and discussions in the general conversation of 
the study of ethics, but that in entering such conversation this thesis engages it in a 
consciously theological perception of the task. 
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 These definitions, which include our theological paradigm of the terms, will 
be employed in the arguments of this study.  Our argument is not only to put forward 
the form of Karl Barth’s hermeneutics, but to propose that several doctrinal loci are 
interrelated in such a construal. This in turn will be proposed as the form in which we 
can engage in the modern task of theological hermeneutics. As a paradigm, we 
propose that different approaches to theological interpretation of Scripture constitute 
not only different anthropology of interpretation but more deeply, a difference in the 
ontology of interpretation. A different ontology results in a different approach in 
interpretation, and this difference is not just a matter of methodology, but in a 
broader context, it is also a matter of the ethics of interpretation.  In the next chapter 
we will show how these themes were developed in the early period of his theological 
exegesis and how they are shaped by the material development of his theology.
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Chapter III: Karl Barth’s Hermeneutics and Exegesis in the Early 
Period 
 
Barth’s hermeneutical approach in the early period1 was the outcome of his intensive 
and critical engagements with two sets of texts: the biblical text, especially the New 
Testament, and the confessional texts of the Reformed tradition.2 The shape of 
hermeneutics that come from these textual engagements is a variety of exegetical 
approaches that are generated by his understanding of the textual subject matter. For 
example, in The Resurrection of the Dead,3 Barth sees that the resurrection of Christ 
is the key to unlock the meaning of Paul’s pastoral exhortations.  At another 
occasion, Barth employs the interpersonal relationship between Paul and his 
addressee as the context for Paul’s theological admonitions.4 Barth’s exegesis is thus 
marked by a certain flexibility and creativity. However, despite this creativity, we 
will argue in this chapter that there are certain ontological convictions, theological 
themes and ethical deliberations that are generated by his reading of the texts and in 
turn shape the practice of his theological exegesis. 
At the beginning of his textual engagements, Barth’s hermeneutics is more 
akin to instinctive perceptions of what is the right theological reading of the 
Scripture. But it was later on elucidated in explicit terms through his engagement 
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with Reformed confessional documents. Reading across Barth’s interpretation of 
these documents and informed by his occasional lectures during the period, we will 
argue for what is the basic form of Barth’s theological hermeneutics. The basic form 
is a procedure of biblical interpretation that is shaped by an ontology of God’s 
communicative presence, generated by Trinitarian theology and the Reformed 
Scripture principle and performed in an ethic of reading inherent in such onto-
theology. This formulation provides the form of the argument of our overall thesis 
and will be elaborated in the following chapters. It is not only a matter of the 
dimensions of his hermeneutics, but also how they are interrelated in a way that 
profoundly shapes his theological exegesis. The burden of this chapter is to show 
how these themes arise in Barth’s early writings and how they provide a framework 
for our constructive proposal of how to construe Barth’s theological hermeneutics, 
and how this will in turn help to shape our contemporary paradigm of theological 
hermeneutics. 
Specifically, we will argue that Barth’s hermeneutics was taking shape in a 
period that was intensely “textual and exegetical” rather than, as sometimes assumed, 
confrontational. Barth’s confrontations with other theologians played an important 
role in Barth’s early development; but it must be emphasized that his textual 
engagements had a greater and more lasting impact in shaping Barth’s theology and 
hermeneutical convictions. It is our contention that Barth’s preoccupations with 
exegesis of Scripture and interpretation of Reformed documents are the critical 
contexts for understanding his hermeneutics. First of all, his intensive biblical 
exegesis provided stimulus for a reflective description of what it means to interpret 
the Bible as Scripture, i.e., not just as a text in general terms.5 These lessons were 
enriched and found a further substantial elucidation by his study of the Reformed 
tradition, especially the Reformed Scripture principle, found in the confessions and 
Calvin’s theological writings.6 Barth did not first formulate his hermeneutical 
principles and then construct a methodological approach for his exegesis. On the 
                                                 
5 Barth, The Epistle to the Romans, 12. To call it an intensive study is only half way to reflecting what 
was a very frantic time of studying and writing biblical commentaries, not to include Barth’s own 
habit to do a serious biblical research for his sermon preparations.  
6 Webster, The Domain of the Word: Scripture and Theological Reason, 67. 
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contrary, his procedure was to start with the exegesis of Scripture, and while 
concentrating on the content of the Scripture, he reflected on what can be said 
theologically of such activities. To his great satisfaction, the material content of the 
Reformed tradition provided the stimulus and the proper theological elucidation for 
what it means to read the Scripture theologically. 
 These two tasks, theological exegesis and analysis of theological traditions, 
occupied most of the academic work of Barth’s professorship in the 1920’s in 
Göttingen and Münster, and in the early 1930’s in Bonn. While these were not the 
only activities of Barth’s academic life, these two tasks occupied much of his 
thinking and writings such that no interpretation of Barth’s early theology will be 
accurate without giving serious attention to these aspects.7 Yet, as Webster rightly 
observes, “Barth’s exegetical lectures have had remarkably little impact on the 
interpretation of his work.”8 Instead many interpreters focus primarily on the 
philosophical, socio-cultural or political backgrounds of his theological exegesis. 
Even though these approaches are fruitful for understanding Barth’s earlier theology, 
they “failed to give a sufficient account of the fact that in Göttingen and beyond 
Barth’s mind was crammed with Scripture and with the texts and ideas he had 
discovered in Calvin, Zwingli and others.”9 
Most of the studies on the early Barth commonly focus on the occasional 
writings between the Epistle to the Romans Commentary and the Church Dogmatics, 
usually based on the papers in The Word of God and the Word of Man,10 Theology 
and Church,11 at times with the amplification of Fides Quarens Intellectum12 and, 
                                                 
7 Webster, Barth's Earlier Theology: Four Studies, 1. 
8 Webster, The Domain of the Word: Scripture and Theological Reason, 66. 
9 Webster, Barth's Earlier Theology: Four Studies, 2. 
10 An earlier translation is Karl Barth, The Word of God and the Word of Man, trans. Douglas Horton 
(New York: Harper, 1957). A new translation is Karl Barth, The Word of God and Theology, trans. 
Amy Marga (London: T&T Clark, 2011). Our reference will be mainly based on the later translation.  
11 Karl Barth, Theology and Church: Shorter Writings, 1920-1928, trans. Louise Pettibone (London: 
SCM Press, 1962). 
12 Karl Barth, Anselm, Fides Quaerens Intellectum: Anselm's Proof of the Existence of God in the 
Context of His Theological Scheme (London: SCM Press, 1960). 
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more rarely, Die Christliche Dogmatik,13 and approach these writings simply as a 
transitional document without a distinctive insight in their own right.14 The image of 
Barth as the result of such an approach is one in which Barth is pictured as a 
dissident theological voice while eclipsing the important aspect of Barth’s formative 
period wherein he was attracted to take the role of the church’s theologian i.e. one 
who offers a constructive theological voice built upon his exegetical works and 
analyses of the church’s traditions.15 This misguided paradigm is further enhanced by 
a misconception that what can be known about Barth’s hermeneutics could be 
isolated to the Romans era (1919-1922), especially in the prefaces, while overlooking 
the development of his exegetical practices in other works (e.g. Philippians, 1 
Corinthians, and John) and his rediscovery of the Reformed doctrine of Scripture.16 
The outcome was that various concepts of Barth’s hermeneutics that were 
theologically reductive and abstract, perceiving Barth mainly as ‘a failed product’ of 
his intellectual culture, were eclipsing his theological and ethical concerns regarding 
reading the Bible as Scripture. It is our contention that in the earlier period Barth had 
already worked out a proper theological coordination between the theological 
emphasis of the divine sovereignty in revelation and the human-moral responsibility 
in the face of the divine ethical summons, and its implication for theological 
reasoning on the relationship between the communicative event of God’s presence 
and the dynamic of the human agency, in Scripture and in the interpretation of 
Scripture.17 This is not only a feature of Barth’s later theology but something that 
already took its shape in his early works. Therefore, Barth’s early hermeneutics was 
already marked by his theological convictions about the Bible, the ontological 
assumptions of such convictions (on revelation, divine presence and human history) 
and the ethical implications for human response to the divine revelatory presence. 
                                                 
13 Karl Barth, Die Christliche Dogmatik Im Entwurf, ed. Gerhard Sauter, Gesamtausgabe (Zürich: 
Theologischer Verlag, 1982). 
14 Webster, Barth's Earlier Theology: Four Studies, 3. 
15 Ibid. 
16 Webster, The Domain of the Word: Scripture and Theological Reason, 67. 
17 Webster, Barth's Earlier Theology: Four Studies, 4. 
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This chapter consists of three analyses of Barth’s exegetical practices and 
their hermeneutical implications for the task of biblical interpretation. Our analysis is 
based on Barth’s engagement with the text of Scripture and on his preoccupation 
with the Reformed tradition. The primary purpose is to provide an historical sketch 
of Barth’s exegetical practices and hermeneutical convictions in the early period with 
the aim of formulating the basic shape of the ontological, theological and ethical 
dimensions of Barth’s early hermeneutics.18 Our first analysis outlines Barth’s 
exegetical practices by taking his second edition of the Epistle to the Romans as 
paradigmatic to sketch the basic picture of his exegesis, particularly in comparison to 
the common practice of historical-critical exegesis of his day. Secondly, the analysis 
is explicated further by the analysis of his later exegeses in the 1920s, mainly in 
connection with I Corinthians, Philippians and the Gospel of John, to provide a 
sense of a wider picture of Barth’s early exegesis and the theological convictions 
behind it. We will argue that the Gospel of John provides a more complete picture of 
his biblical interpretation which can be arranged in the themes of ontological, 
theological and ethical dimensions of hermeneutics. Thirdly we will provide an 
outline of the theological, ontological and ethical dimensions of Barth’s exegesis and 
hermeneutics in the early period, informed by a reading of his occasional lectures 
that explored biblical interpretation, but were based primarily on his hermeneutical 
reflections in his lectures on the Reformed tradition which took place around the 
same time. The conclusion of this chapter will show the interrelation of these themes 
based on the analyses of this chapter. 
1. Barth’s exegesis and hermeneutics in the Epistle to the Romans 
Barth’s exegesis in the Epistle to the Romans reveals his procedure of biblical 
interpretation that remained the same in its basic outline, even though it continued to 
develop in its elucidation of the relationship between text, history and revelation, as 
                                                 
18 There were quite a number of commentaries written by Barth in the 1920s, in the course of his 
ministry in Safenwil and during his professorship in Göttingen and Münster. Five have been translated 
into English, i.e. Romans, I Corinthians, Philippians, John (chapter 1) and recently Ephesians (See 
Ross McGowan Wright, Karl Barth’s Academic Lectures on Ephesians. Göttingen, 1921–22: An 
Original Translation, Annotation, and Analysis (unpublished PhD thesis, St Andrews University, 
2006)). But there are several others, e.g. Colossians, James, 1 John and the Sermon of the Mount, that 
were delivered during 1920s as part of the one-hour course in the New Testament exegesis. Cf. Karl 
Barth, Witness to the Word, a Commentary on John 1, trans. Geoffrey W. Bromiley (Grand Rapids: 
Eerdmans, 1986), ix. 
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shaped by his constant engagement with Scripture. Webster perceptively observes 
that Barth’s early exegesis is “a complex arrangement of historical and textual 
comment, paraphrase, theological reflection and application, all ordered toward the 
task of explicating the Sache of the apostle’s address.”19 It consists of two basic 
steps: a historical-critical exploration and an attempt at understanding. The first step, 
the historical exegesis, establishes “what is there” in the text “by means of translation 
and paraphrasing the Greek words and phrases in the corresponding modern 
language by means of philological, archaeological exposition of the results so 
achieved, and by means of a more or less plausible ordering of the individual 
elements according to historical and psychological pragmatism.”20 In this regard 
Barth admits that he never had any illusion of contributing new insights to the field 
but rather “to sit attentively at the feet of such scholars as Jülicher, Lietzmann, Zahn, 
Kühl, and their predecessors Tholuck, Meyer, B. Weiss, and Lipsius.”21 The second 
step is the interpretation of the meaning of the text, i.e., to understand the author (i.e. 
Paul) and the text as an encounter with the Word of God through written human 
words.22 In this step Barth attempts to re-think the text in his theological context, and 
to press forward to the point where he can understand that, “the riddle of the subject 
matter and no longer merely the riddle of the document as such, where I can almost 
forget that I am not the author, where I have almost understood him so well that I let 
him speak in my name, and can myself speak in his name.”23 These two steps are 
explained in more detail in the following analysis. 
1.1. The first step: historical exegesis 
In the first step, Barth made use of the important historical-critical resources that 
were common in the contemporary scholarly field. Although Barth did not contribute 
new historical findings (as it was not his aim), he critically engaged with 
conservative and liberal scholars in his exegesis. He recounted this scholarly 
                                                 
19 Webster, Barth's Earlier Theology: Four Studies, 13. 
20 Karl Barth, "Foreword to the Second Edition," in The Beginnings of Dialectic Theology, ed. James 
M. Robinson (Richmond: John Knox Press, 1968), 91. 
21 Ibid., 92. 




engagement in his letter to Thurneysen to whom he shared his question about the 
worth of the significant amount of the historical materials.24 The style of his 
commentary is one that resembles a homily in the church. However, among the 
critical notes, one finds discussions on textual criticisms, the use of lexica, other 
translations, and commentaries (including books on Pauline studies). These notes, 
mostly ignored in the study of Barth’s hermeneutics and exegesis, reflect something 
quite important on what happened in Barth’s personal studies and suggests that some 
more rigorous works had actually been done. At the very least, these notes show 
something significant about Barth’s attitude to historical criticism and his theological 
convictions, especially considering that these efforts were made by a village pastor, 
who was not an academic lecturer, and lacked the luxury of academic conversation, 
time and resources, though he was not lacking in the quality of scholarly thinking.25 
Barth never intended to leave behind historical criticism for the sake of spiritual 
interpretation. In the following we will provide some commentaries on the notes that 
can be found in the commentary. 
The first note is the discussion of the New Testament Greek text. There are 
two basic features of Barth’s textual engagement. First, Barth wrote his own German 
translation (from the original Greek) and provides several short explanations of his 
textual decisions. Second, among the available Greek texts, he used the Nestle’s 
Greek text, which according to Bruce M. Metzger, “represents the state of nineteenth 
century scholarship,”26 as the basis of his translation. When Barth deviated from the 
main text and instead used its variants, he provided explanations for favouring a 
variant reading.27 Barth makes clear that his purpose is not to provide a better 
translation than what were already available in the scholarly works. He had a more 
                                                 
24 Karl Barth, Karl Barth-Eduard Thurneysen Briefwechsel, Band I: 1913-1921 (Zürich: 
Theologischer Verlag, 1973), 461-63. 
25 Not only did Barth study in the best universities in German and Switzerland, he was also an 
assistant editor of a leading theological journal in Marburg, the Christliche Welt, from 1918 to 1919. 
See Busch, Karl Barth, His Life from Letters and Autobiographical Texts, 46ff. 
26 Bruce M. Metzger, The Text of the New Testament: Its Transmission, Corruption and Restoration 
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1964), 144. 
27 Cf. Barth, "Foreword to the Second Edition," in The Beginnings of Dialectic Theology, 98.  See also 
Edwyn C. Hoskyns, “The Translator’s Preface,” in Barth, The Epistle to the Romans, xiv. Hoskyns 
argues that Barth was modifying Luther’s German version as the template for his translation. 
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modest goal, that is, to combine the standard Greek text and the standard German 
translation (Luther’s translation) to help him, and his readers, to understand Paul and 
the rest of the Bible better.28 More importantly, Barth was not always satisfied with 
these translations, which have their differences. But his reason was more 
fundamental, because they did not always make good sense in the light of his 
understanding of the subject matter, especially the sense they gave to Paul’s theology 
as a whole in relation to particular verses. For example, Barth decided to retain a 
Greek word (a second νῦν) in Rom 11:31 because it fits better with the 
“eschatological tension” of the whole passage.29 At another place, Barth considered 
“the more recent textual critical studies,” and in conjunction with a “further 
exegetical reflection,” Barth provides his reason for revising the textual decisions of 
the first edition.30 His procedure forms a hermeneutical circle: the text provides the 
basis for his understanding of the subject matter, and the subject matter in turn 
informs and modifies the way the text is translated and revised. This process creates 
a circle between the text and the content, and the way they interacted in Barth’s 
textual discussions. However, it is the content of the text that was always decisive for 
Barth’s textual decisions and translations. 
There are seventeen textual notes in the first edition of the Epistle to the 
Romans. Twelve of them are retained in the second edition, and the other five are 
either modified or conform to the Nestle text.31 Additionally, Barth adds nine 
footnotes to the second edition, and all of them are either in relation to his deviation 
from the Nestle text or his decision to take a more debateable reading of the Nestle 
                                                 
28 Barth explains that his translation is made in comparison with other commentaries, and from the 
notes he provides, these commentaries are, among others, those of J.T. Beck, Erklärung des Briefes 
Pauli an die Römer (Gütersloh: C. Bertelsmann, 1884), Theodor Zahn, Der Brief des Paulus an die 
Römer, Kommentar zum Neuen Testament, vol. 6 (Leipzig: A. Deichert, 1910), Ernst Kühl, Der Brief 
des Paulus an die Römer (Leipzig: Quelle & Meyer, 1913), Adolf Jülicher, Der Brief an die Römer 
(Göttingen: Vandenhoeck un Ruprecht, 1907), and Hans Lietzmann, Einfüuhrung in die 
Textgeschichte der Paulusbriefe an die Römer, Handbuch zum Neuen Testament vol.8, 2nd ed. 
(Tübingen: J.C.B. Mohr, 1910). Cf. David P. Henry, The Early Development of the Hermeneutic of 
Karl Barth as Evidenced by His Appropriation of Romans 5:12-21 (Macon, GA: Mercer University 
Press, 1985), 59. 
29 Barth, The Epistle to the Romans, 417. 
30 Ibid., 522. 
31 Henry, The Early Development of the Hermeneutic of Karl Barth as Evidenced by His 
Appropriation of Romans 5:12-21, 160. 
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variants.32 Adolf Jülicher, a respected New Testament scholar, commented that Barth 
“chose poorly” when he made a textual criticism.33 Barth himself admitted that he is 
“notoriously incompetent” in this matter.34 So why did he insist on making his own 
textual decisions and including some textual notes? The chief reason is that, 
informed by his understanding of the subject matter, Barth was convinced that the 
Nestle text does not provide the best textual decision for the subject matter. For 
Barth, even the best textual decision does not provide an exhaustive answer to the 
theological question of the text. On a more practical level, Barth explains that the 
notes are there to notify the place where he deviates from Nestle so those who 
consult the Nestle text can recognize it and follow the flow of his commentary.35 
Thus, while acknowledging his limitations, Barth remains an independent interpreter 
in regard to textual variations. On the other hand, Barth contends that if given a good 
ground he is “always ready to be corrected.”36 He is not insistent in his textual 
decision, but on the other hand he does not resign from the requirement that as a 
theologian he has to make a responsible textual decision. Nevertheless, Barth’s 
acknowledgement and Jülicher’s critique show that this is not a strength of Barth’s 
commentary; in fact it is where the commentary is open for improvement by the 
progress of historical-critical research. 
Secondly, in regard to the Greek lexicon, Barth used the best available lexica 
for his exegesis i.e. the Cremer-Kögel’s lexicon.37 Cremer’s lexicon was based on the 
classical Greek and published before the monumental works of Adolf Deissmann’s 
Bible Studies (1895, ET 1901) and Light from Ancient East (1909, ET 1910).38 These 
two works, at the time they were published, transformed the world of New Testament 
                                                 
32 Ibid. 
33 Adolf Jülicher, "A Modern Interpreter of Paul," in The Beginnings of Dialectic Theology, ed. James 
M. Robinson (Richmond: John Knox Press, 1968), 75. 
34 Barth, "Foreword to the Second Edition," in The Beginnings of Dialectic Theology, 98. 
35 Ibid. 
36 Ibid. 
37 Barth, Karl Barth-Eduard Thurneysen Briefwechsel, Band I: 1913-1921, 146. This lexicon, the 
Biblisch-theologisches Wörterbuch der neutestamentlichen Gräcität, 1866, revised by Julius Kögel 
in1915, was the most widely used lexicon by Swiss and German biblical scholars at that time. 
38 Henry, The Early Development of the Hermeneutic of Karl Barth as Evidenced by His 
Appropriation of Romans 5:12-21, 57. 
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lexicography that was hitherto based on the classical Greek, into the koine 
(colloquial) Greek lexicography. However, Kögel had updated Cremer’s lexicon 
according to Deissmann’s findings. The Bauer’s lexicon that made full use of 
Deissmann’s findings, was only published in 1928, and was not available to Barth 
when he wrote the Epistle to the Romans.39 The available alternative to Kögel’s was 
Edwin Preuschen’s Greek-German Lexicon. But this lexicon was not as highly 
regarded as Cremer-Kögel’s lexicon. Whatever the weakness of Barth’s translation 
of the Greek, he apparently did not take the task lightly. The fact that Barth 
maintained that he is not an enemy of historical criticism is not an empty statement, 
but represents his exegetical attempts to interpret the Bible in its original text by 
employing the best available scholarship. 
Finally, although there is no sustained engagement with a particular 
commentary, Barth used commentaries from various theological backgrounds that 
indicate his openness to different views. Beside the works listed above, Barth had a 
high respect for Calvin’s commentary, and to a conservative commentator, J.T. Beck, 
whose Romans commentary he regarded “a gold mine”.40 In a letter to Thurneysen, 
Barth wrote that Beck “as a biblical expositor… simply towers above the rest of the 
company, also above Schlatter.”41 While Barth used these commentaries and studies, 
the result of his interpretations is not determined by a particular commentary but by 
his engagement with what he regarded as the content (Sache) of the Scripture. 
Although he had affinities with some conservative commentaries, as he wrote in his 
                                                 
39 Ibid., 58. 
40 Barth, The Epistle to the Romans, 6. Cf. Barth and Thurneysen, Revolutionary Theology in the 
Making: Barth-Thurneysen Correspondence, 1914-1925, 38. 
41 Barth, Karl Barth-Eduard Thurneysen Briefwechsel, Band I: 1913-1921, 148. Beside reformers and 
conservative commentators, Barth engaged quite widely with Pietistic writers such as Johannes 
Bengel (1850, Gnomon Novi Testamenti), C.H. Rieger (1828, Betrachtungen über das Neue 
Testament) and August Tholuck, with ancient writers such as Origen, the critical scholars such as 
Lietzmann, Schweitzer and Lipsius, and the socialist Hermann Kutter (1905, Gerechtigkeit). For 
general works of Pauline studies Barth used both the conservative work of Friedrich Zündel (1886, 
Aus der Apostelzeit) and the critical studies of Albert Schweitzer (1911, Geschichte der paulinischen 
Forschung). Cited in Henry, The Early Development of the Hermeneutic of Karl Barth as Evidenced 
by His Appropriation of Romans 5:12-21, 61. 
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letters,42 his notes in the commentary are enough to show that he was attentive in 
reviewing the suggestions of each commentator while seriously considering and 
making decision about his own interpretation.43 
All Barth’s efforts are quite impressive when seen from the context of his 
pastoral life. This still remains unnoticed because the historical reception of Barth’s 
work and his reputation as a great theologian shadow the pastoral background of the 
commentary. More importantly, it is theologically driven rather than compelled by 
some hermeneutical or exegetical principles.44 The Word of God is in history while 
at the same time it is not of history. While at times Barth speaks in a manner that 
reflects some form of idealism, his theological impulse is the economy of grace in 
which God’s communicative presence employs history and human words for 
expressing the eternal truth of the Word. Webster rightly argues that Barth’s efforts 
were “precipitated by beliefs about God and the economy of God’s act toward his 
creature, beliefs which were themselves generated and sustained through attention to 
Scripture and which could best be articulated by scrupulous scriptural exegesis.”45 
This theological conviction means that establishing “what is there” must be an 
expression of the best responsible acts that are possible for a “human reading” of 
Scripture. The conviction cultivates an ethics of reading which shapes Barth’s 
meticulous interaction with the historical scholarship. In particular Barth appreciates 
more interpreters for whom an understanding of human words is an expression of 
God’s Word. Barth also is quite critical toward interpretation that he deems as “far-
fetched” explorations in regard to comparisons of the religious ideas and the socio-
cultural origins of the biblical writings. Barth does not disregard the fact that the 
biblical text has its historical genesis and development. However, he questions the 
                                                 
42 In his letter to Thurneysen Barth wrote “I have read the whole of Tholuck and discovered all kinds 
of remarkable things, but more remarkable than satisfactory,” Barth and Thurneysen, Revolutionary 
Theology in the Making: Barth-Thurneysen Correspondence, 1914-1925, 42. 
43 Henry, The Early Development of the Hermeneutic of Karl Barth as Evidenced by His 
Appropriation of Romans 5:12-21, 59. 
44 Cunningham, in our opinion, is quite inaccurate in framing Barth’s exegesis as being shaped by “the 
linguistic world of the Bible”, see Cunningham, What Is Theological Exegesis: Interpretation and Use 
of Scripture in Barth's Doctrine of Election, 83. 




view that the exploration of Scripture’s natural history could in itself suffice to 
explain its meaning and as such ignores the ontological nature of Scripture as a text 
caught-up in the economy of God’s salvific communicative action.46 On the other 
hand Barth’s ontological convictions of the text as Scripture provide a solid ground 
for exploring its “natural history”. Thus, rather than submitting to the unexamined 
methodological convictions, or worse, historicist presuppositions, Barth proposes to 
ground such activities in the theological presupposition, that is, God’s 
communicative presence determines the examination of the resources of the 
historical-critical approach. 
1.2. The second step: an attempt at understanding 
In discussing Barth’s second step, the first three prefaces of the Epistle to the 
Romans will be taken up as the textual basis of our analysis. In these prefaces, Barth 
explains what he means by “an attempt at understanding.” They also provide Barth’s 
intense engagements with various reviewers that reveal what he regards as the key 
questions and critical issues in his interpretation of the Bible. These discussions also 
help to clarify what Barth does not intend to do e.g. the pneumatical-approach that 
has less respect for historical criticism, and the subjective-approach, that disregards 
the role of the human author (Paul) in interpreting the meaning of the text. What 
Barth wanted to achieve is a genuine understanding of the historical Paul, but not in 
the sense of his religious ideas or experiences. Barth aims to understand what Paul 
understands about the Word of God, that is, the reality that Paul witnessed. This 
witness, which was written into the Scripture, designates the inseparability of Paul’s 
words and the Word of God while maintaining their distinction. 
Barth begins his preface to the first edition by highlighting the historical 
character of the letter: “Paul spoke to his contemporaries as a child of his age.”47 But 
this remark is just an initial observation, and it is complemented by a second and a 
more crucial observation, that Paul “speaks as a prophet and apostle of the Kingdom 
of God.”48 This reveals what Barth perceives as the decisive purpose of biblical 
                                                 
46 Ibid., 217. 




interpretation in his commentary: “seeing through the historical into the spirit of the 
Bible, which is the eternal Spirit.”49 There is an idealist flavour to Barth’s contention, 
but it must not distract us from a more important contention that is based on his 
theological conviction of reality. The way Barth phrased his hermeneutic is open to 
the impression that history might not have an important role in Barth’s hermeneutic. 
But the emphasis lies elsewhere, not in the denial of history for theological 
interpretation, but rather in the importance of the subject matter (the Word of God) 
under consideration for a true understanding of the historical Paul. 
What was once serious is still serious today, and what today is serious, and 
not just arbitrariness and whim, stands also in direct relation to what was 
formerly serious. Our questions, if we understand ourselves aright are the 
question of Paul, and Paul’s answer, if their light illumines us, must be our 
answers.50  
 
Eberhard Jüngel comments that in this remark Barth makes “the declaration 
of a hermeneutic of simultaneity.”51 According to Jüngel, this approach challenged 
the consensus of historical-criticism of Barth’s day where the historical gulf between 
the interpreters and the texts was a fundamental presupposition. The hermeneutic of 
simultaneity could be perceived, then, as a naïve hermeneutical statement in the face 
of such a gulf.52 Jüngel’s comment is useful as a descriptive tool for a comparative 
purpose, i.e., to see where Barth was different from his contemporary interpreters. 
But it should not eclipse what is more important, that is, Barth’s statement is an 
expression of his insistence that a good interpretation should be focusing on the 
“subject matter, content and substance” which is something Paul and an attentive 
modern reader should share in common, and as such, to read the Scripture with 
“more attention and love upon the meaning of the Bible itself.”53 Barth did not regard 
historical inquiries as unimportant, but, as Emil Brunner perceptively observed, he 
                                                 
49 Ibid. 
50 Ibid. 
51 Jüngel, Karl Barth: A Theological Legacy, 71. 
52 Ibid. 
53 These last two quotations are taken from the drafts of the preface  to the commentary, see Barth, 
“Preface Draft I,” in Burnett, Karl Barth's Theological Exegesis: The Hermeneutical Principals of the 
Römerbrief Period, 277. 
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concentrates on “making the central thought of the Bible really the central point that 
influences everything else.”54 In this context, “the letter to the Romans applies itself 
as soon as it is understood, as soon as one has pushed through from a mere outward 
understanding of the words‒for which modern science offers us splendid means‒to 
an understanding of the content.”55 In Rudolf Bultmann’s assessment, “Historical 
and psychological exegesis establish primarily that this or that has been thought, 
said, or done at a particular time and under such and such historical circumstances 
and psychological conditions, without reflecting on the meaning and demands of 
what is said.”56 Against the convention of the day, Barth takes a different approach: 
The historical-critical method of biblical research has its place; it points to a 
preparation for understanding that is never superfluous. But if I had to choose 
between it and the old doctrine of inspiration, I would resolutely choose the 
latter. It has a greater, deeper and more important place because it points 
directly to the task of understanding, without which all preparation is 
worthless. I am happy that I do not have to choose between the two. But all 
my attention has been directed toward seeing through the historical spirit of 
the Bible, which is the eternal Spirit.57 
 
Barth considers that the choice between the doctrine of inspiration and the 
historical-critical method, while not necessary, is a possibility. It is important to note 
that in suggesting a more important place Barth is not discrediting the method of 
historical research. In Brunner’s estimation, Barth was quite “well-equipped” to 
write something akin to a modern critical commentary if that was his objective.58 It is 
simply because compared to the historical discussions the significance of the doctrine 
has “a greater, broader, and more important place.”59 But the fact that Barth does not 
feel “compelled to choose between the two” must mean that the method of historical-
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criticism can be incorporated into the theology of the Word of God.60 In this way 
historical-criticism is appreciated with a “relative significance” and its results are a 
“relative result” in explicating the subject matter of the text, i.e., the Word of God.61 
The subject matter must be the centre of the inquiry, and in relation to it, 
methodologies are to be treated as ancillary to the normativity of the biblical content. 
To be fair, the historical critical scholars, in general, do not refuse the 
possibility of the Word of God in the words of the Bible. They were, and are, aware 
that the historic Christian faith has always treated Scripture as the locus of revelation. 
But this dogmatic conviction is more often seen as a ‘constraint’, and the historical 
critics see a discontinuity between the Word and biblical history and try to distance 
themselves from it in order to preserve an ‘objective’ approach to the Bible.62 On the 
contrary, Barth’s attitude toward historical criticism involves a theological re-
evaluation of this methodological conviction.63 The difference between Barth and the 
historical critics is not that the latter do not have a dogmatic presupposition while 
Barth does, but rather the difference between their respective dogmatic 
presupposition, between historicist presuppositions and Barth’s theological 
presuppositions.64 Barth wanted to retain the findings of historical-critical study 
while also insisting on allowing the theological presuppositions to play a leading role 
in the process of interpretation. The most crucial presupposition is that as a human 
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word Scripture intends to describe the divine revelation.65 It is this intention that 
must be given priority in the historical approach to Scripture. 
In response to the first edition, there were several conversations that took 
place between Barth and his reviewers. One of the important reviewers was Adolf 
Jülicher who perceived Barth’s theological exegesis as a challenge to the convention 
of historical-criticism.66 Jülicher recognised not only its boldness, but also sensed in 
it Barth’s devaluation of historical study and an attempt to escape from history. He 
stated, “Without doubt we have now to reckon with a period in the history of culture 
that is not historically oriented.”67 In his view, Barth’s hermeneutical statements 
were a sign of an era that moves toward “a denial of history.”68 In his judgement, 
Barth’s commentary does not contribute anything new to the scholarship on Paul and 
its significance was more in the field of practical theology.69 From Barth’s response 
in the second edition, Jülicher’s review made an important impact on Barth’s 
thinking. As Timothy Gorringe rightly argues, it forced Barth “to clarify his method, 
and the preface to the second edition sketched out what amounts to a hermeneutical 
manifesto, which remains one of the landmarks of hermeneutic discussion in the 
twentieth century.”70 We however should not overestimate the review(s), since 
Barth, in the preface of the second edition (1922), explicitly explained that there are 
various impulses that contribute to his revision, and that the reviewers’ critiques were 
only one among many. He singled out four main factors for his revision: 1) the 
continuing study of Paul and Paul’s epistle to the Romans, 2) the engagement with 
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Overbeck’s thinking, 3) a better understanding of Plato, Kant, Kierkegaard, and 
Dostoevsky, and finally 4) the responses to the first edition.71 Barth clearly 
emphasizes that the first point is of the utmost importance.72 This, however, does not 
deny the fact that Jülicher’s critique may have helped Barth to clarify his approach 
and to make a statement of the task of theological interpretation. More specifically, 
the critique has helped Barth to delineate in more detail what he means by 
theological explanation (Erklärung).73   
In the preface to the second edition, Barth argues that explanation 
(Erklärung) must move beyond the initial steps of historical criticism and attempt “to 
understand (verstehen) Paul, that is, to discover not only how what is there can be 
somehow repeated …, but how it can be rethought, and what it may perhaps 
mean.”74 In contrast to Jülicher, Barth sets Calvin as a prime example of what he 
considers to be a good commentator. 
How energetically [Calvin] goes to work after he has conscientiously 
established “what is there” to think the thought of the text after it, that is, to 
come to terms with it until the wall between the first and sixteenth century 
becomes transparent, until Paul speaks there and the man of the sixteenth 
century hears here, until the conversation between document and reader is 
concentrated entirely on the matter (Sache).75  
 
As such, a good expositor must concentrate on discovering the link between the 
human words with the Word of God. Barth contends, 
I must press forward to the point where in so far as possible I confront the 
riddle of the subject matter and no longer merely the riddle of the document 
as such, where I can almost forget that I am not the author, where I have 
almost understood him so well that I let him speak in my name, and can 
myself speak in his name.76 
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Barth rejects that historical-criticism is sufficient in itself to do this.77 As such, he 
boldly claims that “the historical-critical school must become more critical in order 
to suit me!”78 What this entails is a “more critical” approach, that is a critique of the 
methodological conviction that in order to be a good exegete one must distance 
oneself from the content of the text. It is a metacriticism of the historicist’s attitude 
toward biblical interpretation as an objective inquiry. Barth argues that this 
‘scientific methodological virtue’ is a serious hindrance to a true understanding.79 By 
maintaining the distance, the historical critics have created their own blind spot and 
eclipsed the subject matter from the reader. For Barth the key lies in the theological 
conviction that the reader must “confront the riddle of the subject matter,” and in 
confronting this subject matter the reader shares the experience of the author (of 
confronting the subject matter) until one can forget that one is not the author, and 
that in speaking of the subject matter, the reader and the author become one and 
interchangeable witnesses of the same subject matter.80 Thus the decisive factor in 
understanding Scripture is the recognition of “the inner dialectic of the subject 
matter,”81 and this involves, as Webster states, “allowing the matter to be the 
organizing principle of the commentator’s presentation, though without in any way 
supplanting or eclipsing the language, form and sequence of the text itself.”82 
There were some reviewers who suggested that this consideration entails an 
interpretative ‘system’ of Barth’s exegesis. But rather than a system, Barth argues 
that it really is a matter of theological conviction.83 Barth contends, 
If I have a “system”, then it consists in my keeping in mind as constantly as 
possible what Kierkegaard called the “infinite qualitative difference” between 
time and eternity, in its negative and its positive meaning. “God is in heaven, 
and thou on Earth.” The relationship of this God to this man, the relationship 
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of this man to this God, is for me the theme of the Bible and the sum of 
philosophy in one. At this crossroads the Bible sees Jesus Christ.84  
 
The main insight that Barth seriously considers here is the basic conviction of 
God of the Bible and the human being as creature. While it is presented in the 
language of Kierkegaard’s philosophy, the contention is not something new but the 
old truth that come alive in Barth’s reading of the Bible. Barth wanted to think about 
God’s presence in the human act of reading of the Bible as a serious consideration 
for the meaning, purpose and justification of such activity. If there is a 
presupposition of this activity it is a presupposition that when one reads the Bible, 
human witness of God in the text is trustworthy. In other words, as part of his 
exegetical convictions Barth begins with a presupposition that Paul really knows God 
when he speaks about God.85 Barth is not taking this conviction simply as a 
hypothetical device but as the true presupposition for understanding the subject 
matter. Barth recognizes that this conviction is a circular presupposition in relation to 
the subject matter.86 In this case, while maintaining his critical attitude, Barth is 
persuaded by the text, to uphold the presupposition that “Paul knows something 
about God which we as a rule do not know, but which we too could know well.”87 
His reading confirms that the presupposition is true all along. Barth argues that this 
presupposition can be stated simply as “consider well,” in the sense of “consider well 
the theme of the text,” and “consider your interpretation in the light of the theme.”88 
This entails making a considerate assumption that “the Bible is a good book, and that 
it is worthwhile to take its thought at least as seriously as one takes his own.”89 Thus 
Barth begins with a theological conviction that Paul knows something about God 
when he talks about God, and that in the letter, Paul really gives witness to the being 
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of God and not simply to a human experience of God.90 This conviction in turn 
shapes his interpretative process of biblical exegesis. 
 A perceptive reader would immediately ask: how might Barth substantiate 
that the Word of God has been really understood in his reading of Paul’s letter? Does 
not Barth consider the possibility that readers, including himself, might misread the 
human words for the Word of God? And more importantly, how would Barth reckon 
with the possibility that the authors of Scripture (e.g. Paul) might have 
miscommunicated their own historical-cultural opinions as the Word of God? These 
questions bring us to the heart of Bultmann’s review of Barth’s Epistle to the 
Romans second edition that precisely raises these points. Bultmann argues that 
Barth’s theological approach has failed to consider the possibility that the text does 
not only contain the voice of the Spirit but may also reveal the voices of other 
spirits.91 As such, Paul’s letter reveals not only the Word of God, but also human 
traditions and aspirations, as can be seen in “tensions and contradiction, heights and 
depths” of Pauline ideas in the letter.  
[Paul is] dependent on Jewish theology or on popular Christianity, on 
Hellenistic enlightenment of Hellenistic sacramental belief,…but [Paul] is 
doing it from the point of view of showing where and how the subject matter 
is expressed, in order to grasp the subject matter, which is greater even than 
Paul….It is not merely a question of the relativity of the word, but also of the 
fact that no man‒not even Paul‒can always speak only from the subject 
matter itself. In him there are other spirits speaking besides the pneuma 
Christou.92 
In Bultmann’s view, Barth is not objective and critical enough because he does not 
differentiate the subject matter (the Word) from the word of man.93 To be faithful to 
the subject matter, an interpreter must place the Word of God higher than human 
ideas and theology, including Paul’s religious ideas and convictions. Barth should 
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have evaluated Pauline statements by contrasting them to the subject matter because 
the proclamation of Pauline theology can be contrasted with his religious 
backgrounds, and as such Paul’s letters may contain a misrepresentation of the 
subject matter. 
In response to this critique (in the preface to the third edition), Barth argues 
that it is Bultmann who is not objective and critical enough.94 According to Barth 
“what speaks in the Letter to the Romans is nothing but the ‘others’, the various 
‘spirits’ which [Bultmann] adduces, such as Jewish, the popular Christian, the 
Hellenistic, and others.”95 There is no human way, according to Barth, that one could 
point in the text to where the spirit of Christ speaks and where it can be perceived as 
one among competing voices.96 There is no human way of discriminating between 
the human word and the Word of God.97 Every word in Scripture is the voice of other 
spirits and only in the act of reading can it be known by God’s revelation “whether 
and in how far everything can be understood also in the context of the ‘subject 
matter’ as the voice of the spiritus (of Christ).”98 In other words, the subject matter of 
the text cannot be presupposed from the beginning of interpretation. One cannot 
construe some presuppositions at the beginning of interpretation and from these 
presuppositions to evaluate the worth of a particular statement. The Word can only 
be understood in the act of theological exegesis where one sees the whole in the 
context of the subject matter. In this act, it is the subject matter that makes itself 
perceivable in the interpretation of the text. It is not something that the human reader 
is able to perceive but rather something that comes into perception as the act of the 
divine Spirit. 
Interlocking with Barth’s argument is the conviction that Scripture is, 
simultaneously, the Word of God and the word of man, which is an important theme 
in Barth’s proposal on biblical interpretation in Church Dogmatics I/2 §§ 19-21 (see 
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chapter 4 and 5), but something that Barth had instinctively sensed even in this early 
period. To understand Scripture, Barth argues, a reader must engage in “a 
relationship of faithfulness with the author, intends to read him with the hypothesis 
that the author also knew with more or less clarity down to the last word.”99 In this 
context Barth argues that a true interpretation is not so much reading about Paul but 
rather reading with Paul. The former focuses on “the other spirits” of the text and 
discriminates in Paul’s text between the spirits and the Spirit as Bultmann suggested. 
In Bultmann’s approach one assumes more of the role of an observer than a listener. 
As an observer, one is attempting to recognize the Spirit in the text, but one has no 
determination “to stand and fall” with the text, i.e., one exercises discretion in 
relation to the merit or the shortcoming of the text.100 On the contrary, in reading 
with Paul, Barth argues, one is not ignorant of the different degrees of “the quantity 
of the ‘Spirit of Christ’” in the text.101 But the relation of faithfulness means that one 
must firstly ask whether the lack of understanding has something to do with the 
reader rather than with Paul.102 Barth admits that all human words are relative to its 
historical context, even Paul’s.103 He also admits that “we must learn also to see 
beyond Paul.”104 This, however, does not mean that a reader should doubt Paul and 
regard his writing questionable.105 In this regard, to see beyond Paul is to see with 
Paul beyond our understanding of Paul as human author to the Word of God that 
Paul witnesses in the Bible. 
The three prefaces to Barth’s commentary on Romans describe how Barth 
proposes to read Scripture simultaneously, theologically and respectfully. For Barth, 
an attempt at understanding ultimately means that one has to read Paul in order to 
understand what Paul understands about God and not merely to understand Paul’s 
ideas about God i.e. about his religion or morality. It involves faith that Paul knows 
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what is true about God and in understanding Paul one comes to understand together 
with Paul, the truth about God.106 Barth shows that theology plays a crucial part in 
this process, and of particular importance is the doctrine of inspiration. He not only 
recognizes the presence of the Word in the human word, but also the limitations of 
human knowledge to recognize this presence in the text. The basis of this conviction 
is the nature of the subject matter, the Word of God, based on the conviction that 
God is beyond human comprehension. But if the interpretation of Scripture is not 
simply about understanding human religious ideas but its witness to the reality of 
God, interpretation will only be true to its purpose if one considers the meaning of 
the text in the light of its theological claims. In this context, a theological description 
of the doctrine of Scripture, particularly the doctrine of inspiration, is a primer to the 
reading of Scripture. For Barth, hermeneutics is not primarily a philosophical 
description of the event of understanding, although this also has its place, but 
ultimately a theological description of the Word of God in relation to human 
testimony and understanding. Barth’s conviction about the human authors, the 
inexplicability of the subject matter, the Spirit of the text, and the simultaneity of 
biblical content are all explainable only as the implications of his theological 
understanding of the Scripture. 
1.3. Conclusion: Barth’s theological exegesis in the Epistle to the Romans 
In conclusion, the hermeneutical remarks in these prefaces and the practice of 
theological exegesis in the body of commentary have provided the basic forms of 
Barth’s concept of biblical interpretation. It consists of two basic steps: historical 
exegesis and interpretation of its meaning. In the later period Barth will no longer 
construe the task in term of steps but develops a more rounded understanding of 
interpretation. Rather than steps, Barth will construe them as moments of 
interpretation where the connection between historical exegesis, interpretation and 
application will be more closely connected in regard to the event of understanding. 
Within the limits of these two editions of commentary, there are still questions about 
the precise nature of the Word of God and its relation to the Scripture, especially 
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what it means that the Bible is inspired, whether the inspiration is the quality of the 
text or a divine act on the text, and what are its implication for a correct 
interpretation of the Bible. Barth does not yet provide a clear elucidation of his 
theological convictions, and this is understandable because this is a commentary and 
not a manual of a theological hermeneutics. It is only when we explore Barth’s 
doctrine of the Word of God, that a more rounded account of what is entailed in the 
event of understanding will be more theologically comprehensive and 
hermeneutically explicit. These questions were however something that came firstly 
into focus through Barth’s courses in biblical exegesis and studies of Reformed 
theologies (documents and interaction with its chief masters, such as Calvin, Zwingli 
and Schleiermacher), something that involved Barth intensely in the next phase of his 
career as a university professor. In this period Barth developed a more theologically 
explicit relationship between doctrinal convictions, historical criticism and biblical 
interpretation. In the next part, our analysis will present the progress in Barth’s 
thinking on exegesis and hermeneutics as can be perceived in his exegetical works 
during his early period as a university professor. Our primary documents will be two 
other Pauline commentaries, that reveal some further developments of Barth’s 
theological conviction of the relationship of theological exegesis to historical 
scholarship, and a more theologically rounded and rhetorically calm formulation in 
his lecture on the Gospel of John.  
2. Barth’s Exegesis in other Commentaries 
2.1. The Resurrection of the Dead 
Until recently, this commentary was given relatively little attention. This is, however, 
not an accurate indicator of its significance, for as Dale R. Dawson argues, the 
commentary “is a work of exceptional insight and exegetical power,” both in relation 
to the first Letter to the Corinthians and to Pauline theology as a whole.107 The work 
was originally exegetical lectures delivered at the University of Göttingen in the 
summer of 1923. More importantly, it was, in Barth’s view, an exegetical work that 
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was fit for publication (1924).108 As such, the exegetical decisions in the commentary 
can help us in drawing a better picture of Barth’s early hermeneutics. 
As with Romans, Barth’s exposition gives priority of the content over the 
approach or method of exegesis. Although less famous, it is a very accomplished 
piece of exegetical work.109 In the original German version, the Greek text is a 
prominent feature throughout the commentary. Barth continues to engage with 
various commentators, critical or otherwise, such as Lietzmann (quite consistently), 
Bengel and more significantly with Luther. However, the most distinctive feature of 
Barth’s exegesis in this book is his conviction that 1 Cor. 15 is not only “the close 
and crown of the whole Epistle, but also provides the clue to its meaning, from which 
place light is shed on the whole, and it becomes intelligible, not outwardly, but 
inwardly, as a unity.”110 Such is Barth’s conviction that he argues that 1 Cor. 15 is 
the key for understanding all other Pauline letters, and the testimony of the New 
Testament as a whole.111 Barth is aware that the letter is usually treated as a 
collection of loosely connected themes of domestic and congregational issues, and 
that chapter 15 is usually seen as a new theme inserted to support Paul’s pastoral 
responses. However Barth argues that a bigger theme runs through the disparity of 
themes, “a thread …which binds them internally into a whole.”112 Thus in this 
respect the theme of 1 Cor. 15 is not only one theme among many but actually “the 
Theme of the Epistle.”113 
 Although Barth does not elaborate on his exegetical approach, he maintains 
his perennial exegetical convictions, which he supports through a masterly survey of 
1 Corinthians 1-14, i.e., that the priority must be given to the content over the 
historical backgrounds of the text.114 More to the point, rather than providing the 
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justification for his exegetical decisions, Barth’s theological conviction that the letter 
is part of the Scripture, guides his conclusion that the real subject matter of Paul’s 
letter is the resurrection of Christ.115 For him, biblical exegesis is an exegesis of a 
text as Scripture i.e., Scripture as the instance of God’s communicative presence. It is 
a theological activity which is not simply a matter of understanding a text as a 
linguistic entity, but rather as the place where the self-revelation of God is 
communicated. In this context, understanding is not a function of the reader’s or the 
text’s actualization but rather the event of God’s self-communicative action.116 What 
matters here is not that Barth is using a theme (e.g. the resurrection) to decide the 
overall meaning of the letter, but rather that he is reading the letter in which the 
resurrection is the continuing subject matter in the various issues that Paul dealt with 
in the congregation. In other words, the resurrection of Christ is the key event of 
God’s communicative revelation, the substance of faith and the foundation of 
Christian hope without which Paul’s various admonitions would not make any 
sense.117 Barth argues that in the event of the resurrection of Christ God reveals 
himself in history and defines the meaning of reality which includes the 
contemporary reader.118 With this theological conviction, Barth argues the chapter on 
resurrection (1 Corinthians 15), is the key theme to understand the overall meaning 
of 1 Corinthians. 
Although many biblical scholars might be unconvinced by Barth’s exegetical 
proposal (to read the letter in the light of chapter 15), Anthony Thiselton argued that 
Barth is accurate on several exegetical grounds.119 The two chief problems of the 
Corinthian church, their distorted views of the Holy Spirit and their disputes on 
Christian life in an eschatological era, are dealt with by shifting their philosophical 
orientation to a theological orientation in chapter 15.120 As such, it is with the 
                                                 
115 Webster, Barth's Earlier Theology: Four Studies, 70. 
116 Ibid., 71. 
117 R. Dale Dawson, The Resurrection in Karl Barth (Aldershot: Ashgate Publishing, 2007), 39-48. 
118 Cf. Ibid., 48-59. 
119 Anthony C. Thiselton, "Luther and Barth on 1 Corinthians 15: Six Theses for Theology in Relation 
to Recent Interpretation," in Bible, the Reformation and the Church (Sheffield: Sheffield Academic 
Press, 1995), 258-89. 
120 Ibid., 275. 
72 
 
presupposition of the theological content of chapter 15 that Paul responded to various 
pastoral problems in the Corinthian church. This theological approach continues to 
fascinate scholars, even in the context of current research, and is theologically more 
relevant in comparison to other biblical scholars from the same era.121 Barth’s 
theological exegesis is not constrained by the historicism but rather explores a more 
complex dimension of Paul as a pastor-theologian of the church. Paul is not seen as a 
genius of religious ideas but a preacher of the Word and in this context moving 
beyond the scope of historical exploration to the theological implications of the 
resurrection for church life.122 As such Barth’s exegetical decision is not an arbitrary 
spiritual interpretation, but a careful and attentive reading of the textual and historical 
subject matter of Paul’s letter to the Corinthian church for theological interpretation 
of Scripture. There is a strong continuity between the historical Paul and Barth’s 
theological exegesis. Paul, in Barth’s view, is a theological expositor of the faith who 
dealt with the local problems from a specific point of view, i.e., the resurrection of 
Jesus Christ and the eschatological hope of Christian resurrection. 
This commentary shows that in Barth’s interpretation, the history of the text 
and the presence of God’s revelation are closely related to each other. On the other 
hand, there is a slight development in this commentary, compared to the Epistle to 
the Romans.  Barth’s confidence in penetrating through the historical exegesis to the 
“spirit” of the text is now more in continuity with the result of historical research.123 
Barth is less assertive in describing his interpretation as an attempt to listen to Paul’s 
message here and now and more confident of speaking of Paul in historical setting.124 
This might be explained on the ground that Barth was more appreciative of the 
problem of historical reconstruction of Paul’s thought. More importantly, there is a 
sign of development in Barth’s thinking on the doctrine of God which makes clearer 
to him that the absolute freedom of God in his communicative action is in continuity 
with the historical reconstruction of the letter. We can see this, for example, in 
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commenting on 1 Corinthians 11:23, Barth argues that the ultimate setting of the 
interpretation is the supreme presence of revelation of Christ in the church, but this 
theological conviction does not exclude the fact that Paul’s letter has historical 
genesis messages and concerns, and in this regard was influenced by contemporary 
of thought of Paul’s world.125 But with all its historical character, the letter of Paul is 
ultimately an apostolic message that is received from Jesus Christ.126 The aim of 
Barth’s theological exegesis is to elucidate the apostolic witness that is delivered 
through and in the context of Paul’s historical and pastoral message.   
2.2. The Epistle to the Philippians 
The Epistle to the Philippians was first published in 1928 and was originally a series 
of lectures given in Göttingen (Summer 1924) and Münster (Winter 1926/1927).127 
In the Epistle to the Philippians, Barth states that although his purpose is the same as 
in the Epistle to the Romans, he does not bind himself “to the procedure earlier 
employed in the case of the Epistle to the Romans.”128 Barth does not explain in what 
way his exegesis is different, and we can only infer from the way he is interpreting 
the text, that a development has taken place.129  As with the Resurrection of the 
Dead, Barth is more attentive to the historical context of the letter and the proposals 
of critical scholars.130 There are also signs of Barth’s readiness to employ the 
hypotheses commonly used in historical-critical studies.131 Among these hypotheses 
are the developments of Paul’s theological attitude between letters,132 the possibility 
of literary disunity in the Epistle to Philippians (between chapters 2 and 3),133 the 
proposals on Paul’s anthropology,134 and the discussion on the first-century senses of 
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the words such as “bishop” and “deacon”.135 Other than these, Barth continues to 
employ the Greek text (with notes on the Greek text in almost every verse). There are 
places where one can see Barth’s discussions with various commentaries (e.g. with 
Chrysostom, Calvin, Luther, Zwingli, Wohlenberg, Dibelius, and Adolf Schlatter),136 
more footnotes (more in this commentary compared to the Epistle to the Romans and 
the Resurrection of the Dead), and finally, more discussion on textual variants and 
grammatical implications of the text.  
Nevertheless, as Francis Watson rightly notes, Barth’s scholarly engagement 
is not always penetrating or consistently carried out in all his exegesis.137 However 
despite the limitation of his historical exploration, Barth’s readiness to use historical 
scholarship points to a continuous development of his earlier conviction, i.e., a close 
continuity between history and meaning of what Paul once said and what is 
significant here and now.138 A further appreciation of the historical quality of the 
letter is exemplified in the close connection between the content of the letter with 
Paul’s interpersonal relationship with the Philippian church.139 The content is 
communicated in a real communicative event between Paul and the congregation, 
and the communicative event in turn provides the context for the ethos of Paul’s 
moral admonitions. Yet this ethical dimension cannot be explained only through its 
historical setting alone but, more importantly, through its connection to the divine 
reality or the subject matter of the letter.140 Thus, the theological themes in relation to 
God’s action in Christ provide much of the ethical grounds for Paul’s moral 
exhortation to the Philippians. In this way the historical setting is bound together 
with the interpersonal, ethical and theological dimensions of the letter.141 
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The more significant feature of this commentary is its exposition of the whole 
epistle as a seamless text that spoke and continues to speak the Word of God. The 
commentary is less helpful in explaining the meaning of a particular passage in the 
epistle but very insightful in interpreting the whole epistle as one exposition of the 
role of Christ in Christian life and its implication for the church past and present. The 
Word of God and the correspondence of Paul with the church in Philippians go side 
by side so that the Word speaks through Paul’s letter and Paul speaks the Word of 
God in his letter to the church. Barth does not speak firstly of the situation and the 
historical context of the letter then apply it later to modern readers, but rather he 
explains the epistle in the context of Paul’s and the Philippian church’s situation and 
shows how the Word of God can be understood as the truth that make sense of the 
whole letter and the relationship between Paul and the church. 
2.3. The Gospel of John 
Our final example, the Gospel of John, is also a collection of lectures. It was 
delivered first in the Winter Semester in Münster in 1925/1926 and repeated again 
with a slight revision in the Summer Semester in Bonn in 1933.142 By this time Barth 
had gleaned much experience and insights from the previous seven New Testament 
courses (Ephesians, James, 1 Corinthians 15, 1 John, Philippians, Colossians and the 
Sermon on the Mount)143 and developed a more theologically rounded conviction for 
biblical interpretation. The commentary follows Barth’s earlier attitude to the value 
of the historical scholarship, but now with a greater confidence as a professor of both 
dogmatics and New Testament. A student testified that “Barth was even giving some 
instructions in philology”144 and making a great deal of use with the concordance.145 
In continuity with previous commentaries, there are many discussions of textual, 
philological and syntactical aspects of the Gospel, but more distinctive development 
in comparison to the Epistle to the Romans, there are more sustained engagements 
with various commentaries, classic and modern. Barth was specially favouring the 
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commentaries of Augustine and Calvin, but he also valued the contemporary scholars 
such as Holtzmann, Schlatter, Zahn and Bauer. More importantly, he had developed 
competence and appreciation of biblical scholarship in such a way that his 
theological conviction can freely and creatively make use of its resources. 
Nevertheless, Barth’s commentary continues his emphasis on the theological 
exposition of the text. At this point of his development, the lecture shows a more 
rounded approach in his hermeneutics and exegesis. Webster is right in his comment 
that the lectures “offer one of the fullest examples of Barth’s labours in New 
Testament interpretation, and from them a good deal can be gleaned about the 
varieties of his exegetical practices and about his conception of theological 
Erklärung.”146 
 Among Barth’s earlier exegetical lectures, the Gospel of John is where the 
dimensions of ontology, theology and ethics in theological exegesis first come into 
view as distinctive aspects of his hermeneutics. His theological exegesis considers 
the manner in which the revelation of God can be understood as an event in the 
human historicity. The basic ontology is built upon his conviction about the nature of 
God and the relationship between God and human being, and particularly the 
absolute dependence of the human to God. Barth explicitly argues that the authors of 
the Bible are dependent on God in everything they say about the Word of God, and 
on the other hand, the human reader is dependent on God’s communicative presence 
for their understanding of the Word of God. 
In construing the relationship between God’s revelation and human beings, 
Barth employs Augustine’s description of the mountains and the hills as the analogy 
of the apostle and the church, the proclaimer and the recipient of the gospel, in their 
different levels, relative to the revelation of God. While they have relative 
differences, both sides are still “the natural man” who “does not understand the 
things of the Spirit of God,”147 and both sides are in need of the assistance of grace. 
Even so, both sides can only speak of and understand the Gospel as they are enabled 
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by grace and not “as it is” in itself as an object of knowledge. The apostle can never 
speak of the Word of God as it is. The difference between what the apostle could say 
and “what it is” are due to the fact that even as “a man enlightened by God” the 
apostle was “still a man”.148 Barth’s theological conviction takes the meaning of 
‘God’ and ‘human’ in their utter seriousness as two theological words in which the 
gulf is unbridgeable by human work. God and human, however, are not defined by 
the philosophical distance between them but by the theological-ethical 
understandings which fills in the gaps of their ontological distance. Even though we 
will discuss the theological dimensions and the ethical dimension separately, both 
dimensions are connected to each other so that to speak of its theological dimension 
at the same time involves the ethical dimension, and vice versa. Here, in the form of 
commentary what will be the aspects of Barth’s dogmatics, i.e. ontology, theology 
and ethics, come into view in his exposition of the relationship between the Word of 
God and human understanding. These aspects can be also detected in Barth’s 
elaboration of the role of the author and readers of the Gospel in theological 
exegesis. 
 The first theological concept is authorship in relation to the apostleship and 
the historical meaning of the Bible. For Barth, the apostles are similar to the spiritual 
mountains, not in virtue of their natural gifts as an author (religiosity, insights, etc.), 
but in virtue of their enlightenment by God as an apostle. Barth employs the concept 
of witness, which will be more prominent later on in the Church Dogmatics, to 
delineate the apostle as the medium, as contrasted to the source, of the 
illumination.149 Barth argues that “what the mountains impart to us is the possibility 
of hearing something. They cannot impart the illumination of understanding. They 
themselves need illumination.”150 This, however, does not undermine their 
historicity; in fact it defines them. In regard to the historical author of the Gospel of 
John, Barth posits, 
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 His historicity, to which we must cling, has a place and therefore a limit in 
time. It shares in the relativity, the specificity, and the questionability of every 
historical phenomenon. This entails a reservation. He is only a man. He has 
not said it as it is but as he could. As we hear and understand his words we 
are wholly entangled in the historical problems that surround all human 
words. We cannot avoid them. We should not try. He is not Christ but John. 
He does not shine of or through himself. If we look at him we look into the 
darkness of history and not into the light. He passes on a light that he has 
himself received. …He is not an apostle at the level of the historical 
phenomenon to which we are referred. …To see him as an apostle we need 
the same illumination that he needed and received in order to be an apostle. 
He does not proclaim God without God, nor may he be known as one who 
proclaims God without God.151 
Barth does not place the theological and the historical aspects of the Bible as two 
different sides that need to be taken into account. More precisely, for Barth, the text’s 
historical character must be construed on theological grounds and it can be 
understood properly only from this point of view.152 Thus their historical character 
can be understood only in the relation to their function as the witness of the Word of 
God. The apostles are not religious geniuses whose historicity is anterior to the 
Gospel they testify to. They can be understood only as the apostles whose humanity, 
and its historical character, are indistinguishable with their being the apostles of God. 
As such, the historical study of the Gospel is not to be approached from a purely 
academic approach but from a theological ground that their historicity is what it is as 
defined by a theological understanding of apostolic history. This may sound like 
Barth is proposing an approach to history that is, at best, other than objective. To this 
possible complaint, Barth provides a second theological concept of the text and its 
reader that answers the problem of objective history in relation to the study of the 
Gospel. 
 The second theological concept is the recipient of the Gospel in relation to the 
readers and the meaning of the text. For Barth the Gospel is essentially an address, 
and, as Webster rightly comments, it is “a text bearing a divine communicative act to 
its readers, and only rationally accessible as what it is.”153 It is not just a collection of 
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wisdom, but an address directed to the readers, which places one in a specific 
relation to its content. It challenges one’s previous knowledge and places the 
question of faith in relation to its proclamation.154 Thus for Barth, “We hear (and 
understand) the Gospel only when we do not ignore that relation between it and us, 
when we do not ignore the actuality or reality with which it does not so much stand 
over against us as encounter us.”155 This encounter does not mean a 
subjectivist/relativist interpretative approach to the Bible. On the contrary, it places 
the reader in a theological sphere which is defined by three objective theological 
aspects: baptism, church and canon.156 The Gospel cannot be read as other than what 
it is, the Gospel, and Barth contends that “if we want to be truly objective readers 
and expositors of John’s Gospel, however, we will not want to free ourselves from 
the fact that we are baptized, that for us, then, John’s Gospel is part of the canonical 
Scripture of the Christian church.”157 These domains precede and enclose “the reader 
and from which the reader cannot extract himself without making it impossible to 
read the text fittingly.”158 Far from guaranteeing objectivity by removing oneself 
from these theological domains, one would only undermine the theological 
objectivity of biblical interpretation. Furthermore, these theological domains have the 
capacity to resist false objectivity, found among historical scholars who believe one 
is capable of inquiring into the reality of the divine address through historical 
research.159 On the other hand, they highlight the role of divine illumination as “the 
inscrutable and uncontrollable work of God… for which we can only pray.”160 
Barth’s argument provides a theological basis not only for the role of canon and 
church in the interpretation but also as the importance of the divine illumination and 
the humanly corresponding act of faith and prayer. This conviction is based on the 
theological argument that the Gospel is an address and that baptism, church and 
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canon provide the objective theological domains for biblical interpretation, i.e., the 
domains where the Gospel can be read for what it is, the Gospel, rather than simply a 
human-historical document. 
 The ontological and theological dimensions of Scripture contain in it the 
ethical dimensions of interpretation. Barth firstly argues that the ethical dimensions 
of interpretation have two theological aspects. One side lies in the divine realm, i.e., 
the sanctification of the heart to which one could only rise up by the grace of God. 
But alongside this there must be “a readiness to understand that only in the sphere 
denoted by the terms church, sacrament, and canon can John’s Gospel be read and 
understood as the word of an apostle, i.e., as the word of a witness not to himself, but 
to the revelation imparted and entrusted to him.”161 Thus, the interpretation must be 
open to the direction indicated by the subject matter, even if it is only a hypothetical 
intention, there must be willingness in the reader to obey.162 Barth suggests that this 
willingness is righty understood as the objectivity of theological exegesis. On the 
other hand, Barth admits that no one can fully shed one’s subjectivity in the process 
of interpretation; moreover this subjectivity is an ethical subjectivity. What Barth has 
in mind is the attitude of “sincere and earnest desire to read and expound the Gospel, 
not as teacher but as students, not as those who know but as those who do not know, 
as those who let ourselves be told what the Gospel, and through it the divine wisdom, 
is seeking to tell us, holding ourselves free for it as for a message that we have never 
heard before.”163 
2.4. Construing a paradigm for theological exegesis 
Our purpose in analysing Barth’s exegetical works is to narrate the development of 
Barth’s exegetical practice and in this regard to construe a theological paradigm that 
will make sense of the development in continuity and discontinuity of his later 
hermeneutics. Our analyses show that Barth continues to use and employ historical 
criticism in his theological exegesis. But on the other hand the way he understands 
the text continues to grow in more complexity from an idealistic penetration to the 
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spirit of the text, into a more complex relationship that includes the Word of God, 
history, human authorship, canon, church, divine command and church obedience. 
This shows that at one level Barth’s understanding of God continues to grow in a 
way that coordinates the being of God and human history.  
   As Barth engages more in theological exegesis, he becomes more aware of 
the complexity of understanding the Word of God in the human word. There is a 
“qualitative difference” between God and human, and this ontological gap requires a 
theological explanation so that it does not becomes an abstract philosophical 
problem. Our interpretation of Barth’s early theology proposes that such explanation 
was provided by Barth’s second activity as an interpreter of the Reformed tradition. 
As Barth developed his approach, the doctrine of the Trinity, Christology and 
election will become important in his ontology of interpretation. These doctrinal loci 
will then form and inform his theological reflection in construing the Bible as canon, 
the church as reader of the text, and the apostles and prophets as witnesses of the 
Word. Furthermore, these doctrines were applied to the questions of history, 
language and human understanding in relation to church’s reading of the Bible. In 
what follows we will analyse Barth’s second activities in the early period in his 
exploration of the Reformed confessions. We will read the lectures thematically to 
show the doctrinal conviction that undergirds his theological exegesis.  
3. Ontology, theology and ethics in Karl Barth’s early hermeneutics and 
exegesis 
Our analysis, in this last part of the chapter, will explore the basic shape of Barth’s 
hermeneutics through a thematic reading of Barth’s early occasional lectures. There 
are several themes that are recurrent in Barth’s commentaries. However, as an 
extended theological exposition on the nature of Scripture, and its relation to 
revelation and its implication for biblical interpretation, the lectures offer a more 
explicit theological elucidation of the text. But rather than approach the bulk of the 
writings textually, we offer a reading with the purpose of making the themes of 
ontology, theology and ethics more explicitly elucidated. 
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3.1. The development of Barth’s ontology of interpretation 
During his period as a professor of Reformed theology in Göttingen, Barth spent 
much of his academic work in reading, re-thinking and teaching Reformed theology, 
and in many ways, thinking through his theology in relation to various theological 
positions, particularly Lutheranism and Roman Catholicism. Among the lectures that 
he delivered during this period were the Heidelberg Catechism (Winter 1921-22), the 
theology of Calvin (Summer 1922), the theology of Zwingli (Winter 1922-23) and 
the theology of the Reformed confessions (Summer 1923).164 Harvesting from the 
abundance of writings during this period, Barth’s ontological convictions are 
described as a complex interconnection of convictions on the doctrines of God, 
Trinity, election and Christology. Barth’s ontological axiom is developed from a 
simple conviction that “God is God.”165 But it then was developed in a complex 
coordination of several doctrinal loci. At a basic level this means that God cannot be 
grasped and described self-sufficiently by human language. This conviction, 
however, was already present in Barth’s commentaries and in his earlier occasional 
lectures. In one of the earliest, “The New World in the Bible” (1917), Barth argues 
that God, as described in the Bible, may appear as some kind of riddle to human 
reason particularly because its truth lies not on the surface level but in a deeper layer 
of reality.166 The biblical reality of God, or what he called, “the new world of God,” 
is beyond the grasp of human faith and imagination and it only reaches human 
readers in its ‘strangeness’, i.e., a reality that is inexpressible in words so that any 
descriptive attempt will end up in an imperfect theological or philosophical 
description.167 The real content of the Bible is not the human imagination of religion, 
morality or history, though these have their shares in the biblical stories. “It is 
precisely not the right human thoughts about God that form the content of the Bible, 
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but rather the right thoughts of God about humans.”168 This conviction places 
theology in a paradoxical position, which was famously expressed in the lecture, 
“The Word of God as the Task of Theology” (1922): “As theologians we ought to 
speak of God. But we are human and as such cannot speak of God.”169 But even at 
this stage, the conviction is not just theological and ontological, but contains an 
ethical emphasis as well. Such conviction must be followed by the human response 
to give glory to God. 
This idea finds a dogmatic elucidation in The Theology of the Reformed 
Confessions (1923), especially in the lecture on “The Principle of Scripture and its 
Grounds.” In it, Barth no longer speaks in abstract terms such as “God as origin, pure 
futurity, the other and so forth,” but elucidates theology in terms that are informed by 
Reformed theology.170 Barth argues that the ontological concern that defines 
Reformed theology is the content and also the passion over the implication of the 
doctrine of “God’s uniqueness, rule and freedom” for Christian understanding.171 
 The concern of the Reformed in their controversy with the old church 
consists of a passionate interest in the theme of Christian doctrine as such. 
They are preoccupied not so much with the new formulation of its content but 
with the fact that this doctrine deals with God…. Christendom must be taught 
anew because it must become clear again that the issue in this doctrine is 
God. This insight, God is God, has burst upon them like an armed warrior, as 
something totally new, alien, and surprising.172 
 
The ontological conviction that ‘God is God’ stemmed from his biblical exegesis and 
was shaped by the lectures on the Reformed confessions. It provides the ground 
breaking principle that shapes the approach of his dogmatics and also his 
hermeneutics. As Webster notes, Barth’s approach to Scripture is bound up with his 
conviction of the divine aseity and spontaneity of God’s self-communication.173 God 
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is not bound to the text, history or philosophy, but in His freedom God is the only 
way to understand the self-revelation of God i.e. “only God can speak of God.”174 
This theme is elucidated further in Barth’s Trinitarian approach to the Word 
of God. In his earlier lectures, Barth presented the new world of God in Trinitarian 
terms, i.e., Father, Son and Holy Spirit as the One who creates, breaks in and 
implements the new world into the old world.175 The Trinitarian God is expressed as 
a creative, redemptive and communicative presence in the biblical witness and in the 
reading of the church. But what is not clear in the early lectures is the problem of the 
mediation of revelation, one of the central issues that continue to preoccupy Barth up 
to his later period.176 The problem can be stated as such: given that God is present in 
the creaturely world as the contingent and mediated revelation to the human being, 
how can God be at the same time understood as the free, transcendent and non-given 
God?177 In other words, it is the problem of the contingency of the revelation of God 
who is utterly transcendent. In these early lectures, Barth offers a Trinitarian 
approach which employs the doctrine of incarnation as an explanatory language of 
his theological description. 
The relationship to that which is not given comes through that which is given 
and the view into eternity comes within time. Christianity says, this given, this 
time, Jesus Christ…. What can be the meaning of the ‘Word becoming 
flesh’? It is not meant in the sense of a general doctrine of identity, nor is it a 
straightforward equation between deity and humanity in general. Its meaning 
is that of Christian revelation: this flesh, the flesh of Christ, the eternal 
Father’s Word to us.178 
 
In undertaking this important issue Barth made a crucial theological move in 
which he combines his initial insight of God’s transcendence (Father) with the 
revelatory present of God’s immanence (Holy Spirit). The language of Father and 
Spirit could be interpreted as a symbol of human religious experience of the total 
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reality, i.e., the divine transcendence (Father) and the mystical world (Spirit).179 But 
Barth resisted such implications by coordinating the doctrine of Trinity with the 
incarnation of the Son.180 In this context, as Webster rightly notes, the event of 
incarnation is “a finite, temporal given presence of God, a contingent presence of 
God – unique concrete, limited like anything else in the world, but the presence of 
God.”181 This incarnational Christology provides a Trinitarian language of the 
contingent revelatory presence of God that holds together the transcendence and 
immanence of God in creation. In this way Barth can speak the immanence of God 
without blurring the utter distinction between the Creator and the creatures.182 On the 
other hand, as in the emphasis of some of Barth’s early lectures, he also argues that 
the knowledge of God is not mediated through human activity but is unmediated in 
its relation to the being of God.183 This does not mean that God’s communicative 
presence does not involve created reality. For Barth, Scripture is a creaturely 
existence. What Barth wanted to emphasize is the theological conviction that the 
revelation of God is not a kind of intensification of the existing relationship between 
God and creation.184 It is unmediated in the sense that the majesty and the freedom of 
God require that revelation is understood as something isolated in Scripture. Barth 
argues, 
The isolatedness of God generates the isolatedness of his revelation. 
Revelation is not this and that, not everything and anything, but rather this 
definite, incomparable one thing. Therefore, legitimate witness to revelation 
cannot be any random human word about God but rather this definite human 
word about God …It is the word of Scripture.185  
 
The coordination between the isolatedness of the revelation in Scripture and the 
contingency of revelation provide the ontological presuppositions for understanding 
the Scripture principle as the theological context of Barth’s early hermeneutics and 
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exegesis. The exegesis of Scripture is the function, not of a general understanding of 
a text and human understanding, but of the theological description of Scripture as the 
locus where God’s revelation takes place in contingent human history. This 
conviction receives its proper presentation in Barth’s lecture on the Reformed 
Scripture principle. 
3.2. Formulating a theology of interpretation 
Barth’s theology of interpretation in the early period is most clearly expressed in his 
lecture on the Reformed Scripture principle. Barth’s lecture is structured in a 
sustained answer to two basic questions: 1) “What is the meaning of the Scripture 
principle?” and, 2) “How is it grounded?”186 According to Barth, in relation to the 
Reformed confessions, the key to understanding its theological significance is their 
relative insignificance in comparison to Scripture.187 They are not materially 
significant in themselves but only as the witnesses to the truth of Scripture i.e. the 
Word of God.188 As such the primary theses of the Reformed Scripture principle are: 
1) “the church recognizes the rule of its proclamation solely in the Word of God and 
finds the Word of God solely in Holy Scripture”189 2) “the specific content of the 
Reformed confessions lies in its relation to the Word of God spoken in the 
Scripture.”190 In this context, Barth argues that Scripture plays the role of the 
regulative idea and is isolated from human speech as found in confessions and 
church proclamations.191 Scripture is perfect because it is inspired by the Holy Spirit 
and the knowledge of this inspiration is grounded in the work of the Holy Spirit. This 
grounding of the Scripture principle in the work of Holy Spirit provides some 
implications for Barth’s conviction of the way one must approach Scripture. 
 First, a reading of Scripture must be true to its nature as the locus of God’s 
revelation and this means understanding happens under the condition “that the Holy 
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Spirit here (in the reader) connects to the Holy Spirit there (in the Scripture).”192 The 
only foundation for the doctrine of inspiration derives “from the fact that God in 
person speaks in it.”193 This doctrine does not necessarily entail a verbal and dictated 
notion of inspiration, as some believe; for on this ground some have resolved to 
reject the exercise of textual criticism from biblical interpretation.194 As in Calvin, 
inspiration is “a timeless, or better simultaneous act of God, by seeing as inextricably 
linked the then and the now, the there and the here, the biblical author and the 
biblical reader, objective and subjective truth.”195 Thus the content of Scripture is 
not established or negated by historical or rational investigations, such as textual 
criticism, historical criticism, etc., but can only be understood as the work of Holy 
Spirit in the human heart and mind.196 There is a more complex thinking on this 
matter in Barth’s later writing, but at this point it is clear that the Holy Spirit is filling 
much of the role of textual and authorial intentionality in Barth’s early hermeneutics. 
Because of this, Scripture is also understood as capable of a textual freedom that 
challenges and changes the presuppositions of the readers. Scripture has the capacity 
to surprise a reader’s expectations, and demands respect from the reader for the 
subject matter of the text. 
 Second, a reading of Scripture, as far as God’s revelation is concerned, only 
appears as an interaction between the reader and the author, but in reality it is “a 
monologue of the Holy Spirit in them and in us.”197 Thus in this context the witness 
of the Spirit is not the presence of historical proofs, nor an inward subjective 
experience and conviction, nor a self-evident axiom of mathematical or rational 
quality.198 Barth argues that in the process of understanding the Word, one cannot 
differentiate between the witness of the Spirit and one’s cognitive reasoning; 
between its foundation in the canon and the acknowledgement of faith to such 
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foundation; between the Word that shines through the text and the recognition of 
such truth by one’s mind.199 It will always act in accordance with the ordinary human 
reasoning while at the same time, being the work of the Holy Spirit. Barth 
emphasizes further that the Spirit’s witness ultimately means “the revelation of God 
as a sovereign act, grounded solely in God, and emerging from God in freedom.”200 
In this respect it indicates the importance of the theme of election in the self-
revelation of God, i.e., that revelation is based on God’s decision to reveal or to 
withdraw from revealing God-self in the event of the Word of God.201 The freedom 
of God is expressed in election, in the divine self-initiative to reveal God-self in and 
through the reading of Scripture. There is no guarantee of a hermeneutical procedure 
based on competencies in historical, psychological and philosophical analysis of the 
Bible. While all these have their proper place, for Barth election means that the 
discovery of the Word of God in Scripture is, in the end, a matter of God’s free 
decision to reveal God-self.  
3.3. Proposing an ethics of interpretation 
Barth’s theological convictions include and imply an ethics of reading of the Bible as 
Scripture. Through the study of the Reformed confessions and Calvin’s theology, 
Barth aimed at a specific way of relating the doctrine of God and human morality.202 
For him, ethics must be grounded in the doctrine of God and the problem of morality 
cannot be separated from theology. He insists that ethics must be regarded as “a 
problem, a central and burning one, posed immediately in and with the problem of 
God.”203  As Webster rightly observes, Barth’s occupation with moral theology did 
not cease when he broke up with Protestant liberalism but he continued to search for 
an alternative grounding.204 Thus, Webster notes that “Barth’s theology of Trinity, 
incarnation and predestination are all expositions of the single point into which he 
                                                 
199 Ibid. 
200 Ibid. 
201 Barth already connected the doctrine of election to God’s revelation, instead of soteriology, in his 
lecture on “Biblical Questions, Insights and Vistas”, see Barth, The Word of God and Theology, 78ff. 
202 Webster, Barth's Earlier Theology: Four Studies, 58. 
203 Barth, The Theology of the Reformed Confessions, 149. 
204 Webster, Barth's Earlier Theology: Four Studies, 4. 
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had stumbled through his study of sixteenth century Calvinism, namely (and only 
because) God is and acts as the one he is, talk of God cannot be sealed off from the 
talk of creatures.”205 
In this theological context, the ethics of biblical interpretation takes the form 
of an intentional human action to let God speak as God. The decision of God to 
reveal God-self in the communicative act of revelation is both an expression of 
God’s sovereign grace and a calling to a particular ethical human response. The 
implication of God’s sovereign agency in the textual explication is that the reader is 
called to an attentive and serious reading of the text as an instance of God’s 
communicative presence. One must take the reading of the text in all its seriousness 
as a reading about God who is active and speaks through it, and not just a reading of 
a ‘theme’ that can be handled as a passive object of research. Thus the exegesis of 
biblical content must take priority over one’s experience or previous understanding 
on the matter so that if there is a contradiction between them one must be ready to 
submit to the content of Scripture.206 It cannot be regarded simply as a religious text 
contingent on a particular epoch in human history, but a text that calls for a particular 
form of obedience, i.e., to think through the subject matter from the point of view of 
revelation. 
As such, Barth argues, there is no more pertinent ethical reading than an 
invocation of the grace of God in the form of prayer. In view of God’s revelation, 
one must realize that an invocation of God’s grace is an essential ethical step in 
theological exegesis.207 Barth proposes further that God’s revelation demands that 
the ecclesiastical context is the proper theological domain for theological exegesis, 
although academic context also has its own proper place. In the ecclesiastical context 
there is a right theological reason for consulting the old and the new commentaries, 
and for comparing and sharing one’s findings with fellow Christians, thus taking 
lessons from such comparisons.208 These activities are grounded in theological 
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reasoning, i.e., in the theological nature of the church, where theological exegesis is 
not a solitary activity but one where sharing with one another is an essential part of 
growing in the knowledge of God.209 In this domain, reading and preaching are 
closely connected to each other. In this respect, the Scripture principle recommends a 
theological form of preaching, that is, preaching is based on Scripture, and 
considered as the Word of God, as long as it is “in accordance with the Scripture.”210 
In this vein, Barth recommends a form of preaching that is expository rather than 
thematic, one that aims at the “exposition of the entire Bible.”211 Barth argues that 
“this is how the Reformed principle of Scripture should take shape in living 
theological practice.”212 
In conclusion, Barth’s ontological and theological convictions lead him to a 
specific ethical thinking and praxis of theological exegesis. While the place of 
prayer, faith, church and preaching in the reading of the Bible is not an innovation in 
the history of Reformed theology, their systematic connection to the ontological 
convictions and their grounding in theological reasoning are now found to be 
specifically and explicitly theological elucidations in terms that reflect Barth’s 
theological position as a Reformed theologian. It is this specific theological ground 
that prepares Barth’s complex description that interacts with the whole set of 
hermeneutical issues in the Church Dogmatics. This complex undertaking is the 
subject of our analysis in the next chapter. 
4. Conclusion 
Barth’s hermeneutics and exegesis in the early period are driven by specific 
theological motifs, set within particular ontological convictions and exercised in an 
ethics inherent in such theological and ontological convictions. The basic shape of 
Barth’s theological exegesis is twofold, the historical research to establish the 
content of the text and the interpretative reflection to understand the Sache of the text 
from an interpreter point of view. Barth uses historical research quite extensively, 
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and there is a growing appreciation of its usefulness as Barth continued to study the 
Bible in academic contexts in Göttingen, Münster and Bonn. At one level, this might 
be explained biographically i.e. Barth’s formative period as a theological student was 
spent in universities where historical criticism was the reigning paradigm. 
Additionally, the demand and stature of a university professor, particularly as a 
professor of theology and New Testament Exegesis (formally in Münster, but 
practically in all three German universities), obliged Barth to write and lecture in a 
way suited to the contextual requirement. These reasons however do not explain fully 
his hermeneutical stimulus. As we have argued in this chapter, the shape of his 
exegesis, including his re-evaluation of historical criticism, his focus on the Sache of 
the text, and his formulation of the theological procedures of biblical interpretation, 
stemmed from his growing awareness of the capacity of doctrines to provide a 
theoretical foundation for biblical interpretation, particularly, the doctrines of Trinity, 
Christology and Scripture. In what follows we will elucidate this theological 
development in terms of his ontology, theology and ethics of interpretation. 
 First, Barth’s ontological conviction, at this stage, is a reflection of his critical 
thinking of what it means to take seriously the meaning of the word ‘God’ and its 
hermeneutical implications for reading Scripture. It does not take the form of a 
specific philosophical mode of perceiving reality e.g. actualism, objectivism, realism, 
and rationalism.213 It is rather generated by a belief that the reality of God 
encompasses the whole reality, and as such, God’s being takes precedence over 
philosophical presuppositions of what there is (reality, being, becoming, etc.). 
Inherent in such a belief is the conviction that the word ‘God’ implies sovereignty, 
dignity and originality that defines and constrains any theological construction of 
reality. In this account, the chief hermeneutical problem in human understanding is 
not how to bridge the historical past and the present inquiry, or the accidental history 
and the eternal truth, but the gulf between the inscrutable reality of God and the 
limitation of human knowledge. The reality of God challenges the ‘scientific’ 
certainty of human knowledge, a certainty that the theology of his day was rather 
keen to claim. On the other hand, Barth’s ontology is defined by the convictions that 
God is present and is not silent. God’s presence is a communicative presence in the 
economy of salvation. This claim is construed within Barth’s understanding of the 
                                                 
213 For a detailed description of these philosophical motifs see chapters 2 & 3 in George Hunsinger, 
How to Read Karl Barth: The Shape of His Theology (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991). 
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absolute freedom of God. Specifically, Barth employs the theological theme of 
election and construes a theological proposal of God’s sovereign revelation. From an 
ontological point of view, the dialectical tension between the inscrutability of God 
and the limitation of human knowledge on the one side, and the reality of God’s 
communicative presence in his election on the other side, constitute the key 
hermeneutical problem for Barth’s exegetical procedure and practice.  
 This ontological dialectic generates in Barth certain exegetical attitudes in 
reading the Scripture as an instance of God’s communicative presence. It is, first of 
all, exemplified in the seriousness of biblical exegesis. Barth’s scrupulous attention 
to textual criticism, historical research, and scholarship in biblical studies stemmed 
from his ontological belief that a reading of Scripture must be attempted in utter 
seriousness because Barth presupposes that Scripture talks about God (not just 
human ideas of God) and he accepts this presupposition as a crucial starting point. 
On the other hand, the presupposition relativizes the result of textual criticism, 
historical research and biblical scholarship in the context of human knowledge of 
God. He questions the scientific certainty of all creaturely experience, acts and 
efforts when the knowledge of God is in view. Thus while Barth has a high regard 
for historical criticism, he considers its outcome as a relative result for theological 
exegesis. What is more important is the objective status of Scripture in the economy 
of God’s communicative action. God chooses to reveal God-self through the 
creaturely medium of Scripture. This conviction, which is generally elucidated in 
term of subject matter of the text (Sache), generates a certain flexibility and 
ingenuity in Barth’s uses of historical and textual scholarship. 
 Secondly, the theological conviction of Barth’s hermeneutic is built upon the 
belief that Scripture is at the same time the Word of God and the word of human 
beings. The chief feature of this theological conviction can be seen in Barth’s dealing 
with the historical authors of the Bible viz. apostles and prophets. The study of 
historical authors is important for Barth because the human words are the medium of 
the Word of God. Barth believes that the Word of God comes through the word of 
humans and there is no other way of knowing the Word of God except through the 
human words of biblical authors. But the critical reason why Barth has a different 
attitude to historical criticism is because for him the Word of God is not identical 
with the human idea of God. In the later account, the historical background, genesis, 
development and culmination of human thought, are the keys to understanding the 
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Bible. As long as it is limited in human religious ideas, historical research is 
fundamentally adequate for acquiring such knowledge. However, in Barth’s account, 
while all these have their proper place, the definitive key is the Sache (subject matter, 
content) of the Bible. The apostle or prophet as a person of history is not the 
originator of the Word of God but a witness to the Word of God. As a witness, their 
historical time and place are important, but these do not define the meaning of the 
Word of God. It rather defines the witnesses, who they were, and what kind of place 
and time of history they lived in. Furthermore, as a witness, the words and language 
that were used to communicate the subject matter are very important, including the 
literal sense of the words. For this reason, Barth regards the study of biblical 
languages (at the early period Barth’s exploration was limited to the Greek texts) and 
text criticism as important. Barth did not disregard the historical studies of Scripture. 
However, they are not sufficient in themselves and have to be seen as a preliminary 
step for recognizing how the human word was the instance of the Word of God. 
Nevertheless, this theological conviction defines and constrains the extent to which 
Barth uses and employs the results of historical and textual criticisms. 
 The relationship between history and the Word of God is complex and not 
easily defined in Barth’s early exegesis and hermeneutic. We have argued that there 
are some developments in Barth’s exegetical practice through the Epistle to the 
Romans to his lectures on 1 Corinthians, Philippians and John. While the priority of 
the Sache over historical-textual research continues to be a distinctive mark of 
Barth’s exegesis, there was a growing willingness to employ and appreciate the 
insights of historical-textual criticisms. We have suggested that in the earlier period, 
when he wrote the Epistle to the Romans, Barth’s understanding of the relationship 
between history and the Word of God was more intuitive than definitive. Barth 
sensed that the contingent nature of history makes it impossible to be the theological 
locus for the eternal Word of God. The Word of God cannot be mediated through the 
instance of history because the contingent cannot contain the eternal, thus only God 
can reveal the Word of God. However, in his development as a Reformed theologian 
Barth finds theological themes and concepts that elucidate the theological intuition in 
exclusively theological terms. More importantly, it makes Barth’s concept of history 
more rounded because history can have a place in the economy of God’s revelation 
in the form of biblical writings (a tangible codex). This conceptualization is 
generated by Barth’s analogy between the Trinitarian theology, more specifically the 
incarnational Christology, and the Scripture. For Barth, Christ is the contingent 
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presence of God in history. This presence is limited and isolated in a particular 
instance of history. Christ is not available to general history but limited definitely in 
the biblical history. The incarnational Christology provides a theological analogy for 
the relationship between Scripture as the Word of God and its historical narrative and 
situatedness as a contingent human event. As Christ is uniquely and contingently 
God’s presence in history, so is Scripture uniquely and contingently the Word of God 
in human history. The Word of God is contingently present in history in the form of 
Scripture. In such an account, the Word of God, while mediated by human writings, 
remains an unmediated event in human contingent history. This Christological 
construct and its theological analogy provide a backdrop to understand Barth’s 
growing appreciation of historical research. If the Word of God was a presence in 
contingent historical events, revealed in and through the Scripture, then history and 
historical research become an important subject for theological exegesis. The study 
of history, aimed at understanding the witness of Scripture, provides the humanly 
accessible context for understanding the Word of God. It does not define the 
meaning of the Word of God, but it defines the world in which the Word of God was 
given to human beings. This theological reasoning provides a theological motif for 
using the insights of historical and textual criticisms. 
 Finally, there is an ethic of reading inherent in such ontological and 
theological construal. The basic shape is a corresponding human moral response to 
the divine communicative economy. Barth emphatically maintains something 
obvious that might be easily overlooked i.e. the Word of God is essentially an 
address. It addresses the reader to become involved in the Sache of Scripture. This 
address places an ethical demand for the reader in relation to the seriousness of its 
claim i.e. who is God, what is human life, and the relationship between this God and 
our humanity. To read the Bible with this ethical conviction means one cannot stand 
at a distance as an objective inquirer of the biblical Sache without being morally 
irresponsible. Also, one cannot judge the text according to one’s evaluation of the 
worthiness of its subject matter. On the contrary one stands under the judgement of 
Scripture. More to the point, one must be willing to maintain a relationship of 
faithfulness to the text i.e. that the text testifies divine revelation and that this 
testimony is a subject of one’s moral compliance. This conviction delineates Barth’s 
attitudes to historical and textual criticisms. Barth maintains that the general ethos of 
his critics is the willingness to set apart dogma and research i.e. one must be willing 
to be free from dogmatic pressure in the assessment of one’s critical reasoning. This 
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academic virtue, which is respectable as far as it goes, does not mean, as Barth 
argues, that historical research can establish or evaluate the Word of God by virtue of 
its methodology. More importantly, to establish or to evaluate the Sache of Scripture 
is already to commit to an ethical stance of placing one’s understanding of the truth 
above the truth of Scripture i.e. the Word of God.  On the contrary, the proper ethical 
attitude in theological exegesis is marked by obedience, attentiveness and seriousness 
to the content of the biblical text. 
 This ethical deliberation, Barth maintains, is generated by the conviction that 
God speaks to the church in and through Scripture. Thus, Barth speaks of grace, faith 
and prayer in relationship to theological exegesis. It is made possible by the grace of 
God who decides to reach out to human beings in the communicative divine act. The 
real Sache of Scripture is not human thinking of God but divine thinking of human 
beings. To engage in biblical exegesis with this belief however is already an act of 
faith by which one maintains that exegesis is first of all a human response to the 
divine address.  As such the most appropriate exegetical method takes the form of a 
prayer i.e. theological exegesis is a form of prayer by which Barth believes it is 
ultimately about the Spirit in and through the text speaking to the interpreter. It is a 
spiritual exercise defined by a belief in divine inspiration by the Holy Spirit i.e. 
inspiration encompasses the inspiration of biblical authors and the illumination of 
contemporary readers. For Barth, biblical exegesis is an act of prayer fraught with the 
risk of human irreverence. 
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Chapter IV: Karl Barth’s Ontology of Interpretation 
 
This chapter examines Barth’s theological ontology which shapes his hermeneutics, 
specifically, his theological vision of reality in which a Christian theological 
interpretation of the Bible takes place. For Barth, ultimate reality is Jesus Christ. To 
state that Jesus is the most real reality or revelation as “concretissimum” (the most 
concrete reality) is certainly not an obvious truth to everyone. From common sense 
or reason alone it is an obscure claim.1 Ingolf U. Dalferth is right to argue that 
Barth’s view of reality is not based on observation or rational deduction of reality but 
on “the eschatological realism” of Christ’s resurrection.2 For Barth, the resurrection 
of Christ is “the reality which determines what is to be counted as real and what 
isn’t.”3 Dalfert notes that, “The eschatological reality of the resurrection which 
Christians confess in the Credo has ontological and criteriological priority over the 
experiential reality which we all share. The truth-claims of the Christian faith are the 
standard by which we are to judge what is real, not vice versa.”4 For Barth, true 
reality is not a private or an imaginary reality by way of social or philosophical 
construction. The reality of Christ exists independently of our opinions or beliefs and 
cannot be exhausted by human description.5 For Barth, reality is known trough the 
revelation, and Christ is the ultimate reality of all being.6 In hermeneutical terms, 
Christ is ultimately what is “being interpreted.” As Barth argues, a hermeneutics of 
reality outside revelation is a distorted ‘theological’ speculation, a figment of human 
speculation which is constructed by an imperfect and sinful human mind.7 
                                                 
1 CD I/1, 136, 137. 
2 Ingolf U. Dalferth, "Karl Barth's Eschatological Realism," in Karl Barth: Centenary Essays, ed. 
S.W. Sykes (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), 22. See also Graham White, "Karl 
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Religionsphilosophie 26, no. 1 (1984): 54-70. 
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4 Ibid. 
5 Ibid., 17. 
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7 Ibid, 238. 
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If Barth argues that Christ is true reality, it is worth pondering what he means 
by this and, in relation to our research, what it entails for Barth’s theological 
hermeneutics. The underlying question of this chapter concerns the relationship 
between Barth’s ontological convictions and the hermeneutical problem of 
theological interpretation. Is Barth working from a philosophical foundation for his 
ontology or is it more a matter of theological elucidation for the purpose of providing 
an interpretative ontology? While we will argue that the latter is the case, we want to 
make clear two things for which we are not arguing. First, philosophical ontology is 
not to be rejected simply because it is philosophical, and theological ontology is not 
simply true because it is theological. While both have their rightful places, it is 
theological ontology that gives warrant to faith that accepts the reality of God as a 
necessary determination in an ontological construct. Second, a theological ontology 
does not necessarily lack philosophical features and implications in its construal and 
content. As a mode of human cognitive activity they share the same traits of logical 
persuasion. What is important about the two is that they lead and show the way 
reason has to proceed. Specifically, a theological ontology works with specific 
doctrinal convictions that have crucial purchase for an ontological discussion of 
philosophical hermeneutics. It is the specificity of theological doctrines within which 
we build an ontology that makes the endeavour a distinct one. In this way the use of 
the term ‘ontology’ will not be understood as a philosophical doctrine of being 
independent of the material content of dogmatics. Rather ontology is used as an 
operative term in which doctrinal understanding informs the material and formal 
shape of our discussion on being. 
 The second question this chapter attempts to answer is the relationship 
between doctrine and a constructive study of Barth’s hermeneutics. Is doctrine 
important for Barth’s hermeneutics, if it is, in what way?8 Our proposal is an 
affirmation to such a question, and for the purpose of ontology of interpretation, we 
contend that Barth’s doctrines of Trinity, Christology and Election provide the 
                                                 
8 In a way this project will move in a reverse direction from Anthony C. Thiselton, The Hermeneutics 
of Doctrine (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2007), xvi-xxii. Thiselton argues for an application of 
hermeneutics to doctrine that “could inject life into engagement with doctrine” (xii).  Ours is an 
application of doctrine that injects life (form and content) into the engagement of hermeneutics, 
specifically in relation to the church reading of the Scripture. 
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crucial material building blocks. They form part of an answer to this question and we 
will provide an analysis on Barth’s doctrine of Trinity in relation to hermeneutics, 
the relationship between his Christology and hermeneutics, and what his doctrine of 
election has to do with his ontology of interpretation. On the surface, these doctrines 
seem to be irrelevant for the study of hermeneutics. But upon deeper reflection, we 
argue, these doctrines, as Barth presents them, provide the material building blocks 
for an ontology of interpretation, in which, the being of God is the foundation for a 
Christian interpretative activity. It is because of this conviction that we offer a 
constructive proposal on Barth’s ontology of interpretation based on an exploration 
of his dogmatics. 
From within Barth’s theological vision, an ontology of interpretation does not 
necessarily share the same traits as philosophical hermeneutics which offers a 
phenomenological ontology of human understanding.9 In the first chapter we 
discussed certain scholars who argue that Barth has no hermeneutics in a strict 
philosophical sense. On the other hand, there are others who argue that rather than 
hermeneutics, it is his exegesis that provides insightful resources for a contemporary 
church reading of Scripture. According to this view, Barth’s practice of exegesis is 
his real contribution to the study of hermeneutics. Still others believe that Barth’s 
hermeneutical insights are comparable to, and can be brought into dialogue with, 
theologians and philosophers on hermeneutics. Each of these opinions holds some 
truth and provides some stimulating thoughts on Barth’s thinking.10 But the common 
problem with these proposals is that they do not capture the unique feature of Barth’s 
theology in which the materiality of dogmatics generates a specific ontological belief 
and provides the hermeneutical foundation for biblical interpretation. It is the 
contention of this chapter that the material content of dogmatics is crucial for Barth’s 
ontology of interpretation. Therefore, over against some of the established views on 
Barth’s hermeneutics, we will argue that a description of Barth’s hermeneutics is 
possible at an ontological level; a description that is thoroughly theological. 
                                                 
9 Webster, Word and Church: Essays in Christian Dogmatics, 58. 
10 When in February 1935 Barth said his farewell to students in Bonn, after being dismissed from his 
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yet more exegesis! Keep to the Word, to the Scripture that has been given to us.” See Busch, Karl 
Barth, His Life from Letters and Autobiographical Texts, 259. 
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Furthermore, such a description will perform the necessary functions of the ontology 
in a theological interpretation that will replace what general hermeneutics usually 
claims as a universal construct of the event of understanding.11 This is not to say that 
it will become a general hermeneutics from a theological point of view. A Christian 
reading of Scripture, as John Webster argues, is “an instance of itself.”12 Barth never 
explored, in a sustained and systematic manner, a general hermeneutics and the 
philosophical problem of interpretation. But despite Barth’s sometimes “negative” 
remarks on hermeneutics,13 his exposition of Christian doctrines engages with 
philosophical, historical, scientific and linguistic challenges of such studies. In these 
engagements, he makes penetrating analyses of the theological and philosophical 
culture of modern theology and sets its hermeneutical and philosophical 
presuppositions as the context of his theological exposition. More specifically, his 
theological exposition describes the divine reality disclosed by the event of 
revelation in the life and ministry of the Church, and provides a hermeneutical 
guideline for textual exposition. It is true that Barth’s dogmatics starts with the belief 
that the Word of God is the foundation and presupposition of theology.14 But then he 
brings the dogmatic contents into dialogue with the philosophical, linguistic and 
scientific questions of human understanding. These engagements, we argue, provide 
important reflection on ontology of interpretation in the theological sense i.e. 
                                                 
11 Needless to say that such an abstract account is not to be found in Barth’s writings and not possible 
on account of his theology that is based on the concrete Christological event. But this does not mean 
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account of universal hermeneutics is a prerequisite for specific instances of Christian reading of the 
Bible. This view of theological hermeneutics  is advocated by, inter alia, Werner G. Jeanrond, Text 
and Interpretation as Categories of Theological Thinking (New York: Crossroad, 1988); Jeanrond, 
Theological Hermeneutics: Development and Significance; David Tracy, The Analogical Imagination 
: Christian Theology and the Culture of Pluralism (London: SCM, 1981); David Tracy, Plurality and 
Ambiguity: Hermeneutics, Religion, Hope (London: SCM, 1988). For an account that argues for 
Christian reading of Scripture as an instance of itself see, inter alia, Francis Watson, Text, Church and 
World: Biblical Interpretation in Theological Perspective (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1994); John 
Webster, "Hermeneutics in Modern Theology: Some Doctrinal Reflections," in Word and Church 
(Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 2001). 
12 Webster, "Hermeneutics in Modern Theology: Some Doctrinal Reflections," in Word and Church, 
58. 
13 Eg. CD I/2, 466, 472.  
14 Ibid., 88. 
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reflecting upon the theological reality of human understanding in the church’s 
reading of Scripture.15 The emphasis is in the church rather than in human 
understanding i.e. what theologically happens when the church truly understands the 
Word of God. On the other hand, it is not primarily about formal guidance for 
biblical interpretation but mainly about what the material content of the doctrine 
requires for a truly theological hermeneutical approach.16 It is a movement from 
doctrine to hermeneutics rather than vice versa. Specifically, Barth believes that from 
the biblical (human) expressions of witnessing to the revelation we can learn 
something important about what it means to describe other things in human 
language.17 In other words, rather than surrendering biblical hermeneutics to the 
anthropological explorations of general hermeneutics, doctrines can provide the 
needed hermeneutical insights for describing what it means to understand Scripture 
and, from this, indirectly to understand the text in general (general hermeneutics).18   
In this chapter we will arrange Barth’s comments in his dogmatic exposition 
into a material description of ontology of interpretation. This does not mean that we 
will provide a systematic theory of hermeneutics but rather will present them in an 
orderly manner for the purpose of analysing the hermeneutical consequences of 
Christian doctrines. Specifically, we will argue that Barth’s dogmatic expositions of 
Trinity, Christology and election provide a descriptive content and language for an 
ontological description of a Christian reading of Scripture. This description is not 
necessarily prescriptive nor should it become restrictive to a methodological 
approach of biblical interpretation. On the other hand, it will provide something more 
                                                 
15 Over against the universal possibility of human understanding. 
16 There is a sense that epistemology coincides significantly with hermeneutics. In modern theology 
hermeneutics have taken over much epistemological discussion, but nevertheless it is still a 
considerably distinct field of exploration which focuses on the foundation (or non-foundation) of 
knowledge which intersects with, and in Barth’s case, provides groundwork for, thinking about 
interpretation. For an excellent discussion of the relationship between the problem of epistemology 
and hermeneutics, see Paul Ricoeur’s article “What is a text? Explanation and Understanding” in 
Ricœur, Hermeneutics and the Human Sciences: Essays on Language, Action and Interpretation, 
chapter 5. 
17 CD I/2, 565-566. 
18 Whether general hermeneutics is inescapably theological, as Kevin Vanhoozer argues, is quite 
another matter. But it is true that general hermeneutics, like every other philosophical thinking, can be 
evaluated from a theological point of view, and in this sense, it can be found theologically inadequate. 
For Vanhoozer’s argument see his article “The Spirit of Understanding” in Vanhoozer, First 
Theology: God, Scripture & Hermeneutics, chapter 7. 
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fundamental, that is, a theological vision of reality in which theological exegesis 
takes place.  
Our approach is a thematic reading of the Church Dogmatics, and in this 
regard we read it from the point of view of Barth’s later theological ontology. Our 
method presupposes that Barth’s theological ontology of being in becoming becomes 
more consistently explicated in terms of Christology and election in Church 
Dogmatics Book IV. As such our reading of the earlier part of Church Dogmatics 
will take Barth’s later theological ontology to supplement the theological ontology of 
Barth’s earlier treatment on revelation and the Word of God in Book I.1 and I.2. In 
this regard our reading while generally exegetical, is also constructive in regard to 
bringing in later material to revise ontological assumption of the early part of Church 
Dogmatic.19 This will particularly clarify where our argument on the actualism of 
God in revelation will be understood in relation to the history of God’s dealing with 
humanity in Jesus Christ. We posit that the freedom of God is defined by the election 
of God in Jesus as God of humanity. God is at the same time free from humanity and 
also free for humanity. 
Our argument will consist of a five-part analysis which begins with a brief 
argument for the relevance of doctrine for an ontological understanding of 
hermeneutics. From this analysis we will offer a Trinitarian account of what is 
commonly known as “Barth’s actualism” in relation to his theology of God’s being 
in becoming, and, the being in becoming of reality in general. Next we will analyse 
Barth’s Christology in relation to his ontological analogy that will provide a 
theological realism of being as God’s determination to be God in Christ. This will 
bring us to a discussion on election in which God’s decision of his being provides the 
ontological basis for the actuality of revelation and reading of Scripture as an 
actualization of God’s freedom in human freedom. We will conclude the chapter 
                                                 
19 Our approach in this part is indebted to the analysis of Bruce McCormack. In his recent article, 
McCormack argues that there is a crucial ontological difference in Christology between CD I/2 and 
CD IV/1-3 that it would be a mistake to read his later Christology in the light of the earlier, but rather, 
it must be seen, that Barth’s later Christology stands in an ontological revision of his early 
Christological proposal. See Bruce L. McCormack, "Karl Barth's Historicised Christology: Just How 
"Chalcedonian"Is It?," in Orthodox and Modern: Studies in the Theology of Karl Barth (Grand 
Rapids: Baker Academic, 2008), 201-33. 
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with the implications of this analysis for our understanding of Barth’s ontology of 
interpretation. 
1. The ontological significance of doctrine 
Hermeneutics cannot escape ontology. The problem of hermeneutics is ultimately the 
problem of being as interpreted being. In what follows we will explain what we mean 
by these two interconnected statements, provide criticism of their ultimate claim and 
argue why doctrine should replace such a claim in a Christian reading of Scripture. 
We agree with Gadamer and Ricœur that hermeneutics is grounded in a reflection on 
an ontology of understanding, but, we will argue that, theologically speaking, general 
hermeneutics does not give a proper account of the theological nature of reality, i.e., 
hermeneutics starts and ends with anthropology, thus it does not provide a proper 
basis for discourse on a divine communicative presence.  
The development of hermeneutics from a special field of textual exegesis to a 
general description of human understanding was generated by a philosophical 
question of what it means for a human being to understand a text.20 It was perceived 
as a necessary pre-requisite to clarify the philosophical meaning of ‘understanding’ 
before a true textual exploration is achieved. The technical problem of textual 
exegesis developed into a philosophical problem of meaning and language, of sign 
and signification. In their own characteristic way, every approach to hermeneutics 
has, what Paul Ricœur calls, “the ontological roots of comprehension” i.e. what 
existentially happens when someone comprehends a text.21 Such ontological roots 
operate as a kind of working hypothesis or an axiomatic presupposition that underlies 
one’s approach. It might not be clear at the beginning of the interpretative process. 
For some, ontology might only appear in the midst of an interpretative process or 
only be realized at the end of the process. Nevertheless, interpretation always 
involves a vision of reality in which comprehension and understanding takes place. 
                                                 
20 The development of hermeneutics as a discipline and how it becomes deeply involved in the 
problem of philosophy and historical understanding is well documented in Wilhelm Dilthey, "The 
Rise of Hermeneutics," New Literary History 3, no. 2 (1972): 229-44. Paul Ricœur discusses and 
provides criticism of Dilthey’s account in his section on “the Origin of Hermeneutics” in Ricœur, 
"Existence and Hermeneutics," in The Conflict of Interpretations: Essays in Hermeneutics, 3-5. 




Hermeneutics derives its existence from an ontological thinking about reality, 
including the reality of the text or as invoked by the interpretation of the text.  
 In the development of hermeneutical study, reflection on the role of history in 
hermeneutics is very important. A human being is an historical being and situated in 
a specific historical lived-world. As such, understanding and history are closely 
connected. As a being in history, understanding is an event in a particular plausibility 
structure i.e. plausible within this specific historical epoch. History is the field of 
reality where understanding takes place and, paradoxically, about which an historical 
being is trying to understand an historical phenomenon historically. The 
hermeneutical problem of an historical human being is, as Ricœur probes it, “how 
can a historical being understand history historically?”22 This question opens up a 
further fundamental problem in hermeneutics, a question of philosophical identity 
and the meaning of being historically. In sum, it questions whether historical reality 
must be understood as something purely accidental without its original meaning, or 
whether there is something inherently meaningful in history and in the life of a 
historical being. At its root it is “the problem of the relationship between force and 
meaning, between life as the bearer of meaning and the mind as capable of linking 
meaning into a coherent series.”23 There is a deep ontological query involved in this 
regard, as Ricœur rightly notes, “If life is not originally meaningful, understanding is 
forever impossible.”24 
   On the other hand, understanding is not only historically bound, it is also 
linguistically mediated. At a phenomenological level, there is no meaning before 
speech. From a hermeneutical point of view, meaning is an expression of life in the 
event of a historical being. As an expression of life, meaning is objectified into a 
semantic structure. For understanding to be possible, it requires the interpreter to 
reverse this objectification process in the act of interpreting. Linguistically speaking, 
an interpretation of a text is a reversal process of life objectified in writing.25 The 
                                                 
22 Ibid., 5. 
23 Ibid. 
24 Ibid. 
25 Ibid., 11. 
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reversal nature of interpretation brings to the fore the fact that at the linguistic level 
meaning is not always univocal. Hermeneutics attempts to explain that the problem 
of multiple meanings is not the result of confusions of understanding but a necessary 
reality on the ground of this reversal process in the act of interpreting life-objectified. 
As such, at the linguistic level, the surplus of meaning is perceived as a necessary 
hermeneutical reality. But a problem arises when such surplus of meaning is justified 
on ontological grounds. It needs a transcendental explanation that the problem of 
equivocality is not just rooted in a semantic predicament but also in the experience of 
life itself.  More specifically, it requires an ontological explanation that the logic of 
linguistic plurality of meaning is rooted in human existence and is not simply a 
confusion of meaning.26 
 The ultimate question in this regard is the question of being as interpreted 
being. The ontology of understanding consists not only in the historical and linguistic 
existence of the human being in relation to meaning and understanding, but in the 
mode of being in which being understands itself as being in relation to the discovery 
of life objectified within the text. It is here that the problem of equivocation finds its 
final justification. The rediscovery of being at the ontological level provides an 
answer and a justification for such a problem. At this point, the transcendental 
explanation of understanding turns into a problem of self-understanding. Ultimately 
it is not merely about a semantic of equivocality but about how being discovers itself 
in various ways through the discovery of life within the text. In other words, the 
being of the human is the ultimate problem of hermeneutics. Whether being is 
understood in the semantic of desire (as in Freud’s analysis), or in the struggle for 
authentic self and power (Nietzsche) or in the symbolic representation of the divine 
(religious studies), the being of the human is the hermeneutical problem of textual 
interpretation. Hermeneutics, at the ontological level, relies on a transcendental 
anthropology in relation to being as interpreted being. Human being as interpreted 
being is the ultimate problem in the ontology of general hermeneutics. 
 In the final analysis, the vision of reality in the study of hermeneutics is 
rooted in a certain doctrine of being, specifically in a phenomenological description 
                                                 
26 Ibid., 18. 
105 
 
of human being as interpreted being. Hermeneutics is inescapably an exploration of 
ontological vision that gives rise to a specific ontological version. If this analysis is 
correct, then there is a theological question to be asked at this point. The question is: 
should theology follow the ontology of general hermeneutics and begin with 
anthropology rather than theology proper? Should not theology begin with the 
doctrine of God, and explore the being of the human in the light of God’s being as 
all-encompassing reality? We posit that this is not just a matter of a conceptual 
procedure of a theological analysis, whether to begin with the doctrine of humanity 
or the doctrine of God. More fundamentally, what is at stake here is the question 
whether the being of God is a reality that is prevenient or not in theological 
construction. If it is, the reality of God is more than a theological starting point. In 
other words, divine reality is not just assumed but also prevenient in textual 
engagement, and as such in the question of hermeneutics. Hermeneutics in general 
explores the problem of understanding from a point of view where human being is all 
there is to be considered or possible to be considered. It does not consider the being 
of God as something prevenient within its field of analysis. To depend solely on its 
insight for the church’s reading of Scripture places theological interpretation in a 
field of vision in which human being is the sole reality, and consequently the 
ultimate reality. At this point we posit that theological hermeneutics needs to explore 
beyond the anthropological analysis of modern hermeneutics to be truly theological 
as a hermeneutics. It must begin with the being of God before it constructs the being 
of human in the church’s reading of Scripture.  
 In distinction from general hermeneutics, Barth’s theology affirms that, “the 
being of God is the hermeneutical problem of theology.”27 As a theologian of the 
church, Barth does not borrow a transcendental ontology from a philosophical 
analysis of human subjectivity, or for that matter, a teleological system of history, or 
any constructive vision inspired by either natural or social sciences.  He believes that 
the language and the concept for ontological description of the church’s reading of 
Scripture, materially and formally, should be explicated from Christian theology. 
                                                 
27 Eberhard Jüngel, God's Being Is in Becoming: The Trinitarian Being of God in the Theology of Karl 
Barth, trans. John Webster (Edinburgh: T.&T Clark, 2001), 10. 
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While he never writes an interpretative ontology, we will argue that, for him, 
dogmatics provides the ontological vision of what takes place in the Church’s 
interpretation of Scripture. It is not primarily a description of human understanding, 
although this can be implied; nor is it a methodological prescription of interpretation, 
although a prescriptive suggestion is not altogether irrelevant; nor is it primarily 
about the text, the author and the reader, i.e., what is the hermeneutical situation in 
which these aspects theologically located, though they have their rightful places. For 
Barth, the question of hermeneutics ultimately concerns the being of God. This is 
because, for Barth, the being of God precedes and determines all human theological 
enquiry, as Jüngel posits, “God’s being goes before the theological question about 
God’s being.”28 
 The profundity of this statement lies beyond a claim that the being of God is 
the presupposition of theological enquiry.29 If this is what Barth means, it could be 
transcended by a radical questioning of such a presupposition, even if the being of 
God is the presupposition. Every presupposition, including the theological, is 
ultimately a human presupposition. All human presuppositions can be transcended if 
they are merely cognitive assertions. The being of God is not a presupposition of 
theological enquiry. In Barth’s theological ontology, as Jüngel explains, “The being 
of God goes before all theological questioning in such a way that in its movement it 
paves the way for questioning, leading the questioning for the first time onto the path 
of thinking.”30 In other words, God’s being proceeds to open the path of theological 
understanding and it precedes human theological enquiry. It is this reality that makes 
understanding theologically possible in the first place.  
The root of this conviction in Barth’s theology is not in a general belief of 
God’s providence. Barth’s theology provides a deeper layer of doctrinal conviction, 
i.e., the Trinitarian understanding of the eternal proceeding in the being of God in 
which there is already an encounter between God and human.31 Specifically, this 
                                                 
28 Ibid., 9. 
29 Ibid. 
30 Ibid. 
31 Ibid., 10. 
107 
 
eternal proceeding is the event of Christ, which first of all is an encounter between 
the electing God and elected humanity.  Put simply, the event of Jesus Christ in the 
eternal proceeding of God’s being is the real problem of hermeneutics from a 
dogmatic point of view. Barth posits,  
At no level or time can we have to do with God without having also to do 
with this man. We cannot conceive ourselves and the world without first 
conceiving this man with God as the witness of the gracious purpose with 
which God willed and created ourselves and the world and in which we may 
exist in it and with it.32 
In this context, the ontological question is a question in light of Barth’s doctrine of 
Trinity, Christology and Election. These doctrines, we posit, provide the formal and 
material description and language for Barth’s ontology of interpretation. They are 
intricately related to each other in Barth’s theology. The basic conviction is that the 
immanent being of God proceeds, which implies that God is a living being, both in 
the inner life (immanently) and in the work (economically) of God. God is always 
present and always active, including in the Church’s activity of biblical 
interpretation. Divine communication is not an alien activity to the immanent divine 
life but a threefold reiteration of God’s immanent being in the historical activity of 
God. In this regard, the vision of reality is shaped by the conviction that God’s being 
is in becoming. 
In what follows we will explore in what ways these doctrines provide the 
necessary ontological foundation for Barth’s hermeneutics. We will begin with the 
material consequences of Barth’s doctrine of the Trinity for an ontological 
understanding of hermeneutics. Our reading of this doctrine follows what can be 
called a “strong” reading of the relationship between Trinity and election.33 This 
means that the doctrine of the Trinity and election is connected in such a way that 
God’s relation to his being is decided in God’s self-determination in Jesus Christ.34 
While Barth is not always consistent in his presentation of the “strong” reading 
                                                 
32 CD IV/2, 33. 
33 Paul T. Nimmo, "Barth and the Election-Trinity Debate: A Pneumatological View," in Trinity and 
Election in Contemporary Theology, ed. Michael T. Dempsey (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2011), 163.  
34 For a lively debate in this matter, see the collection of essays in Dempsey, Trinity and Election in 
Contemporary Theology.  
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between Trinity and election, even in his later theology,35 the virtue of this way of 
reading is that it takes into account the development of Barth’s theology in which his 
later reflection modifies some of his earlier conclusions.36 On the other hand a 
“weak” reading of the doctrine, which argues that Trinity must logically precede 
God’s election, does not give a proper account on Barth’s evidently “strong” account 
on the relationship between Trinity and election. While a “weak” reading can still be 
supported by Barth’s later writings, it fails to account for the fact that Barth is not 
always consistent in this matter. This approach tends to read passages that support 
“strong” readings either metaphorically or reductively.37 The “strong” reading has 
the virtue of taking into account the developmental aspect of Barth’s theology and 
the fact that Barth’s exploration of election and reconciliation supersedes his earlier 
account on the Trinity. 
2. Trinity and Ontology 
2.1. Revelation as God’s self-interpretation 
First, we will explicate the significance of the doctrine of the Trinity for Barth’s 
ontology of interpretation. Our reference at this point is the salient feature of Barth’s 
Trinitarian exposition in the Church Dogmatics particularly I/1and I/2.38 In this 
volume, Barth argues that Church Dogmatics is a theological discourse within the 
context of the Church.  It is not a philosophical inquiry into the possibility of 
transcendental knowledge.39 Barth presupposes that God’s revelation is heard, known 
                                                 
35 Among others, CD IV/2, 31, 345.  
36 See also our discussion on election and ontology below.  
37 Nimmo, "Barth and the Election-Trinity Debate: A Pneumatological View," in Trinity and Election 
in Contemporary Theology, 177. 
38 At this point in the argument we will not discuss the genetic problem of Barth’s theology in which, 
as McCormack perceptively sees and Matthias Gockel argues further, there is a crucial ontological 
shift in Barth’s exploration of the doctrine of election (CD II/2) from an actualism with a remnant of 
essentialist influence to a full working out of actualism which only more consistently used in Barth’s 
exploration of the Doctrine of Reconciliation (CD IV). For exploration of this matter, see 
McCormack, Karl Barth's Critically Realistic Dialectical Theology: Its Genesis and Development, 
1909-1936, 455-58; Matthias Gockel, Barth and Schleiermacher on the Doctrine of Election: A 
Systematic-Theological Comparison (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), 158-95; McCormack, 
Orthodox and Modern: Studies in the Theology of Karl Barth, 213-18. For our purpose, the 
implication of Barth’s Trinitarian ontology for hermeneutics is quite a consistent one so that we will 
limit our discussion on this matter and only enter into this problem in the later part of this chapter 
where it will become relevant.  
39 Cf. John Webster, Barth (London: Continuum, 2000), 51. 
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and believed in and by the Church, thus focusing his treatment on “describing how 
things look once one is inside the region or culture of the church.”40 In this context, 
the foundation of theological activity is established on the ground of the self-
revealing Trinity. It is the self-communicative presence of God that provides the 
material content and the formal shape of Barth’s theological epistemology. In the 
strict sense this is not an epistemology. There is no methodological prescription that 
can be construed into a knowledge system by this approach. But it is not anti-
foundational either, because there is a foundation for a theological epistemology; but 
it is not in the form of a conceptual framework that can be readily applied to 
theological discourse.41 Hence, Barth does not shy away from discussing and making 
remarks on methodological issues. Nevertheless, it is the living and active 
communicative presence of God that he believes generates the insights of describing 
the theological process of knowing God. According to Webster, for Barth, the Holy 
Trinity is “the methods, norms and source of theology.”42 
Structurally, the doctrine of the Trinity is located (I/1) where prolegomena is 
generally to be expected in a systematic theology. This structural decision, as Jüngel 
points out, is “a hermeneutical decision of the greatest relevance.”43 It means that the 
doctrine of the Trinity has a hermeneutical significance, not only formally but also 
materially, for Barth’s architectonic vision of the subject matter of dogmatics.44 It is 
through this doctrine that Barth engages in the discussion on the Church’s 
responsible talk about God, a discussion which is commonly engaged in a 
prolegomena of Christian doctrine. Barth’s approach changes the question of 
                                                 
40 Ibid. 
41 For an in-depth discussion of this issue see McCormack’s article “Beyond Non-Foundational and 
Postmodern Readings of Barth” in McCormack, Orthodox and Modern: Studies in the Theology of 
Karl Barth, chapter 5. 
42 Webster, Barth, 51. 
43 Jüngel, God's Being Is in Becoming: The Trinitarian Being of God in the Theology of Karl Barth, 
16. The doctrine of Trinity as hermeneutically significant has been previously pointed in Friedrich 
Schmid, Verkündigung Und Dogmatik in Der Theologie Karl Barths: Hermeneutik Und Ontologie in 
Einer Theologie Des Wortes Gottes (München: C. Kaiser, 1964). 
44 The role of Trinity in providing structure and language for theology, not only for prolegomena but 
also for the whole CD has been shown by Benjamin C. Leslie, Trinitarian Hermeneutics: The 
Hermeneutical Significance of Karl Barth's Doctrine of the Trinity (New York: Peter Lang, 1991). See 
specially chapter 2. 
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theological prolegomena. It is not a question of epistemological, but rather a question 
of dogmatic explication. Thus, for Barth, the real question is not “how can we talk 
about God at all?” but what it means to talk about God as the “object” of a 
theological discourse. It starts with the belief that the church does talk about God. It 
asks about what are the meanings of this fact and it explores the implications of the 
theological reality.  
When we turn to the doctrine of Trinity, specifically §8 and §9, Barth 
explores a complex relationship between God’s immanent being and God’s historical 
(spatio-temporal) revelation in God’s presence to the church.   Barth’s argument is 
that God’s revelation in history is a reiteration of God’s inner being in the Trinitarian 
relationship of Father, Son and Holy Spirit. As Jüngel rightly points out, God’s 
Trinitarian being is an event of mutual self-giving in love in which “God as being 
distinguished and differentiated within itself.”45 As such the historical self-giving of 
God to the human being is not something alien to God’s being. It is, at its essence, a 
reiteration of God’s self-giving of the inner Trinitarian perichoresis in God’s being. 
For Barth, God’s self-giving to humanity is already anticipated in the event of God’s 
Trinitarian self-giving within God-self. 
 The implications of such an ontological construct for Barth’s relationship to 
philosophy, hermeneutics and biblical studies are enormous. At any rate, it is not 
intended to close or to protect theology from critical inquiry. God’s self-giving to 
humanity, as a self-giving to humanity, is an event that involves humanity’s rational 
ability. The rational and critical engagement of dogmatics is not only theologically 
justified but also rooted in Trinitarian self-giving. Critical inquiry is necessary and 
must be endeavoured by the church as a responsible faith-response to the revealing 
God. On the other hand, in and by itself, there is no possibility of human rational 
inquiry capable of transcendental truth, that is, independent of revelation.46 Barth 
accepts the basic Kantian assumptions that human rational inquiry is not only 
incapable of transcendental truth but that the subject matter itself (divine reality) is 
                                                 
45 Jüngel, God's Being Is in Becoming: The Trinitarian Being of God in the Theology of Karl Barth, 
41-42. 
46 Trevor Hart, "Revelation," in Cambridge Companion to Karl Barth, ed. John Webster (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2000), 41. 
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basically unintuitible as an object of cognitive investigation.47 The theological 
solution to this problem is that God must make God-self intuitible to the human.48 In 
principle, this is not something that can be deduced from a philosophical first 
principle but a truth of revelation that is made known by God in a self-revealing act. 
It is a truth of a real and concrete divine act. On the other hand, not everyone in the 
theological community, at Barth’s time and in ours, contests the possibility of an 
independent rational inquiry into the divine reality as a principle of theological 
investigation.49 Accepting this “point of contact” means theological inquiry sets itself 
upon a search for a link between the church’s faith-based discourse and philosophical 
axioms, between “faith seeking understanding” and the deduction of a first principle 
into “a greater nexus of being.”50 It results in an abstraction of God’s revelation as a 
phenomenon of historical contingency universally open for philosophical inquiry. In 
other words, he rejects the possibility of doing theology built upon the 
presuppositions of natural theology.51 
Barth’s specific argument to solve the Kantian epistemological problem is 
based on a belief that God stands not as an object of inquiry but as a subject who is 
actively inquiring in the event of revelation, and in this way provides God-self as an 
object of human knowledge. In relation to God’s revelation to the church, revelation 
is not only God’s self-revelation but also God’s self-interpretation. Specifically, it is 
not a revelation of a concept or a series of propositions but of God’s being, i.e., 
revelation is a self-interpretation event of God’s being. Barth believes that any 
attempt to objectify God’s being as an object of theological study, without the act of 
God’s self-interpretation, is misleading and erroneous. Human knowledge cannot 
                                                 
47 McCormack, Orthodox and Modern: Studies in the Theology of Karl Barth, 111. 
48 Ibid. 
49 Rudolf Bultmann, for example, criticises Barth at this point. In his letter to Barth on June 8, 1928, 
he wrote, “It seems to me that you are guided by a concern that theology should achieve emancipation 
from philosophy …Now if the critical work of philosophy … is ignored, the result is that dogmatics 
work with the uncritically adopted concepts of an older ontology. This is what happens in your case.” 
In reply Barth argues that it is Bultmann’s dependence of philosophy that makes his theology shaped 
more by philosophy and less by the subject matter of theology. See Karl Barth and Rudolf Bultmann, 
Karl Barth-Rudolf Bultmann Letters, 1922-1966, ed. Bernd Jaspert, trans. Geoffrey W. Bromiley 
(Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1982), 39, 41. 
50 CD I/1, 36. 
51 Cf. Webster, Barth, 54. 
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inquire into the divine reality as an object of its investigation. Barth perceives the 
best way to resist the human’s objectification of God is through an ontological 
description of God’s own objectivity in God’s revelation, specifically, the revelation 
as God’s self-interpretation of his being. The way Barth achieves this objective, we 
argue, is by offering the divine trinity as the being in becoming in the event of 
revelation as  the way of preserving God’s objectivity in God’s self.52 It is as being in 
becoming that God is portrayed as an objective reality in God’s self and to the 
church. God is an objective reality to God-self and to the church in the act of divine 
communicative grace. But does not this understanding entail a philosophical reaction 
to the notion of divine objectivity inspired by Kant’s philosophy? Is this becoming an 
abstract construct that attempts to find a proper way of speaking about God? 
We posit that Barth’s approach is less of a reactive theological position 
against divine objectification and more a theological implication inspired by the 
material content of dogmatic exposition. It is the theological content that informs 
Barth’s approach and not a philosophical abstraction of divine being.  In this context, 
a divine objectivity is an objectivity of God in relation to God’s self-objectification in 
revelation. Human beings cannot objectify God as something to be inquired, but God 
can objectify God-self in the event of revelation. More importantly, God wills to 
objectify God-self in revelation. The dialectic between the non-objectification of God 
to human reason and the self-objectivity of God in the event of revelation shapes 
Barth’s epistemological approach to theological knowledge. As such, while the 
objectivity of God is acknowledged, it is not a given reality always available to 
human inquiry at any time and place. On the contrary, it is always an event, i.e., a 
subjective and a concrete act of God. God is being in action.53 In the event of God’s 
being-in-act God is making God-self available as an object of knowledge. As such, in 
                                                 
52 Jüngel, God's Being Is in Becoming: The Trinitarian Being of God in the Theology of Karl Barth, 
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theological knowledge, God is not firstly an object of inquiry but a subject who 
inquires; God is only an object of knowledge in the act of divine self-
objectification.54 Concretely, God’s being is not only the content of revelation, but 
also God is the Being who comes to speak in the event of revelation. It is “Dei 
loquentis persona” (God speaking in person).55 Both the form and the content of 
revelation have to do with God in his act, such that the event of revelation as well as 
what is revealed are both God’s. In other words, God is the subject, the predicate and 
the object of revelation, or as Barth puts it, God is “the revealer, the revelation and 
the revealedness.”56 The being of God as Triune shapes the way theological 
knowledge is known to the human believer. Barth believes that the relationship 
between God’s revelation and our theological knowledge will always be a miracle 
and an event of God’s revelation. 57 It is always a movement from God who revealed, 
reveals and promises to reveal.  
This theological epistemology entails the concept of an impossible possibility. 
As such, it is only possible within the Trinitarian understanding of revelation as a 
miracle and an event. It is a miracle because God has decided to reveal something 
the human mind cannot inquire and that there is a possibility of speaking of a 
theological knowledge of God. This possibility is necessarily a miracle of faith by 
the work of the Holy Spirit in the event of human theological knowledge. This 
approach implies that a theological understanding, which is based on the conviction 
of revelation, does not automatically ensure a right understanding without 
simultaneous divine guidance. It must be a miracle and an event, and only in these 
dual senses, is theological knowledge both possible and impossible. 
What is the implication of such theological epistemology for Barth’s 
hermeneutics? It defines the methodological limitation of hermeneutics where the 
question of God is involved. It invites us to an open space to discourse about the role 
of prayer, doctrine and church in theological interpretation. It shapes the way in 
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which text, reader and author are understood. In this chapter, however, we will limit 
our analysis to explore the implication in relation to the ontology of hermeneutics. 
More specifically, we will explicate Barth’s ontological thinking in relation to a 
Trinitarian understanding of God’s being in becoming. It is here Barth’s 
epistemology shapes an ontological approach that is important for understanding his 
hermeneutics. 
2.2. The ontological implications for hermeneutics 
Grounded in Barth’s theological epistemology, we posit that Barth’s theological 
ontology is grounded in the Trinitarian understanding of God’s being in becoming. In 
a sense, Barth’s ontological exploration is pursued in a different direction from the 
metaphysical question, “what is ultimate reality?” In the strict sense of the term, 
Barth’s Church Dogmatics, as Jüngel comments, “is not an ontology; at least not in 
the sense of a doctrine of being drawn up on the basis of a general ontological 
conception within which the being of God (as highest being, as being-itself, etc) 
would be treated in its place.”58 Instead, Barth offers an account with a serious 
consideration of the reality of God’s being as it is revealed in Jesus Christ as the 
basis of his ontology.  In this respect, God’s being precedes all human understanding, 
meaning that Barth’s ontology is shaped by the subject matter and its description can 
only take the form of a following after God’s revelation such that human 
understanding is a function of God’s self-interpretation. 
 It will be helpful for conceptual clarification to differentiate Barth’s ontology 
from both essentialist ontology and process ontology. In the former account, the 
vision of reality is constructed in terms of an actualization of substance or being that 
ultimately defines the field of action of an agent (if it is a person) or the 
characteristics of an event. As McCormack rightly comments, in essentialist 
ontology “what a person ‘is’ is something that is complete in and for itself, apart 
from and prior to all  the decisions, acts, and relations that make up the sum total of 
the lived existence of the person in question.”59 The event itself does not have a role 
                                                 
58 Jüngel, God's Being Is in Becoming: The Trinitarian Being of God in the Theology of Karl Barth, 
76.  
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in determining the nature of reality, and if it involves it at all, it is understood as a 
manifestation of a more or less definitive essence. The dynamic of the event is rooted 
in the being which defines the nature of an action or an event.  
On the other hand, in process philosophy, reality is an open and dynamic 
process in the flux of history. Ultimately, the process itself is the ultimate reality 
such that the changes in history shape not only human reality but also the inner being 
of God (in a definitive way). By implication, both the being of God and the being of 
the human are unfolded in and through the course of historical events. In this 
construal God becomes in the process of historical events. Ultimately God’s 
becoming is a function of the absoluteness of process.  
Barth’s view of God’s being in becoming is different from essentialist 
ontology and process philosophy. McCormack rightly comments that for Barth, 
“God’s being is not reciprocally related to the world he created such that events that 
occur in the latter should exercise an influence on his being.”60 More importantly, 
Barth builds his ontological approach from the material content of Christian 
dogmatics that is not surrendered to a philosophical category of being.61 For Barth, 
there is no special ontology of being from which the being of God is construed. As 
Jüngel rightly comments, “revelation is the criterion of all ontological statements in 
theology.”62 Specifically, Barth perceives no separation between being and action, 
and between word and deed in the act of God’s revelation.  Barth’s ontology is built 
upon the conviction that the revelation of God is the action of God, and the action of 
God is the being of God, in such a way that the simultaneity of being and action is 
established.63 In this ontological rendering, the common distinction between being 
and action is not applicable and cannot limit or define the descriptive construal of 
God’s being. On the contrary, God’s revelation, understood as an event of God’s 
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action and being, will be a determinative material substance through which the 
distinction between being and action are assessed and reconstructed. 
This complex concept is commonly known as actualism, which according to 
George Hunsinger, is the motif that “governs Barth’s complex conception of being 
and time.”64 Hunsinger also comments that for Barth “being is always an event and 
often an act” and is always understood as “an act whenever an agent capable of 
decision is concerned.”65 The meaning of this motif in relation to the divine and 
human involves a critical construct in which “the possibility for the human creature 
to act faithfully in relation to the divine creator is thought to rest entirely in the 
divine act, and therefore continually befalls the human creature as a miracle to be 
sought ever anew.”66 But, as Paul Nimmo rightly argues, “Barth’s actualistic 
ontology goes far beyond the dynamism of God as a Being in act.”67 It is not simply 
a motif for understanding Barth’s theology but, more profoundly, a complex 
conception that the immanence of God is not different from God in the divine 
economy.68 Barth posits that “God is who He is in His work.”69 In the event of 
revelation, God reveals “not only His reality for us-certainly that-but at the same 
time His own, inner, proper reality behind which and above which there is no 
other.”70 
This does not mean that in becoming God would become another being. What 
it means is that God’s becoming is the nature of God’s ontological being.71 God is a 
living being rather than a static one. More specifically, because God’s being is in 
becoming, the being of God is not a separate entity from the action of God. The 
being of God is the action of God and the action of God is the being of God. As such 
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the Trinitarian reiteration of God’s action defines Barth’s ontology in which “God is 
God’s act.”72 The being of God is not “the real face of God” behind God’s economic 
action whose identity is hidden behind the action of God. On the contrary God’s 
action in the world is a proper revelation of God’s inner Trinitarian being.73 As an 
ontological concept, Barth’s theology employs descriptions “which hold together 
being and act, instead of tearing them apart like the idea of ‘essence’.”74 Thomas 
Torrance rightly notes that God’s becoming “does not mean that God ever becomes 
other than he eternally is…, but rather that he continues unceasingly to be what he 
always is and ever will be in the living movement of his eternal being…. His 
becoming is his Being in movement and his Being in movement is his Becoming.”75 
As Jüngel rightly points out, God’s being in becoming “is not a matter of the ‘God 
who becomes’; God’s being is not identified with God’s becoming; rather, God’s 
being is ontologically located.”76 
The doctrine of the Trinity, as the real material content of Barth’s ontology, 
means that this ontology is a description of Trinitarian life. There is an analogy of 
relationship between God’s being ad intra and God’s work ad extra. More 
specifically, Barth’s ontological understanding is built upon the Trinity as the self-
related God.  For Barth, the Trinity is the relational event of God’s being as 
becoming.  In this regard, the inner relational life of Trinity is not a predicate of the 
being of God; the Trinitarian relationship is the being of God. In becoming related to 
each other, God eternally exists with and in Trinitarian relatedness. The Trinitarian 
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relationship shapes the ontological meaning of relationship. For Barth, God’s 
relationship to the world finds its root in God’s inner life as Trinity of relation. The 
meaning the formula, “the being of God is in becoming,” is defined by an ontology 
of being that is relationally construed. Jüngel posits:  
The modes of God’s being which are differentiated from each other are 
related to each other in such a way that each mode of God’s being becomes 
what it is only with the two other modes of being. The relational structuring 
in God’s being expresses different ‘relation of origin’ and ‘procession’ in 
God’s being. As the being of God, Father, Son and Holy Spirit, God’s being 
is thus a being in becoming.77 
The relationality of God’s being does not imply that the being of God is isolated 
from humanity. On the contrary because God is relational in God’s being, God is 
truly being God in the act of God’s decision to be God for humanity. It does not 
mean that God is incomplete without humanity, but as Barth posits,  
[God] does not will to be God for Himself nor as God to be alone with 
Himself. He wills as God to be for us and with us who are not God. Inasmuch 
as He is Himself and affirms Himself, in distinction and opposition to 
everything that He is not. He places Himself in this relation to us. He does not 
will to be Himself in any other way than He is in this relationship.78 
This brings to the fore an ontology of love in Barth’s theological vision of 
reality. The Trinitarian relationship ad intra is reiterated in God’s loving relationship 
to humanity ad extra. This does not mean that God’s action is moved by humanity. 
Barth posits, “God is not the being moved in and by us which we know or think we 
know as our movement of nature and spirit.”79 On the contrary “God’s being is not 
only moved being, but self-moved being.”80 According to Barth this implies that “the 
movement of nature and spirit, which occurs in His revelation and is effected by it, 
does not lead back to any self-movement of man.”81 But at the same time, God’s 
relation to humanity as the reiteration of Trinitarian inner-relationship is constituted 
in God’s being in becoming for humanity. There is an important dialectic in this 
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regard. While God’s being in Trinitarian self-relatedness is the ontological source of 
God’s being for us, it is simultaneously constituted in the relation of God to 
humanity in the event of revelation.82 As God’s eternal act, there is no temporal or 
ontological priority in this regard, but only a dialectical relationship between God’s 
work ad intra and ad extra. However as God’s determination of God-self, it is God’s 
determination for humanity that constitutes God’s being in becoming of God’s 
Trinitarian relationship. 
The specific content of God’s being in becoming is the act of love, originated 
in God’s inner being and reiterated in God’s love for humanity i.e. reconciliation. 
Revelation and reconciliation are profoundly integrated in Barth’s understanding of 
God’s being. Barth argues that, “Revelation in fact does not differ from the person of 
Jesus Christ nor from the reconciliation accomplished in him.”83 Barth explicates the 
nature of God’s love in four interconnected descriptions. First, “God’s loving is 
concerned with a seeking and creation of fellowship for its own sake.”84 There is 
giving and receiving in this relationship. But, Barth posits, “God does not give us 
something, but Himself; and giving us Himself, giving us His only Son, He gives us 
everything.”85 Second, God’s love is not conditioned by reciprocity and worthiness 
of humanity.86 In fact, the love of God creates the capacity for love on the side of 
humanity, reaches into the darkness and blindness without which there will be no 
fellowship between God and humanity. Third, “God’s loving is an end in itself.”87 
Barth posits that God’s glory and humanity’s salvation are the function of God’s 
love. “Certainly in loving us God wills His own glory and our salvation.  But He 
does not love us because He wills this. He wills it for the sake of His love.” As such 
“without and before realising these purposes” God loves because “Even in realising 
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them, He loves because He loves.”88 Finally, “God’s loving is necessary, for it is the 
being, the essence and the nature of God. But for this very reason it is also free from 
every necessity in respect of its object.”89 God does not need humanity to have an 
object of God’s love, as if God’s being in loving necessitates humanity as the object. 
The existence of humanity is grace and not natural to the being of God. It is the 
object of God’s love because of the decision in the love and grace of God’s being.  
This fourfold aspect of God’s love is the content of God’s being in the 
Trinitarian relationship of God’s becoming. God’s being is being in act, specifically, 
being in act with a specific content. God’s being is being in the act of love. For 
Barth, the ontological statement that is foundational to all ontological understanding 
is a simple statement that “‘God is’ means ‘God loves’.”90 Thus being in becoming is 
not a philosophical construct of understanding reality nor is it a way of thinking that 
unites being and action in a theological analysis. Barth’s actualism, understood in the 
Trinitarian sense, has a specific content. Being in action is being in a loving 
relationship, in the overflowing of love toward loved ones. This prepares us for the 
concrete realization of God’s love. The ontology of love is not an abstract concept 
for understanding reality. For Barth, the ontology of love is based on the concrete 
and specific reality of God’s love in the relationship between God and humanity. 
This concrete ontological event is the event of Jesus Christ. The next part of our 
analysis will explore this specific content of God’s love. 
3. Christology and Ontology 
As we have argued, Barth’s Trinitarian understanding of epistemology delineates the 
belief that theological knowledge is always a miracle and an event in God’s 
communicative presence. We also point out that this event is not only God’s self-
revelation but also God’s self-interpretation, especially in relation to divine 
objectivity. The theological foundation of this epistemology i.e., the analogy of faith, 
is the self-objectifying act of God in the event of revelation. A deeper analysis has 
shown that the act of revelation is rooted in the ontological relationship of Trinitarian 
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life. It is the dynamic of God’s inner life that is reiterated in God’s act towards 
humanity. This ad extra movement of God has a specific content, which is love. And 
this love is not an abstract idea nor a human feeling but a specific historical event in 
the life of Jesus Christ. Hence, Christology is not only an integral part but also 
constitutive of Trinity in Barth’s theological vision. Nevertheless, there are certain 
themes that can be explored more extensively from a Christological point of view. 
Barth’s mature doctrine of reconciliation develops further in Barth’s Christology 
what is important for his theological ontology, specifically his revision of 
Chalcedonian’s substance ontology and its replacement with an actualistic ontology.  
 In this part of our analysis we will elaborate the ontological basis and 
implications of Barth’s actualism in relation to Christology. The underlying question 
in relation to our argument is this: What is the implication of Barth’s Christology to 
his ontology of interpretation? For this purpose, we will briefly summarize Barth’s 
Christology and explore the implication of such ontology for Barth’s ontology of 
interpretation. We will not attempt to provide a new or comprehensive analysis of 
Barth’s Christology, because it is beyond the scope of the present argument and has 
been provided by quite a number of past and recent studies.91 We will attempt to 
draw ontological implications of such construction for his hermeneutics. We will 
firstly clarify what we mean by Barth’s Christology and then explore the 
implications for our argument. 
3.1. An outline of Karl Barth’s Christology 
What is the shape of Karl Barth’s Christology? In the past, there was a tendency to 
understand Barth’s Christology as situated between the poles of Antiochene-
Alexandrian Christologies. Some propose that it is basically an Antiochene 
Christology, which means that in perceiving the Christological formulation of “one 
person, two natures” Barth emphasizes Jesus’s humanity at the expense of 
undermining his deity.92 Others propose that Barth’s Christology is basically 
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Alexanderian which means that Barth emphasizes Jesus’ divinity in a way that 
somehow undermines his humanity.93 Others argue that Barth’s Christology is 
neither Antiochene nor Alexandrian but faithful to the basic thrust of Chalcedonian 
Christology.94 Our contention is that to construe Barth’s Christology in these terms is 
problematic because, from a strictly historical point of view, there is not only one 
way to interpret Chalcedonian Christology.95 The formula is characterized by 
negation rather than affirmation and can be interpreted in ways that lean more to 
Alexandrian or Antiochene Christologies.96 Furthermore the terms Antiochene and 
Alexandrian are not representative of a definite view of Christology but rather a 
tradition of interpretations that show variations in different theological traditions.  
But more importantly, Barth’s mature work shows a critical development that 
significantly changes his Christological understanding so that even the term 
“Chalcedonian” can only be used in a qualified way to describe his Christology.97  In 
a way we can say Barth’s later Christology (CD IV) supersedes his earlier reflection 
(CD I/2, §15) of Chalcedonian Christology.98 In this regard, there is a crucial 
difference between Christology found in CD I/2 in comparison to CD IV/1-3, 
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particularly on the ontological assumption of the doctrine.99 While in CD I/2, Barth’s 
Christology can be argued as a faithful rendering of Chalcedonian Christology, in 
CD IV/1-3 Barth revised the ontological assumptions of the formula in a way that 
more thoroughly follows his actualistic ontology. There are still continuities between 
the two,100 but, as McCormack rightly observes, “the development is sufficiently 
significant on the level of the precision of his ontological commitments that it would 
be a mistake to simply draw now from CD I/2 and now from the doctrine of 
reconciliation in CD IV/1-3 in elaborating a unified, synthetic picture of 
[Christology]… without considerable qualification.”101 The reason for this change is 
Barth’s critical correction of his whole theology through a new interpretation of the 
doctrine of election (CD II/2) that is construed in a thoroughly actualistic way, e.g., 
revising the essentialist presuppositions of the Chalcedonian formula.102 We will 
consider this change and its implications for Barth’s interpretative ontology in the 
next section. In this section we will note this change, outline what McCormack calls 
“Karl Barth’s historicized Christology” and, more significantly for our purposes, 
draw implications for our proposal on Barth’s ontology of interpretation.  
 In CD I/2 §15.2, entitled “Very God and Very Man”, Barth explores 
Chalcedonian Christology in a three part exposition of John 1:14, “the Word was 
made flesh.”  What is important to note for our purposes is the fact that Barth’s 
ontology, at this point, is close to the essentialist ontology of ancient Platonic 
Christianity. In this view, God is rendered immutable and that the sense of God’s 
“becoming” is isolated in the humanity of Christ. Christopher Stead notes that for 
ancient orthodox Christianity, which was strongly influenced by Platonism, the 
incarnation of Christ could not be seen as a change in the being of God, but only in 
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relation to other, in this case the humanity of Jesus Christ.103 In Platonism, God is 
changeless so that a perceived change in God was thought as a change in what is 
compared to God and not of God in God-self. As such God cannot act in time and 
space because that will mean that God undergoes a process of change. It was thought 
impossible for an immutable god to act in history and time. There is a process of 
perpetual change in time and space, and change means a movement to be greater or 
lesser. God, who is perfect, cannot be thought to become greater or lesser. As such, 
God could only act in history as God incarnate and not as God in God in se. In the 
context of incarnation, to preserve the immutability of God, God in se cannot act in 
but only as God incarnate. It is the human nature of Christ that undergoes change 
brought by Logos’ action in history. In holding to the basic formula “two natures in 
one person” Barth does not critically evaluate this basic ontology that underlies the 
Chalcedonian formula.104 The actualism of Barth’s theology, at this point, only 
reached to the nature of Christ but he did not reflect on the person of Christ, i.e., the 
being of becoming of God in Jesus Christ is located in the human nature but not in 
the second mode of God’s being. It was only later that he reflected on the person of 
Christ when, in CD IV, Barth replaced the language of nature with the language of 
history in his Christology. As a result, Barth asserts that “God Himself in person is 
the Subject of a real human being and acting.”105 But Barth does not explore what 
this statement means in relation to the becoming of the Son of God, i.e., the 
implication of becoming the human Jesus as the becoming of the Son of God. It is 
not clear at this point how Barth would explain that God is a being in becoming 
without undergoing any change in God’s divine essence. In line with the metaphysic 
of Chalcedon, Barth claims that the ontological distance between the being of God 
and the being of the creature explains why the event that took place in the history of 
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Jesus Christ has no clear ontological significance to the being of God.106 Barth’s 
solution to the question of God’s becoming is similar to the Chalcedonian formula in 
which the immutability of God is preserved by distinguishing the ontological 
difference between the eternal Logos and the human Jesus. God is immutable in 
God’s being so that there is no real sense of the becoming God undergoes, because 
becoming is only an event in the human nature of Jesus. The locus of the change is in 
the human nature, and, as such, it does not determine the person of the Son of God. 
God assumes human nature that makes God experience “becoming,” including 
human experiences of death and suffering, but only in the human nature. This 
becoming has no ontological determination to the being of God in the immanence of 
God’s being. McCormack rightly notes, “Against his [Christological] claim that God 
is the Subject of a real human being and acting, [Barth] has virtually rendered this 
claim null and void through his distinction between a becoming of the human nature 
and the becoming of the Word.”107  
 This ontological stance is coherent with Barth’s Christological understanding 
in CD I/2 where Barth accepts a “special Christology” and posits that “His Word will 
still be His Word apart from this becoming [incarnation], just as Father, Son and 
Holy Spirit would be nonetheless eternal God, if no world had been created.”108 The 
purpose of Barth as this point of his exposition is to delineate the freedom of God in 
that the incarnation is not an eternal necessity to the being of God, and to highlight 
the gratuitous nature of the incarnation. But at the same time this view implies that 
the Logos is complete in itself without the becoming of God that takes place in the 
event of incarnation.109 Once again the becoming of God is only an event in the 
human nature of Jesus without any real becoming in the Subject, that is, in the being 
of God. In other words, in CD I/2, Barth accepts the reality of the absolute being of 
logos asarkos (logos without the flesh) in isolation from logos incarnadus (logos to 
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be incarnated). To accept such a possibility i.e. the reality of the Logos in isolation 
from reconciliation, is to posit an abstract Christology in isolation from the concrete 
event of Jesus Christ in history. From the limit of revelation alone, as later Barth will 
argue in CD IV, there is no foundation to accept a possibility of such a metaphysical 
being (independent logos asarkos). This ontological inconsistency in Barth’s early 
Christology is the result of preserving the Chalcedonian metaphysical assumption 
while at the same time holding on to the Trinitarian ontology of being in becoming in 
the theology of revelation. 
 These two ontological convictions undergo a critical evaluation in CD IV/1-
3.110 Barth questions whether there is such a thing as a special Christology in 
isolation from the work of Christ, the Reconciler. Barth posits, “In the New 
Testament there are many christological statements both direct and indirect. But 
where do we find a special Christology? - a Christ in Himself, abstracted from what 
He is amongst the men of Israel and His disciples and the world, from what He is on 
their behalf? Does He ever exist except in this relationship?”111 Barth argues that 
there is no ontological difference between God in God-self and God in the history of 
Jesus Christ. Barth posits, “His being as this One is His history, and His history is 
this His being.”112 As such, there is no such thing as a logos asarkos, an absolute 
being, who exists independent of the event of Christ in history. The incarnation of 
Christ means that God eternally decides to be God in Jesus Christ and none other. 
Barth posits, 
If it is true that God became man, then in this we have to recognise and 
respect His eternal will and purpose and resolve-His free and gracious will 
which He did not owe it either to Himself or to the world to have, by which 
He did not need to come to the decision to which He has in fact come, and 
behind which, in these circumstances, we cannot go, behind which we do not 
have to reckon with any Son of God in Himself, with any λόγος ἄσαρκος, 
with any other Word of God than that which was made flesh. According to 
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the free and gracious will of God the eternal Son of God is Jesus Christ as He 
lived and died and rose again in time, and none other.113 
If the identity of the Son of God is already Jesus Christ since eternity, there is no 
divine being which could be construed independently, with its own special 
ontological being, different from the Son of God incarnate. The becoming of God as 
the ontological problem of Chalcedonian Christology is not answered by isolating the 
becoming of God in the human nature of Christ but rather by replacing the 
ontological commitment of Chalcedonian Christology with a dogmatic rendering of 
actualism based upon God’s concrete decision and act to be God in Jesus Christ. 
McCormack rightly agues, “The problem is no longer that of explaining the union of 
an abstract metaphysical subject that is complete in itself with a historically 
constituted human ‘nature’,… the problem is, rather, that of reflecting upon the unity 
of a Subject whose being is constituted both in time and in eternity by a twofold 
history.”114 While the theological principles of Chalcedon are preserved (truly God, 
truly human), it is done by “replacing the category of ‘nature’ (one person, two 
natures) with the category of ‘history’ (one person, two histories) and then 
integrating this ‘history’ into the concept of ‘person’.”115 As such, the ontology of the 
divine nature is defined by the history of humiliation in “the Way of the Son of God 
into the Far Country” (CD IV/1, §59.1); while, the ontology of human nature is 
defined by the history of exaltation in “the Homecoming of the Son of Man” (CD 
IV/2, §64.2). But this is not two histories of two divine subjects, but, precisely in the 
humiliation of the Son of God and the exaltation of the Son of Man, it consists of a 
single history of one divine subject. This history is a single history because it is the 
history of Jesus Christ. McCormack is right to conclude that Barth “has replaced the 
language of ‘natures’ with the concept of ‘history’, and he has integrated the concept 
of ‘history’ into his concept of ‘person’. The result is that Jesus Christ is still seen as 
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truly God, truly human, and is both in a single Subject. But he is seen to be all of this 
under quite different ontological conditions”.116 
3.2. Ontological implications 
We will now draw several implications of Barth’s Christological understanding for a 
theological ontology of the being of God. First, the history of God in Jesus Christ 
defines the meaning of God’s being in becoming in relation to God’s self and 
humanity. The being of God is not a preconceived absolute being that is alien to 
humanity and has no relationship with humanity. The becoming of God in Jesus 
Christ is not a paradox or inconsistency in the being of God, to be located in the 
human nature of Christ alone. Barth posits that in God “there is no paradox, no 
antimony, no division, no inconsistency, not even the possibility of it.”117 As such, 
“Who God is and what it is to be divine is something we have to learn where God 
has revealed Himself and His nature, the essence of the divine.”118 It is in the history 
of Jesus Christ where we learn of the being of God and its implications for the being 
of all reality. If in the history of Jesus, we learn about the obedience of the Son of 
God, it tells us that obedience is not alien to God’s being. It is not alien to the being 
of God to act in obedience and subordination. Barth affirms that “We have not only 
not to deny but actually to affirm and understand as essential to the being of God the 
offensive fact that there is in God Himself an above and a below, a prius and a 
posterius, a superiority and a subordination.”119 The history of Jesus is both primary 
and axiomatic because it is the history of God. It is a history that cannot be 
supplemented or synthesized into a higher conceptual framework of universal history 
because God is the subject and the agent of this history, and in it, God defines all 
history. The history of Jesus is definitive for a theological understanding of the being 
of God and the being of creation. 
 Second, there is humanity in the being of God. This does not mean that God 
is a development of humanity, or that God is shaped by the spirit of human history in 
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general. What this means is that in the specific history of Jesus Christ, God 
participates in the life of human being. In the life of Jesus Christ there takes place the 
assumption of humanity into the life of God. While the assumption of humanity into 
the being of God is in the mode of being of the Son, not of the Father and the Spirit, 
yet, at the same time, the second mode of being, for Barth, is to be understood as the 
second mode of the One divine Subject.120 That is to say that the event of incarnation 
is an event in the Trinitarian life of God’s being. In reflecting Barth’s Christology, 
Jüngel posits that “God has bound himself to this history from all eternity,” and that 
this implies “God’s own eternal being is moved by the man Jesus” and that, “The 
elect man Jesus is moved in his human history by the eternal being of God and is, 
from the beginning, with God in all the works and ways of God.”121 In Jesus Christ 
God choses to be God for and with humanity, and in no other way, because in the 
being of God there is no God in God-self in isolation from God’s love of humanity. 
McCormack posits, “God the Son participates in the human being and existence of 
Jesus of Nazareth in the sense that all that occurs in and through and to this human is 
taken up into the divine life and made to be God’s own.”122 Jüngel rightly argues that 
“There is an ontological connection between the being of the human Jesus and all 
other human being, because God, in Jesus, transforms history into history for all 
humanity.”123  
 Third, suffering and death are not alien to the divine life. It does not mean 
that these are something God must undergo, i.e., it is not a necessary implication of 
divine being that God cannot avoid. It is rather the grace of God to will the man 
Jesus Christ to be in the life of God. In Jesus Christ, Barth posits,  
The Almighty exists and acts and speaks here in the form of One who is weak 
and impotent, the eternal as One who is temporal and perishing, the Most 
High in the deepest humility. The Holy One stands in the place and under the 
accusation of a sinner with other sinners. The glorious One is covered with 
shame. The One who lives forever has fallen a prey to death. The Creator is 
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subjected to and overcome by the onslaught of that which is not. In short, the 
Lord is a servant, a slave.124 
For Barth, the historical event of Jesus’ life is an event in God’s inner life, thus in 
this context the event of the passion and the cross is the event in God’s very own 
being. God does not cease to be God when God undergoes such an experience. On 
the contrary, as McCormack rightly notes, “God is never seen more clearly as the 
God that he truly is when he suffers death on a cross. Here is where his true being is 
disclosed.”125 God does not become this on account of an accidental-historical 
tragedy. God does not become this because human or social determinations 
necessitate the will of God. God becomes this because of the gracious and loving 
election to be God in this way, and none other.126  
Finally, there is a participation of the human Jesus in the being of God.127 In 
Jesus Christ, there is a sharing of the history of God through the obedience of the Son 
of God.128 This participation is not a deification of Jesus’ human nature but rather the 
conformity of humanity to the will of God. In this way humanity is defined. The 
history of the obedience of the Son of God is by implication the universal history of 
all humanity.129 On the other hand, this participation does not eliminate the 
distinction between the being of God and human being. It defines Christ’s act of self-
humiliation as an act that is very dear to the inner life of God.130 McCormack rightly 
comments that the exaltation of the human Jesus consists of an act of active 
conformity to the history of obedience and humiliation of God.131 Thus, it shows the 
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meaning of true humanity. It is a confirming of human determination to the 
determination of God to be God for humanity. 
 The ontological implication of Barth’s Christology is closely related to 
Barth’s doctrine of election. It is the determination of God to elect the God-human 
Jesus Christ to be the reality of God’s inner being that shapes Barth’s Christological 
revision of Chalcedonian ontology. In the next part of our analysis we will explore 
Barth’s doctrine of election and draw further ontological implications from it for 
Barth’s ontology of interpretation. 
4. Election and ontology 
We will now analyse Barth’s doctrine of election and draw out its implication for his 
ontology of interpretation. In the analysis we will first summarize Barth’s doctrine of 
election CD II/2 in relation to his understanding of the ontology of God’s being in 
becoming and show how this doctrine develops in Barth’s later reflections in the 
doctrine of reconciliation (CD IV). This analysis will explore further the ontology of 
God’s being in becoming but now view it from the perspective of Barth’s doctrine of 
election. Following our analysis, we will draw out some implications of Barth’s 
doctrine of election for understanding his ontology of interpretation. 
4.1. Barth on Divine election 
Matthias Gockel rightly notes that there is an important development in Barth’s 
doctrine of election, especially when we compare his thinking in the Epistle to the 
Romans with CD II/2.132 In the period of Romans commentaries Barth interprets the 
doctrine of election as a historical dialectic between election and rejection in the 
human response to God’s universal election (following Schleiermacher). In his later 
period Barth combines the historical and the eternal perspective of election by 
construing Jesus Christ as both the elected and the rejected human being in God’s 
decision to be God in Jesus Christ as the electing God. 
In CD II/2, Barth explores this doctrine in four important sections (§32-35) 
and elucidates its meaning and implications for his doctrines of God, church and 
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humanity. For our purposes, we will limit our exploration in relation to Barth’s 
ontology of God. This is where Barth’s doctrine of election is at its most creative. 
For Barth, election is not primarily a soteriological doctrine. In fact Barth is very 
critical of Calvin’s soteriological understanding of decretum absolutum where 
humans are predestined from eternity to salvation or condemnation.133 Against this 
view, election is primarily a doctrine of God and only secondarily/derivatively is it a 
doctrine of salvation. In what follows we will summarize Barth’s thinking on this 
doctrine.  
 The core of Barth’s election can be summarized into two interconnected 
theses.134 First, Jesus Christ is the elected Man for humanity; second, Jesus Christ is 
the electing God for humanity. The first thesis is Barth’s revision of the older 
conception of election. In the older Reformed conception the decree of God is 
construed as something unfathomable and is regarded as a mystery of God’s way 
with the world and humanity.135 This is applied to the teaching that humanity is 
eternally destined and separated into elect and reprobate irrespective of (or in 
incompatibility with) their historical life. Barth makes a critical remark against such 
conception. 
Our thesis is that God's eternal will is the election of Jesus Christ. At this 
point we part company with all previous interpretations of the doctrine of 
predestination. In these the Subject and object of predestination (the electing 
God and elected man) are determined ultimately by the fact that both 
quantities are treated as unknown. We may say that the electing God is a 
supreme being who disposes freely according to His own omnipotence, 
righteousness and mercy. We may say that to Him may be ascribed the 
lordship over all things, and above all the absolute right and absolute power 
to determine the destiny of man. But when we say that, then ultimately and 
fundamentally the electing God is an unknown quantity. On the other hand, 
we may say that elected man is the man who has come under the eternal 
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good-pleasure of God, the man whom from all eternity God has foreordained 
to fellowship with Himself. But when we say that, then ultimately and 
fundamentally elected man is also an unknown quantity. At this point 
obscurity has undoubtedly enveloped the theories of even the most prominent 
representatives and exponents of the doctrine of predestination. Indeed, in the 
most consistently developed forms of the dogma we are told openly that on 
both sides we have to do, necessarily, with a great mystery. In the sharpest 
contrast to this view our thesis that the eternal will of God is the election of 
Jesus Christ means that we deny the existence of any such twofold 
mystery.136 
Barth grounds election in Jesus Christ and strips off what he regards as the 
“obscurity” of the old formulation. For Barth the old doctrine of election does not 
have a clear answer to the question: who is the God who elects and who is the human 
being, the elect? In contrast, for Barth, these are the most crucial questions for a 
theology of election. The failure to answer these questions, according to Barth, is 
because the abstract conception of election is rooted in the anthropological or socio-
historical starting point of the doctrine, i.e., why everybody is not saved. As such, 
Barth clears this problem and builds his doctrine from the concrete revelation of God 
in Jesus Christ. Barth focuses his exposition to answer the question (who is the God 
that elects and who is humanity that is elect) by positing Jesus as the electing God 
and the elected human, and in him all humanity is elected. As such, Barth makes a 
radical revision of the meaning of the reprobate. Jesus Christ is the only reprobate as 
seen from the fact of the cross. More specifically, in God’s election, Jesus is the only 
reprobate who undergoes God’s rejection, such that it is impossible for anyone to be 
reprobate in view of God’s rejection of Christ at the cross. Barth continues the 
Calvinist theme of double predestination but modifies and isolates its meaning onto a 
single individual, who is the elect and the reprobate at the same time ˗ Jesus 
Christ.137   
 The election of Jesus Christ as the elected human reveals not only who God is 
but also God’s will for humanity. For Barth because God’s will is known only by 
God’s self-revelation, God is not different from God’s will. Barth posits, “The 
eternal will of God in the election of Jesus Christ is His will to give Himself for the 
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sake of man as created by Him and fallen from Him. …His self-giving: God gave-not 
only as an actual event but as something eternally foreordained… He hazarded 
Himself. He did not do this for nothing, but for man as created by Him and fallen 
away from Him.”138 God elects to be with rejected humanity, and to share in 
humanity’s suffering and death. It does not mean there is a necessity of death and 
suffering in God’s life, but rather in choosing to be with humanity God chooses from 
eternity to partake in the suffering and death of humanity. God can suffer and die 
because God wills it. This takes place in the election of Jesus Christ in eternity and 
unfolds in the history of Jesus of Nazareth. In Him, God assumes the rejection of 
human being as God’s own rejection. God does not have to do this, but God wills it. 
In doing this “God declares His solidarity with [humanity], taking his place in 
respect of their necessary consequence, suffering in Himself what man ought to have 
suffered.”139 The implication is that God’s eternal covenant of grace with humanity is 
a decision to be in solidarity with humanity. This, however, is not the end of the story 
because in the election of Jesus Christ God elects humanity. God elects humanity 
when God elects Jesus Christ as God-human in eternity. This brings us to the 
anthropological dimension of God’s election. 
 In the election of Jesus Christ God defines God’s eternal will for what it 
means to be part of God’s elect humanity. The purpose of God’s reconciliation is to 
bring humanity “home” i.e. the eternal purpose of God for humanity. Barth posits, “It 
was God who went into the far country, and it is man who returns home. Both took 
place in the one Jesus Christ.”140 Jüngel rightly comments, “There is an ontological 
connection between the being of the human Jesus and all other human being, because 
God, in Jesus, transforms history into history for all humanity. It is precisely for this 
reason that the history of Jesus Christ is both God’s history and humanity’s 
history”.141 The election of humanity is an election to partake in God’s eternal will of 
being with humanity. In the suffering and death of a concrete human it is shown that 
humanity takes part in the eternal resolve of the divine-human Jesus Christ. It is in 
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Jesus Christ that God elects a humanity that is decided as God’s eternal purpose. It is 
a humanity which finds its glory in humiliation. It is a humanity that will be 
redeemed from the sinful, arrogant, and slothful humanity. Jüngel rightly explains, 
“The history of the man Jesus on earth actualizes the being of the man Jesus, which 
was in the beginning with God.”142 
 Barth’s second thesis is equally important for understanding his ontology of 
interpretation i.e. Jesus Christ is the electing God. Barth believes that the first thesis 
must be understood as tied to the assertion, “Jesus Christ is the electing God.”143 The 
electing God in the Trinitarian life has a clear identity as Father, Son and Holy Spirit. 
Specifically, the identity of the Son was already Jesus Christ in this eternal 
election.144 Jesus Christ replaces the idea of decretum absolutum, in which God is 
understood as a mysterious being. In this old doctrine, there is a speculation about 
the identity of the divine being who decides election in the depth of God’s being. 
Contrary to this view, Barth posits, “We must not ask any other but [Jesus Christ]. In 
no depth of the Godhead shall we encounter any other but Him. There is no such 
thing as Godhead in itself. Godhead is always the Godhead of the Father, the Son and 
the Holy Spirit.”145 In the eternal decision of God the Son of God, the Logos already 
has a name, that is, Jesus Christ.  
Why is Barth insisting on claiming that Jesus Christ is the electing God? 
What role does it play in his construal of Christian theology? To understand Barth’s 
decision on this theological construct we need to perceive its theological significance 
against the background of the alternative view in the historical doctrine of election. 
The alternative to Barth’s view is to see the electing Son of God in pre-incarnation 
form as logos asarkos (Logos without flesh), as God without identifying God’s being 
by the history of Jesus Christ. If this is what Barth proposes, then there would be 
nothing radical in Barth’s doctrine of election in regard to the being of God. The 
election of Jesus Christ would then only achieve a soteriological purpose, and it 
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would have no consequence to the being of God. The Logos arbitrarily elects to be 
incarnated, to be the reconciler of the world. This Logos, then, is an unidentified 
Logos. It is a Logos that is only arbitrarily related to the reconciliation of the world. 
But this is not what Barth is arguing. In contrast, Barth posits, it is Jesus Christ, the 
God-human, who is the electing God. Already in the act of election it is the Son of 
God as the God-human who acts as the electing God. Since eternity the Son of God 
has a name. Since eternity the Logos is Jesus Christ. It is not Jesus Christ who is 
identified as the Logos, but Logos who is identified as Jesus Christ.  
 Election, for Barth, is not primarily soteriological but a question of who God 
is and what is it that is very dear to the eternal being of God. To claim that Jesus 
Christ is the electing God is to claim that election is about how the will of God 
determines God’s being. Barth posits, “[election] is part of the doctrine of God 
because originally God’s election of man is a predestination not merely of man but of 
Himself.”146 It is good news because in Jesus Christ God chooses God’s being as a 
being in relationship with and for humanity, and a being in which the incarnation, the 
cross and the resurrection are at the heart of God’s eternal essence.147 The essence of 
Barth’s doctrine of election is the doctrine of the decision of God’s being because, as 
Jüngel notes, “the decision of the election of grace not only affects elect humanity 
but also at the same time affects God in a fundamental way.”148 McCormack rightly 
comments that for Barth, 
Election is the event in God’s life in which he assigns to Himself the being he 
will have for all eternity. It is an act of Self-determination by means of which 
God chooses in Jesus Christ love and mercy for the human race and judgment 
(reprobation) for Himself. …Thus ultimately, the reason ontology is very 
much to the fore in Barth’s thinking is that the death of Jesus Christ in God-
abandonment, precisely as human experience, is understood by Him to be an 
event in God’s own life. And yet Barth also wants to insist that when God 
gives himself over in this way to our contradiction of Him and the judgment 
which falls upon it, he does not give Himself away. He does not cease to be 
God in becoming incarnate and dying in this way. He takes this human 
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experience into his own life and extinguishes its power over us. But He is not 
changed on an ontological level by this experience for the simple reason that 
his being, from eternity, is determined as a being-for this event.149 
 This ontological construal of God’s being is not built on an essentialist 
approach in which the essence of the Son of God is complete regardless of the 
decision and the act of God in and for the world. McCormack notes that for Barth’s 
actualistic approach, “‘essence’ is given in the act of electing and is, in fact, 
constituted by [God’s] eternal acts and relation.”150  In Barth’s ontology, God’s 
decision is not differentiated from God’s being.151 The decision of God is not seen as 
a complement to God’s being. The decision of God is the being of God itself. 
Although sounding strange, what it essentially means is that God is a being who is 
self-moved in God’s freedom. Barth is at pains to show that God’s decision and 
God’s freedom are one and the same thing. The event of God’s decision always 
means the event of God’s freedom for, as Jüngel comments, “as event, God’s being 
is his own decision.”152 Barth believes that “the fact that God’s being is event, the 
event of God’s act, necessarily …means that it is His own conscious, willed and 
executed decision.”153 The event of God’s decision is not an arbitrary event nor is it 
out of any necessity. On the contrary, God’s decision is the event of God’s freedom 
in God’s grace. Put differently, the freedom of God’s decision is the event of the 
grace of God. In Barth’s ontological approach, even grace is not a necessity to God’s 
being, a substance which necessitates the result of God’s decision, but something that 
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is seen as the result of God’s decision.154 So, for Barth, grace is defined in the being 
of God by his decision to be God in Jesus Christ. Through this understanding, 
Barth’s ontological paradigm is shaped by his Trinitarian ontology of being in action, 
being in freedom and being in grace.155 In this way God’s election means primarily 
God’s free decision to be God in and as the man Jesus Christ. It is grounded in God’s 
eternal triune life, in his freedom and self-determination to be God for human being 
and creation in Jesus Christ. It is in God’s self-determination to be God in Jesus 
Christ that God reveals the true being of God, i.e., in the decision of humiliation, to 
suffer and die for humanity. In being God for humanity, God truly becomes what 
God is in God’s inner being. The freedom of God is not a freedom to avoid and to 
exempt God’s being from death and suffering. It is the eternal will of God to use 
God’s freedom in self-determination as God for humanity. God is free in relation to 
God’s being and human being in such a way that God can use his freedom to 
determine God’s being as a being for humanity. God does not cease from being the 
free God by binding God’s inner being to the history of humanity. In fact, God is 
revealed as the most free being in God’s decision to be God for humanity. 
4.2. Election and interpretative ontology 
All these discussions on Barth’s election are very stimulating as a dogmatic 
exploration. But what is their relevance for our question regarding Barth’s 
interpretative ontology? If our starting point is that the being of God is the 
hermeneutical problem of theology, then we posit that these discussions are very 
relevant to three hermeneutical questions. The first is the relationship between God 
and the reality of the world in God’s inner being; the second is the relationship 
between God and the Christian reader; the third is the relationship between God’s 
freedom and God’s work toward the world.  
 Before we enter into the explication of these themes, we will argue that this 
relationship, as based on Barth’s doctrine of election, is covenantal in nature. Barth’s 
ontology is not about the relationship between God and the world in general, but 
                                                 





about a specific relationship, a concrete historical event which is Jesus Christ. 
McCormack rightfully argues that it is more properly called as “covenant 
ontology.”156 The relationship of God with the world is a relationship that is based on 
God’s relationship to God’s self in the specific determination to be God in Jesus 
Christ. Jüngel rightly comments that for Barth election “as the beginning of all the 
ways and works of God,… is not only an opus Dei ad extra [external work of God] 
or, more precisely, an opus Dei ad extra externum [external work of God directed 
outwards]; it is at the same time an opus Dei ad extra internum [external work of 
God directed inwards].”157 The being of God in relation to the world is decided in the 
inward relationship of God when God elects the concrete history of Jesus Christ as 
the inner being of God’s immanence.  
 The first is the relationship between God and the world which is established 
by the act of God’s self-determination (election). The world is not an independent 
reality which is left to be interpreted by any non-partisan observer. Election means 
God is not ontologically absent from the world, and that the world is not a 
mechanistic reality (in a Newtonian sense) with an open hermeneutical gap between 
what it is and its telos. Reality is not an ocean of meaninglessness. On the other hand, 
reality is not construed as a teleological reality in a naïve sense, shaped by 
transcendental reason and by human self-confidence in construing meaning and 
purpose. The doctrine of election confronts us in our understanding of the world and 
ourselves. The history of the world is not a lonesome history deserted from the being 
of God. In the election of Jesus Christ, the history of the world is decided as the 
history of God’s being. In this history the event of creation, reconciliation and 
redemption are eternally decided to overcome the meaninglessness of reality. God 
decides to heal the open wound of hermeneutical and existential meaninglessness. 
Reality is inherently meaningful because of the decision of God in Jesus Christ. The 
problem of meaninglessness is already faced and overcome by God in the eternal 
decision to be with God’s creation. 
                                                 
156 McCormack, "Grace and Being: The Role of God's Gracious Election in Karl Barth's Theological 
Ontology," in Orthodox and Modern: Studies in the Theology of Karl Barth, 190. 




 The second is the ontological relationship between God and the Christian 
reader. On the surface, this seems to be a rather tenuous reflection on election. But if 
election is closely connected with the Trinity, revelation and humanity, then it is 
necessary to ask the question for the implication on election for a true Christian 
response in relation to the ontology of truth. Barth’s doctrine of election means that 
there is no privileged reader of Scripture. Only Jesus Christ is the true revelation of 
God, and as such the true expression of the true God. Only Jesus Christ is the true 
interpreter of the God’s Word; He is in fact the Word of God.  The election of all 
humanity in Jesus Christ means that the truth is for all humanity. In Jesus Christ, all 
humanity is unworthy of the truth and at the same time elected for the truth. But 
since Jesus Christ is the human who is elected by God to be true human, then it is 
theologically implied that participation in Jesus Christ is a prerequisite for a true 
reading of the Scripture. This is in harmony with Barth’s understanding that “the 
being of the church is Jesus Christ.”158 But truth does not belong to the church as an 
institution, or to a certain group of people who claim certain adherence to Jesus 
Christ. The ontology of truth is in Jesus Christ, not as an abstract concept, but as a 
concrete event in His history. His history is an event in the eternal life of God such 
that God decides to be God for humanity in Jesus Christ. As a decided event, then, 
the event of the truth is not something that can be grasped or controlled. It is rather 
something to be anticipated in faith and prayer. For the present church it is an 
eschatological event. Dogmatically, a true reader of Scripture is always an 
eschatological being, always something in the future, in the being of Christ. It is a 
being in becoming in Jesus Christ. It is a being in becoming in accordance to the 
humiliation and exaltation of Jesus Christ. While no group is privileged in the 
reading of Scripture, Barth’s doctrine of election means that for the church the true 
humanity, i.e., the true reader of Scripture, is ontologically located in Jesus Christ 
and ontologically determined in the humiliation and exaltation of Jesus Christ. For 
the church, a true reader of Scripture is always an eschatological being.  
 Third, the relationship between God and God’s work toward the world is 
decided in election. In election the freedom of God in relation to the world is 
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decided. It is not an absolute freedom which is indeterminate, and abstract. God is 
not a prisoner to freedom and bound to be indeterminately free. God is “free also 
with regard to His freedom.”159 God uses God’s freedom to will “fellowship with 
man for Himself” and at the same time “fellowship with Himself for man.”160 God is 
not identical with freedom; God is greater than freedom and uses freedom to will a 
specific relationship i.e. God in relation to God’s self and God’s relation to the 
world. In the election God decides to dispose of the absolute freedom and choose to 
be God bound by God’s decision for humanity. Eberhard Busch rightly comments, 
“As freedom for fellowship, God’s freedom is essentially communicative, committed 
to solidarity, social freedom not in competition but rather in coexistence, freedom not 
at the cost of other but for their benefit, for them and with them.”161 Barth’s doctrine 
of election as such shapes his vision of reality in which God is free to reveal God’s 
self. Revelation is not an indeterminate event. God bounds God-self into the 
fellowship with humanity. As such the being in becoming of God is being in 
becoming as defined by the election of God to be God for the world. This is the 
vision of reality in which the reading of Scripture takes place: a reality that is not 
deserted into confusion and misunderstanding. This does not mean that there will be 
no confusion or misunderstanding as the true being of humanity is eschatological. It 
is currently hidden in Jesus Christ as the true being of the church. In this sense the 
present condition of the church’s reading of Scripture is open to continuous 
correction. This is true not only because of her sin and limitations, but also in view of 
its being as eschatologically located in Jesus Christ.  
5. Toward a theological ontology of hermeneutics 
In the final part of this chapter we will draw conclusions from our discussion on the 
ontology of God’s being and reflect on the hermeneutical implications of such 
ontological construct. This chapter begins with two interconnected  questions. The 
first question concerns the relationship between Barth’s ontology and hermeneutics; 
the second concerns the relationship between doctrines and ontology of 
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interpretation. Our answer to this question is that we believe that Barth’s 
hermeneutics is shaped by his ontological convictions, and his ontological 
convictions are determined by the formal shape and the material content of his 
doctrines. In this regard we have explored his doctrines of Trinity, Christology and 
Election for construing his theological ontology. In the last part of this chapter we 
will draw out the implications for a systematic construal of his theological 
hermeneutics by proposing an ontology of interpretation based on the dogmatic 
exploration we have pursued in this chapter. To achieve this purpose, we will 
summarize our argument and reflect upon the implications of our dogmatic 
exploration for constructing a theological ontology of hermeneutics. 
5.1. Ontology and hermeneutics 
As we have argued, hermeneutics cannot escape ontology. A criticism of 
hermeneutics at a metacritical level shows that a construct of reality in which one 
interprets a text or in which interpretation and meaning take place, is a crucial part of 
hermeneutics. It is crucial that one’s vision of reality shapes one’s hermeneutics. In 
general hermeneutics, the question of how meaning happens or how understanding 
becomes an event shapes one’s ontological questions. In this regard the reflection of 
meaning and how it is related to a text leads to the realization of the importance of 
language. Meaning is always mediated by language. But language belongs to an 
historical being who understands it within a plausibility structure of an historical 
being and epoch (with its streams of lived and living traditions). As being who acts 
historically and linguistically, human is an interpreted being.  This leads to a 
hermeneutical belief that the being of the human is the ultimate problem of general 
hermeneutics.  
 It is our argument that, for Barth, the being of God is the ultimate problem of 
theology, and so is for a theological hermeneutics. The vision of reality where the 
church’s reading of Scripture takes place, in Barth’s theology, is the problem of 
God’s being. The being of God is the hermeneutical problem not only because it is a 
presupposition of theology but, more importantly, because the being of God precedes 
and determines one’s theological exploration of the Scripture. Before the church 
attempts to interpret Scripture, God is already reaching out to the church. In fact, in 
and after the act of reading, the reality of God is always communicative to the 
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church. The event of communicative divine presence is not only an economy of 
God’s grace, but, more profoundly, as understood by Barth, it is an event that is 
decided in the immanence of God. God’s way to the world is a reiteration of God’s 
immanent being. God is already related and communicative in God’s inner being. 
This is not an abstract principle based on a metaphysical reflection of God as an 
absolute being, but a concrete doctrine based on the act of the Trinitarian God in the 
particular history of Jesus Christ. 
 If this is correct, then we find in Barth’s theology a rich resource for a 
dogmatic approach to construct an ontology of interpretation with and after the 
manner of his theology. The following points are our attempt to think along this line 
with and after Barth. They are not a strict exegesis of Barth’s theology but contain a 
constructive proposal after the manner and content of his theology.  In this regard we 
propose several lines of thought that are worthy of reflection. We propose that in 
thinking with and after Barth’s dogmatics we can propose that: Trinity is being as 
interpreted being; Jesus Christ, the Word of God is the true language of a dogmatic 
approach to hermeneutics; Jesus Christ is the primal history of reality; and election is 
the ethics and politics of hermeneutics. In what follows we will elaborate each of 
these ontological concepts. 
5.2. Trinity is being as interpreted being 
The first ontological conviction is that the Trinity is being as interpreted being.162 
“Trinity” as a term is already an interpretation. What is intended here is more on an 
ontological level in which the Trinity is the self-interpretation of God’s being. The 
Trinity is the concrete reality of the self-relating and self-communicating God. In the 
life of the divine Trinity there exists God’s interpretation of God’s self. In the divine 
Trinity there is a becoming. This becoming is God’s decision to reveal God’s self in 
Jesus Christ. God’s decision to reveal God’s self is the ontological basis for knowing 
God. But revelation is not simply a revelation of something about God, but the 
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revelation of God’s being itself. God’s being revealed is not different from God’s 
being in God’s self. God’s relation in God’s self is identical with the sending of the 
Son and the outpouring of the Holy Spirit in the world.  This ontological self-
identification between God in God pro se and pro nobis is the basis for speaking of 
the correspondence between God’s being in God’s self and God’s being in history, 
between being and history.163 God’s revelation in history truly reveals the being of 
God, not just God in relation to the world, but also of God in relation to God’s self. 
In Jesus Christ we can know the true being of God. 
 Trinity as interpreted being means that God’s revelation is not just the first 
movement of God’s revealing act, but it is also the affirmation that God is the 
revelation and revealedness.164 It is the second and the third movement, i.e. in God’s 
revelation, where there is a correlation between the self-differentiation of God in 
God’s self and the event of divine communication to the church.  In the becoming of 
God, we recognize that God’s self-revelation is an event of God’s self-interpretation. 
In this regard the relationship between God and the event of meaning is not a 
coordination of two agencies. God does not leave the event of communication once 
God speaks God’s Word. God does not become mute once God speaks God’s Word 
and leave it to human language to capture the meaning of revelation. It is, rather, a 
capturing of human language for and by the Word of God. This implies that, in itself, 
human language is incapable of communicating God’s being. This, however, does 
not undermine the theological fact that human language can and does speak of God’s 
being. But it can only do so by the grace of God; insofar as God’s communicative 
presence continues to enable it. As Jüngel rightly notes, “The doctrine of the Trinity 
had to establish the fact that, as subject of his being, God is also the subject of his 
being known and becoming known.”165 In this sense, we are not speaking of a 
personification of revelation but rather expressing the Trinity as interpreted being. It 
is God who speaks in the event of revelation, as Barth rightly posits, “Revelation is 
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Dei loquentis persona.”166 Meaning has a definite sense not as an objective reality of 
the words but as God’s communicative prevenient grace. It is not a function of 
anthropological deliberation but the reality of God’s communicative presence. But 
the definiteness of meaning does not cancel the fact that there is such a thing as a 
surplus of meaning. In this context this surplus is not a function of anthropological 
existence but a function of God-human dynamics in God’s relationship to humanity. 
The surplus of meaning is ontologically located in the creativity of God’s 
communicative presence in relation to human temporary existence. The surplus of 
meaning is a function of God’s communicative presence. 
 Thirdly, in the doctrine of Trinity, being as interpreted is an event of God’s 
becoming that shows that relationship and love are an essential part of divine reality.  
The being of God is relational being, and in this relationship the Trinitarian 
relationship is marked by love. This, however, is not an abstract concept of love, but 
a concrete relationship in the historical life of Jesus Christ taken up into the eternal 
being of God. In other words, relationship and love are essential to reality; it is not a 
philosophical abstraction that is born out of speculation on life and its meaning. It is 
a truth that comes to our understanding as a concrete realization of God’s reiteration 
of God’s being in the world. It is not an abstract philosophical principle but a reality 
decided in the inner being of God and fulfilled in the concrete event of Jesus Christ.  
5.3. Jesus Christ as the being of language 
Jesus Christ as language means that the being of Christ and the event of meaning and 
understanding are inseparable in the church’s reading of Scripture. The ontology of 
meaning and understanding in dogmatics is an event that happens through the being 
of Christ.167 All true interpretation takes place in Jesus Christ as the ontological 
being of language. But because Jesus Christ is truly divine and truly human, the 
event of understanding is simultaneously truly human in divine communicative 
presence, i.e., it is an event with and by human language as the medium of 
understanding. Human language does not cease from being a human language 
because of this; but it finds its ontological roots in the being of Christ. In this regard, 
                                                 
166 CD I/1, 304. Revelation is God speaking in person. 
167 Cf. Gerhard Ebeling, Word and Faith (London: SCM Press, 1963), 318. 
146 
 
the formation of theological concepts has Jesus Christ as its language-world. He is 
the common language within which the possibility of thinking and speaking about 
God in a realistic sense is made actual and concrete. It is not universally accessible as 
an event of nature but made universally available as the event of grace. The reality of 
knowledge in the human act of knowing God is bound with Jesus Christ as a 
language event.  In this sense the being of God is not something untranslatable, 
eternally remaining in the mystical realm of the divine. It is expressible in Jesus 
Christ as the true language of God. 
Second, this also means that the reality of Jesus is a truth that cannot be 
translated into a methodological prescription. The being of Christ is not a static truth 
within the reach of human conceptuality; it is a truth that cannot be held captive. In 
fact it is the truth that is free from human determination so that it can be the truth for 
human existence. Human use of language is bound with a particular world-view with 
its particular traditions, linguistic-world and linguistic-habits, because, as Hans-
Georg Gadamer argues that language is the medium of hermeneutical experience.168 
While Gadamer argues that the event of language-use can free the human from the 
bondage of world-view as it emerges in experience of understanding, we posit that in 
theological hermeneutics Jesus Christ is the event in which such freedom comes into 
reality. The truth emerges in the event of the Word of God, not as an agentless event 
of mystical fusion of horizons, but as an instance of God’s communicative 
presence.169 It is true that the truth is not a deposit of ideas hidden away from any 
language-world that its reality is an event emerging in the existence of human use of 
language, and this movement of the truth is not a mystical and directionless event. 
Truth is indeed a free event, but it is a free event in the determination of God in Jesus 
Christ as the true being of language. It cannot be captured by human method but can 
only be hoped for in prayer and faith. It does not dispense with method as 
unimportant and meaningless, but a dogmatic approach to hermeneutics will regard 
such endeavour as a human response of faith and prayer to the ontological being of 
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language as Jesus Christ. Ultimately, Jesus Christ is the true expression of reality. 
And we mean this not metaphorically but in a realistic sense of the truth. A true 
method of theological hermeneutics has the characteristic of a critical reflection on 
human understanding that recovers the importance of faith and prayer in guiding 
human experience to know and to understand the true being of God in Jesus Christ. 
Furthermore, this ontological conviction means that there is an analogical 
relationship between Jesus as the true being of language and human knowledge as 
linguistically mediated. In Jesus Christ, God embraces humanity and its linguistic 
capability as the bearer of God’s revelation and truth. Christology offers 
hermeneutics a theological analogy of the relationship between human language and 
the Word of God in the knowledge of God. Specifically, for Barth, in and by itself 
human knowledge cannot comprehend God’s revelation as the human nature of Jesus 
cannot comprehend the Son of God by its inherent human capability (finitum non 
capax infiniti). The basic form of the analogy follows the dogmatic conviction that it 
is God who becomes human without a divinization of the human nature. Human 
knowledge by and in itself has no capability to signify or to bring into reality the 
Word of God. On the contrary it is God’s event of speaking that brings out and 
commandeers language in the event of God’s speech-act.170 This, however, does not 
negate the fact that there is such thing as human knowledge of God and that such 
knowledge is expressible through human language. In the event of revelation human 
knowledge exists and has God as its object of knowledge.171 God is genuinely 
becoming an object of knowledge in the normal sense of a human object of 
knowledge, and the human being is genuinely becoming the subject of knowledge in 
which God is her genuine object. God can really be known in the realistic sense of 
knowing and expressed in the normal sense of human language. Here Barth’s 
actualism plays an important role in defining the nature of knowledge and language. 
The becoming of God as an object and the becoming of the human as a subject 
always happens as an event. This implies that the human subject cannot make God 
available as an object of knowledge without God coming to speech-act in the event 
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of revelation. Theological knowledge has the normal sense of general human 
knowledge as a knowledge, but it does not mean that this knowledge is a knowledge 
similar to other knowledge in the way the human is a subject and a thing is an 
object.172 Barth argues that, in the event of revelation, God differentiates God-self 
from other objects of knowledge, and differentiates a human subject as a knowing 
subject of God-as-object from other subjects.173 Nevertheless the nature of human 
knowledge of God is not a different kind of knowledge from other knowledge 
because it requires no special ability from human beings. In every way it is a human 
knowledge as other human knowledge and in every way employs human language as 
other human languages. The real difference lies in the act of the self-objectification 
of the being of God because, in Barth’s words, “Certainly we have God as an object, 
but not in the same way as we have other objects.”174 However, in the process of 
revelation the human being acquires the ability, by the grace of God, to know God as 
an object of knowledge.175 It is not something inherent in the human that is activated 
in the event of God’s speaking, but rather a possibility brought by the event of the 
Word of God to the human.176 
5.4. Jesus Christ as (the primal) history 
In CD I/2, Barth rejects the concept of primal history because the historical epoch of 
Jesus Christ cannot be understood through a historical study as the meaning of all 
history.177 This rejection is related to a concept of primal history that he previously 
accepted in the Epistle to the Romans where Barth invokes the primal history as the 
revelation of God in a construct of historical fact, specifically the historical reality of 
Jesus and biblical personalities, i.e., to perceive the meaning of all history from the 
history of biblical personalities.178 This early conviction is clearly at odds with 
Barth’s conviction that “revelation is not a predicate of history, but history is a 
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predicate of revelation.”179 However, in his later exposition, Barth construes a primal 
history as the decision of God in eternity (not in history). God takes the humanity of 
Jesus Christ into the life of God in the second mode of the Son of God. This is a 
different and new understanding of the primal history. In his exposition of Jesus as 
the primal history, Barth does not speak about a particular historical epoch as the 
primal history but rather locates such history in eternity, in the eternal determination 
of God for history. Barth posits,  
There is a history between God and the World. But this history has no 
independent signification. It takes place in the interests of the primal history 
which is played out between God and this one man and His people. It is the 
sphere in which this primal history is played out. It attains its goal as this 
primal history attains its goal. And the same is true both of man as such and 
also of the human race as a whole. The partner of God which cannot now be 
thought away is neither "man" as an idea, nor "humanity," nor indeed a large 
or small total of individual men. It is the one man Jesus and the people 
represented in Him. Only secondarily, and for His sake, is it "man," and 
"humanity" and the whole remaining cosmos. Even human nature and human 
history in general have no independent signification. They point to the primal 
history played out within them between God and the one man, and all other 
men as His people. The general (the world or man) exists for the sake of the 
particular. In the particular the general has its meaning and fulfilment…. The 
other towards which God moves in this wider sphere is, of course, the created 
world as a whole. It is, of course, "man" and "humanity." But everything 
which comes from God takes place according to this plan and under this sign. 
Everything is from this beginning and to this end. Everything is in this order 
and has this meaning. Everything happens according to this basic and 
determinative pattern, model and system. Everything which comes from God 
takes place "in Jesus Christ," i.e., in the establishment of the covenant which, 
in the union of His Son with Jesus of Nazareth, God has instituted and 
maintains and directs between Himself and His people, the people consisting 
of those who belong to Him, who have become His in this One. The primal 
history which underlies and is the goal of the whole history of His 
relationship ad extra, with the creation and man in general, is the history of 
this covenant. The primal history, and with it the covenant, are, then, the 
attitude and relation in which by virtue of the decision of His free love God 
wills to be and is God. And this relation cannot be separated from the 
Christian conception of God as such.180 
This primal history precedes human history because it took place in eternity. But it is 
a concrete history, not an abstract history of a mysterious being because it is the 
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being of Jesus Christ as a human being from Nazareth who is in the beginning with 
God that is construed as the primal history.181 Thus the primal history is not a history 
that begins in time and space in such a way that encompasses all histories because of 
its power to inspire, but a reference to God’s eternal resolve to be God for human 
being. The history of the world is the theatre for the unfolding of this primal history. 
This history precedes all human history in this sense, and it does not entail a 
philosophical abstraction of universal human history but rather a concrete decision of 
God’s history as “the Way of the Son of God into the Far Country.” This, however, 
provides an ontological basis for thinking about the nature of history. As such, 
“Everything is from this beginning and to this end. Everything is in this order and 
has this meaning. Everything happens according to this basic and determinative 
pattern, model and system. Everything which comes from God takes place ‘in Jesus 
Christ’.”182 Jesus Christ, as the true being of history, means that the meaning of a 
particular historical epoch cannot be understood apart from the eternal determination 
of God to be God for humanity.  
 This also means that, in this primal history, God has decided the history of 
humankind to face the threat of evil and death. Jüngel rightly comments that “The 
prevenience of the divine being in the primal history of the eternal covenant in its 
very prevenience already has as its goal direct confrontation with lost humanity, and 
in this confrontation an encounter with death.”183 In this sense death and suffering 
have been overcome in the being of God. Jesus Christ as history does not play down 
the reality of evil, in fact, in God’s primal decision God took seriously the fact the 
human race faces the reality of evil. God confronts evil in eternity. But it is the 
human being who is overcome by evil that God took seriously, and not the evil itself. 
In Jesus Christ, there is a reality of evil but only as a defeated reality.184 The meaning 
                                                 
181 Jüngel, God's Being Is in Becoming: The Trinitarian Being of God in the Theology of Karl Barth, 
91-92. 
182 CD II/2, 8. 
183 Jüngel, God's Being Is in Becoming: The Trinitarian Being of God in the Theology of Karl Barth, 
94. 
184 See Barth’s treatment on the problem of Nothingness in §50 CD III/3.  
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of the fact of suffering, death and evil is decided in God’s being in becoming Jesus 
Christ as the primal history in eternity. 
 The ontological reality of Jesus Christ provides a basis for an ontology of 
interpretation in relation to human history, including (but not exclusively), the fact of 
suffering, death and evil in human reality as revealed in Scripture. These themes are 
a problematic subject in the study of hermeneutics.185 To say that in the primal 
history of Jesus God has faced the reality of evil is not intended to ease the problem 
in anyway. But if this is the real ontological location of the being of history then it 
provides an ontological starting point for responding to such themes. The history of 
Jesus Christ, as God’s primal history, reflects the determination of God to take the 
side of humanity against evil and to take human folly and sin as part of God’s 
outward movement toward humanity and creation. As the primal history, Jesus Christ 
is already the saviour of the world. In this history there lies the hermeneutical key to 
the meaning of history, and also to the history of God’s covenant of reconciliation 
and redemption of the world.   
5.5. Election as the foundation of being 
Our final ontological reflection on the building blocks of an ontology of 
interpretation is based on Barth’s doctrine of election. In this doctrine we learn the 
meaning of freedom as the freedom of God. Freedom is not an abstract idea to which 
God and humans must conform if they want to be a free being. Freedom is a quality 
of God’s action and must be understood in the light of God’s being in the act of 
eternal election. In this doctrine God’s election is not different from God’s being, as 
Jüngel rightly comments that “God’s being-in-act was understood to mean that God 
is his decision.”186 Election is the foundation of being, specifically, the foundation of 
what it means to be a free being. It is from the freedom of God that the church has to 
learn what it means to be free in her actions. God’s election is not an absolute decree 
of an indeterminate agent, but an act of love to bind God’s self with universal 
                                                 
185 See e.g. Paul Ricœur, "Evil: A Challenge to Philosophy and Theology," Journal of the American 
Academy of Religion 53, no. 4 (1985): 635-48; Paul Ricœur, The Symbolism of Evil, trans. Emerson 
Buchanan (Boston: Beacon Press, 1969), 351-55. 




humanity. It is not a free-floating free-will that choses arbitrarily. It is directed 
inwardly toward God’s relationship to God’s self as the God of love and relationship 
(as well as God of obedience and humiliation); it is also directed outwardly toward 
God’s relationship to the world in creation, reconciliation and redemption. In all 
these, the freedom of God is defined by a specific historical event, that is, the event 
of Jesus Christ. In Jesus Christ we see the true meaning of freedom and as such the 
true being of a free agent. Jesus Christ is the true face of a free God.  
 This foundation has a great ramification for an ontology of interpretation. A 
genuine interpretation of any text is a free action without the boundary of an 
imposing power. The struggle against powers in the act of genuine reading is aimed 
at, as Paul Ricoeur argues, destroying the idols and freeing the human self from its 
illusion of freedom.187 Ricoeur posits, “Hermeneutics seems to me to be animated by 
this double motivation: willingness to suspect, willingness to listen; vow of rigor, 
vow of obedience,” such that fundamental to hermeneutics is the task “to destroy the 
idols, to listen to the symbols.”188 The imposing powers of idols are human 
determinations of power, self and sensuality hidden behind an inauthentic reading of 
a reader and in the rhetoric of the truth of the text. Hermeneutics is aimed at clearing 
the horizon for an authentic expression of truth, self and meaning in the symbolism 
of the text.189 Such an endeavour is important and rightly proper in a genuine 
interaction between a reader and a text. But what is the true form and the material 
content of true and authentic freedom? The locus of such freedom is not in human 
self-determination, be it religious or otherwise. It is also not in the sense of a 
continuous process of seeking authentic freedom by stripping off the idols of human 
imagination. We posit that such freedom must find its ontological root not in any 
human determination for freedom but in the real act of God’s freedom. The locus of 
human freedom is not found in the search for an authentic-self, but in the realization 
of God’s self-determination for freedom in human determination of freedom; in the 
realization of God’s freedom for humanity as human freedom for God. It is 
                                                 
187 Cf. Thiselton, New Horizons in Hermeneutics, 347. 
188 Ibid. 
189 Ibid., 348. 
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ontologically located in God, specifically in God’s freedom from humanity so that 
God can be God for humanity. To construe the freedom of hermeneutics in this way 
is to act on the basis of faith and hope. It is a freedom based on the grace of God and 
not on the basis of an ascesis of subjectivism. Ultimately it meets us as the gospel. It 
is the good news that a true and authentic freedom in reading of a text is made 
possible in the freedom of God for humanity. 
 The being of God as interpreted being, as language, as history and as freedom 
is the ontological description of the vision of reality within which the drama of the 
world is staged, and within which the church’s reading of Scripture takes place. This 
ontological conviction leaves us with the question of what it entails for such a 
theological vision of how we must understand text, author and reader in relation to 
our theological construction of meaning, language and history. How must we 
understand this in relation to meaning as human meaning, language as human 
language and history as human history? How is the theological character of this 
ontology related to the secularity of the world? In short, what is the theology of 




Chapter V: Barth’s Theological Interpretation of Scripture: A 
Sachlich Hermeneutics 
 
In this chapter we will present a theology of interpretation based on Barth’s doctrine 
of Scripture. The argument of this chapter is built upon the ontology of interpretation 
as has been argued and elucidated in the previous chapter. We have argued that 
reality within which the church’s reading taking place is a reality elected by the 
Trinitarian God as God for humanity in Jesus Christ. This chapter will take on the 
human dimension of such ontological thinking and elucidate its implication in 
relation to history, language, author, text, and understanding. These are themes that 
are perennial in modern study of hermeneutics. However, as a dogmatic approach to 
such questions, we will not expand our argument to its detailed discussion in modern 
hermeneutics but only within the limit of Barth’s theology. Since the concrete reality 
of Barth’s ontology is described in the history of Jesus Christ, and that such 
conviction is central to Barth’s understanding for theological exegesis, we will 
elaborate our argument from this point of view. In Barth’s hermeneutical term, Jesus 
Christ is the Sache of Scripture. This simple conviction however is elaborated in a 
complex discussion of Barth’s theology of the Word of God. It is with this point of 
view we will engage in the discussion of theological hermeneutics. In other words, 
this chapter is an elaboration of what it means to claim that Jesus Christ, the Word of 
God, is the Sache of Karl Barth’s theological interpretation of Scripture.  
According to Paul Ricœur, the central task of hermeneutics is “to discern the 
‘matter’ of the text.”1 It is in this “discourse on the matter,” that differing 
hermeneutics propose various approaches to the text.2 In view of this, we posit that in 
his theology of Scripture, Barth strikes at the core of the problem by proposing a 
sachlich hermeneutics, i.e., a hermeneutics based on the matter of the text. Barth 
posits, “The universal rule of interpretation is that a text can be read and understood 
                                                 
1 Ricœur, Hermeneutics and the Human Sciences: Essays on Language, Action and Interpretation, 
111. 
2 Vanhoozer, "Discourse on Matter: Hermeneutics and the "Miracle" of Understanding," in 
Hermeneutics at the Crossroads, 3. 
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and expounded only with reference to and in the light of its theme.”3 In a perceptive 
comment, Gadamer remarks, “in his great work Church Dogmatics, Karl Barth 
contributes to the hermeneutical problem explicitly nowhere and indirectly 
everywhere.”4 While this is generally correct, it is not entirely accurate, because 
there are places where Barth directly discusses, in Church Dogmatics, the so-called 
hermeneutical problem. Nevertheless, Gadamer is correct in pointing out the 
presence of indirect hermeneutical reflections in a great number of places in Church 
Dogmatics. The core of Barth’s proposal is strikingly simple ˗ a text is to be read it in 
the light of its subject matter.5 What does Barth offer to the study of hermeneutics in 
this proposal? Because some aspects of this question have been explored in a 
previous chapter, our focus in this one will be narrower: what does it mean for the 
church to read the Scripture as a (human) text if it has its ontological origin in God? 
What sort of text are we dealing with when we read Scripture? And more 
importantly, how and in what ways does doctrinal understanding form and inform the 
church’s interpretation of Scripture? 
Barth’s basic proposal is to discern the subject matter of a text; however, the 
critical questions are: what is one’s answer to the question of the content, the 
meaning, and the distinctiveness of the subject matter itself? How can one arrive at 
the subject matter of the text? More importantly, how can one be sure that it is the 
subject matter of the text itself that one is arriving at, or that one is not mistake in 
understanding the subject matter? One of the ways to perceive the differing options 
of hermeneutics is to look at the answers to these basic questions in which 
hermeneutics provides differing answers and options. 
 This chapter explores Barth’s theological hermeneutics, in his Church 
Dogmatics, and delineates the different angles Barth deals with such questions. We 
will argue that Barth’s theological hermeneutics is a sachlich hermeneutics based on 
a doctrinal understanding of Scripture. Moreover, Barth’s discussion on other 
                                                 
3 CD I/2, 493. 
4 Gadamer, Truth and Method, 250. 
5 Barth believes that this approach that he learnt from his interaction with the Bible can be applied to 
various writing, religious or non-religious, should it fall unto him the task of reading such texts. Cf. 
Barth, The Epistle to the Romans, 12. Also see CD I/2, 465. 
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doctrines often highlights and reflects the same question in various ways and from 
different angles. We propose that Barth’s hermeneutics is not unique because it is 
sachlicher, but because of the kind of Sachkritik he posits and the role of doctrines in 
his hermeneutics. The ontological convictions of his dogmatics form and inform his 
argument about the matter of the text. While our reading is based on Barth’s 
exposition in CD I/2 §19 on “The Word of God for the Church” and CD I/1 §4-5 on 
Barth’s doctrine of the Word of God, the ontological understanding will be informed 
by Barth’s later theological ontology as has been argued in chapter three. In this 
regard the threefold form of the Word of God (written, proclaimed and revealed) and 
threefold form of God’s speaking (speech, action and mystery) will be explored and 
reinterpreted in the light of Barth’s later theological ontology.6 In Barth’s theology of 
the Word, in the later period, the analogy between Trinity and threefold Word of God 
becomes less and less tight as compared to the earlier.7 However the material 
(subject matter) relationship between the one Word of God (Jesus Christ) and the 
forms of the Word is maintained throughout his exposition from CD I to CD IV.8 
                                                 
6 The development of Barth’s doctrine of the threefold form of the Word of God took a period of 
thirteen years, from a lecture in Göttingen (Summer 1924), two lectures in Münster (1926-1927), and 
the expansion of the material in the lectures given in Bonn and Basel which was later on published as 
CD I/1 and CD I/2. McCormack, "The Being of Holy Scripture Is in Becoming," in Evangelicals & 
Scripture: Tradition, Authority, and Hermeneutics, 57. Part of our effort in this study is to coordinate 
the salient feature of the doctrine of threefold form of the Word with Barth’s discussion of the nature 
of the one Word as speech, action and mystery. 
7 In CD IV/3, 114, Barth notes, “By a lengthy detour we are thus brought back to the theme 
of the Prolegomena to the Church Dogmatics, to the doctrine of the threefold form of the Word of 
God as revealed, written and proclaimed. In this context, we cannot establish, develop and present it 
again as is done in detail in CD I/1 and I/2. In explication of the present question it is enough that, 
recalling our earlier conclusions, we should simply maintain that alongside the first and primary Word 
of God, and in relation to it, there are at least two other true words which are distinct yet inter-related 
in the above-mentioned sequence.” (Emphasis added). The two true words are Scripture and church 
proclamation, but in this context Barth introduces, in addition to the two, “lesser lights” that can be 
accepted on the ground of material criteria of the One Word of God, Jesus Christ. This openness 
however revises the Trinitarian analogy of the earlier account of the Word of God. 
8 McCormack comments that, “Each time, no matter how much material expansion took place from 
one version to the next, the concept of a threefold form of the Word provided the organizing principle, 
thus testifying to the high degree of continuity in the material vision that informed Barth’s doctrine of 
the Word of God and his doctrine of Holy Scripture as one aspect of that more comprehensive 
doctrine of the Word.” McCormack, "The Being of Holy Scripture Is in Becoming," in Evangelicals 
& Scripture: Tradition, Authority, and Hermeneutics, 57-58. In CD IV, Barth is open to other forms 
of the Word, but Barth keeps the material relationship between the Word of God and the forms of the 
one Word. CD IV/3.1.,110-118. Thus while Telford Work rightly argues that Barth’s strict analogy of 
Trinity and the threefold form of the Word of God becomes rather loose in the later part of the Church 
Dogmatics, Barth maintains the material relationship between the Word and the forms which is the 
original purpose of the Trinitarian analogy from the beginning. For his criticism of Barth’s Trinitarian 
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We will argue that Barth’s sachlicher approach, as a hermeneutical principle, 
is not unique because many scholars recognize the importance of the subject matter. 
We contend that it is a matter of common sense that a reading of a text is an attempt 
to grasp its subject matter. Rather, his contribution lies in the theological description 
of the nature, the identity, and the actuality of the Scripture’s subject matter. Thus 
our reading proposes a double threefoldness of Scripture’s subject matter: the 
threefoldness of God’s speaking (preached, written and revealed) and the 
threefoldness of God’s speech (speech, act and mystery). The first aspect is explored 
from the perspective of actual reality of God’s speaking, and the second is explored 
as the internal dynamic of God’s speech. The threefold Word of God is well known, 
and has been much explored regarding Barth’s doctrine in relation to scriptural 
interpretation. We will argue that the other threefold, i.e. speech, act and mystery, 
provides the inner dynamics that is important for understanding Barth’s 
hermeneutics. It provides a dynamic concept of the event of the Word of God in the 
life of the church. Attending to these themes generates a perspective that the 
hermeneutics of the subject matter is primarily a communication, a divine address, 
rather than an inquiry into the multi-layered textual realities. However, the divine 
address does not mean that the humanity of the biblical text is ignored. It is, rather, 
theologically grounded in the divine communicative ordering of the created world. 
By grounding Barth’s hermeneutics in the doctrines, we avoid any inclination to 
think that Barth’s sachlich hermeneutics is primarily a methodological tool for 
exploring Scripture. It is, rather, a disciplined thinking of what it means for the 
church to read the Bible as Scripture, i.e., as a text, Scripture realisation is animated 
by God’s communicative presence. 
 Our argument will begin with Barth’s central statement of sachlich 
hermeneutics. Then we will explore Barth’s concept of Scripture as the witness of 
revelation, and relate this theme to the role of history and historical study in the 
church’s interpretation and proclamation of Scripture. Our contention is that the 
meaning of Scripture, history and the church’s proclamation is hermeneutically 
                                                                                                                                          
account of Scripture see  Telford Work, Living and Active: Scripture in the Economy of Salvation 
(Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2001), 67-100. 
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conditioned by the subject matter they are witnessing to. Based on this contention, 
we will present the identity of the subject matter in the threefoldness of God’s 
speaking, and explore what it means to read Scripture as an actual realization of the 
Word of God. We will, therefore, explore the threefoldness of God’s speech in 
Barth’s discussion of the nature of the Word of God as speech, action and mystery. 
We will conclude this chapter with the meaning and purpose of Barth’s sachlich 
hermeneutics, and what this implies for the church’s practice of the theological 
interpretation of Scripture. 
1. Barth on human understanding 
What does “understanding” mean in Barth’s hermeneutics? The question of human 
understanding stands at the pinnacle of modern hermeneutics. Barth does not provide 
an extensive answer to this question which shows that his interest does not lie in 
hermeneutical insights but rather in a theological response to the so called 
hermeneutical problem. Barth’s answer is that human understanding is only a real 
understanding when one grasps the subject matter of a discourse (in reading or in 
listening). Theological interpretation affirms that there is a strong relationship 
between human understanding and the linguistic and the historical aspects of the text. 
However, Barth insists it must not stop there because understanding is not simply 
grasping the words and their syntax, i.e., their lexical and semantic interactions; or, 
an understanding of the authors of the Bible, or the people in the Bible, i.e., their 
religious ideas, practices, lives and traditions. The language and history in the Bible 
are important, and it is impossible for a theological understanding to encircle these 
fundamental elements of the biblical text. Barth argues that a true understanding of 
the Bible must move through and beyond the words and the people to the subject 
matter of the Scripture. Barth provides the essence of his sachlicher understanding 
when he posits:  
We do not speak for the sake of speaking, but for the sake of the indication 
which is to be made by our speaking. We speak for the sake of what we 
denote or intend by our speaking. To listen to a human word spoken to us 
does not mean only that we have cognition of the word as such. The 
understanding of it cannot consist merely in discovering on what 
presuppositions, in what situation, in what linguistic sense and with what 
intention, in what actual context, and in this sense with what meaning the 
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other has said this or that. ... We can speak meaningfully of hearing a human 
utterance only when it is clear to us in its function of indicating something 
that is described or intended by the word, and also when this function has 
become an event confronting us, when therefore by means of the human word 
we ourselves in some degree perceive the thing described or intended. It is 
only then that anyone has told me anything and I have heard it from him. We 
may call other things speaking and hearing, but in the strict sense they are 
only unsuccessful attempts at speaking and hearing. If a human word spoken 
to me does not show me anything, or if I myself cannot perceive what the 
word shows me, we have an unsuccessful attempt of this kind. Understanding 
of a human word presupposes that the attempt to speak and hear has 
succeeded. Then I know what is being said. On the basis and in the light of 
the word I understand what is said to me.... Of course, concretely this 
understanding can consist only in my returning from the matter to the word 
and its presuppositions, to the speaking subject in its concrete form. But it is 
only in the light of what is said to me and heard by me, and not of myself, 
that I try to inquire of the word and the speaking subject. The result of my 
inquiry in this form will be my interpretation of this human word. My 
exposition cannot possibly consist in an interpretation of the speaker. Did he 
say something to me only to display himself? I should be guilty of a 
shameless violence against him, if the only result of my encounter with him 
were that I now knew him or knew him better than before. What lack of love! 
Did he not say anything to me at all? Did he not therefore desire that I should 
see him not in abstracto but in his specific and concrete relationship to the 
thing described or intended in his word, that I should see him from the 
standpoint and in the light of this thing?9 
 According to this passage, understanding is a “listening” to someone who 
says something about something. It is an activity of receptive assent to someone who 
communicates something to her readers/audiences. According to Barth, the subject 
matter is what a true listener/reader should be attentive to when one reads a text or 
listens to someone. For this purpose, the matter must be differentiated from the 
words or the psychological deliberation of the speaker. When one is confronted with 
the subject matter, then there is a real understanding. When this is not the case, then 
there is a misunderstanding. Understanding of the subject matter is not understanding 
of word and its speaker, for that is just a preparation for understanding. Surely, Barth 
adds, one must return to the words and to the speaker. But if one only grasps the 
words and the speaker, then it is not understanding. A true understanding takes place 
when through and beyond the words and the speaker, one grasps the subject matter, 
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or more precisely, is grasped by it. Even when one penetrates to the psychological 
state of an author, it is not a true understanding if the subject matter slips through the 
interpretation. An understanding of a text, even when all the grammatical, lexical and 
semantic elements of the words are considered, is not a true understanding if the 
subject matter of the text is missed. A real understanding is an understanding of the 
subject matter that is communicated through the words and by the author. One 
cannot bypass the words and the speaker to understand the subject matter; one cannot 
stop with the words and the speaker either, as one must move through and beyond 
the words and the speaker to be confronted with the subject matter. In this regard, 
understanding is an act of love, i.e., a love and care to the speaker and the words she 
uttered in communicating the subject matter. In other words, to understand a text one 
has to participate, to be involved in the conversation about subject matter. To 
understand is not to stand outside and observe the speaker and the language as an 
impartial inquirer but to let the speaker address one through and by the text. The 
reader becomes a contemporary of the author in the conversation about the subject 
matter. 
There are many ways we can approach this proposal. We can read it 
biographically in the light of Barth’s disputes with his contemporary theologians. We 
also can read it as an opinion of the psychology of understanding. We may also read 
it as a proposal on the philosophy of understanding. Nevertheless, in Barth’s own 
terms, he claims that this is a hermeneutic that he learns from a theological 
engagement with Scripture.10 Barth posits, 
What is the source of the hermeneutic teaching which we have just sketched? 
Well, the fact that in spite of its inherent clarity it still does not enjoy general 
recognition is in itself an indication that it does not arise out of any general 
considerations on the nature of human language, etc., and therefore out of a 
general anthropology. Why is it that, as a rule, general considerations on the 
nature of human language do not lead to the propositions indicated? My reply 
would be: because the hermeneutic principles are not dictated by Holy 
                                                 
10 This approach to hermeneutics reverses the order of general hermeneutics where it is from general 
hermeneutics that one has to learn to read the Bible. In this view, reading the Bible is a specific 
instance of general phenomena of human understanding. The weakness of this view is that in moving 
from general to special hermeneutics, it has uncritically carried with it the anthropological 




Scripture, as they are in our case. If we ask ourselves, and as readers of Holy 
Scripture we have to ask ourselves, what is meant by hearing and 
understanding and expounding when we presuppose that that which is 
described or intended by the word of man is the revelation of God, the answer 
we have given forces itself upon us.11 
The theological rationale of Barth’s approach goes beyond a lesson from experience. 
Barth proposes a general hermeneutical conviction of human understanding that is 
based on a specific theological conviction of the Scripture. Barth posits, “It is from 
the word of man in the Bible that we must learn what has to be learned concerning 
the word of man in general.”12  
Nevertheless, we could ask Barth whether his conviction is necessarily 
theologically grounded. To read a text in the light of its subject matter, i.e., “what 
someone says to someone about something,” is not something unique to Barth’s 
hermeneutics or a theological hermeneutics.13 Bultmann also proposes that an 
interpreter must aim at expounding the text’s subject matter. Bultmann argues that 
the subject matter must be seen as greater than the authors and the words of 
Scripture. In his criticism of Barth’s Epistle to the Romans, Bultmann suggests that 
an interpreter must allow the subject matter of the text to evaluate Paul and his 
religious ideas, precisely because the subject matter itself is greater than Paul or the 
words Paul wrote.14 Wilhelm Herrmann, Barth’s teacher, also focuses his theology 
on the subject matter. In Barth’s evaluation, one of the important lessons he learnt 
from Herrmann is the “thundering summons to the subject matter itself, to the true 
theme,” that everything else circles around in the Bible, dogmas and proclamation.15 
From the field of general hermeneutics, modern approaches, as expounded by 
Ricoeur and Gadamer, also aim at engaging with the subject matter of a text. For 
Gadamer, understanding is a participation in the subject matter the text discloses, that 
is, engaging in a dialogue with the text, on the subject matter. Gadamer posits, “This 
                                                 
11 CD I/2, 465-66. 
12 Ibid., 466. 
13 Vanhoozer, "Discourse on Matter: Hermeneutics and the "Miracle" of Understanding," in 
Hermeneutics at the Crossroads, 19. 
14 Barth and Bultmann, Karl Barth-Rudolf Bultmann Letters, 1922-1966, 120. 
15 Barth, Theology and Church: Shorter Writings, 1920-1928, 271. 
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is the essence, the soul of my hermeneutics: To understand someone else is to see the 
justice, the truth, of their position. And this is what transforms us.”16 In this regard, 
understanding involves the event in which the subject matter makes itself known to 
the reader. The subject matter reveals the justice and the truth of its position in the 
fusion of the horizons between the text and the reader. As such, “understanding is to 
be thought of less a subjective act than a participating in an event of tradition, a 
process of transmission in which past and present are constantly mediated.”17 In this 
regard the interpreter is not simply active or passive but caught up in the event of 
understanding by which the subject matter reveals itself.   
Ricoeur argues that hermeneutics is not a matter of discovering authorial 
intention but grasping the ‘world’ projected by the text.18 Understanding is not a 
general comprehension of what is being said, but more specifically, understanding of 
“that about which something is said.”19 Although the subject matter is not the 
favourite word of Ricouer (he prefers ‘the world’ of the text), there is something 
about grasping the subject matter as clearly offered in his proposal. For Ricoeur, to 
retrieve the truth about the subject matter one has to begin by suspecting the 
ideological biases of the words and authors of a text. And yet to be truly listening to 
the subject matter, one cannot stop here. One also has to suspect one’s biases toward 
the text and the disillusion of a self-objectivity, i.e., a self-deceptive inclination to 
regard oneself as a free reader and a narcissistic inclination to read an echo of one’s 
own voice into the text. A failure to avoid these dangers means a failure to listen to 
an “other” in and through the text. A disciplined listening must be carried out 
rigorously if one wants to engage with the subject matter of the text and not engage 
with one’s self-created mirror into the text. 
                                                 
16 Hans-Georg Gadamer, Hans-Georg Gadamer on Education, Poetry, and History Applied 
Hermeneutics (Albany: SUNY Press, 1992), 152.  Gadamer proposes that what one engages in the text 
is not limited to the understanding of the author because the text discloses something beyond the 
authorial intention. 
17 Gadamer, Truth and Method, 290. 
18 Paul Ricœur, Interpretation Theory: Discourse and the Surplus of Meaning (Fort Worth: Texas 
Christian University Press, 1976), 87-88. 




Thus, if Barth and others share a point of view that interpretation is about 
understanding the subject matter, “what someone says to someone about 
something,”20 in what way is Barth’s sachlich approach unique from differing 
hermeneutics? Despite the apparent similarities, we propose that Barth is distinct in 
what he proposes about the nature and the identity of the subject matter. When we 
compare Barth’s understanding with Gadamer and Ricoeur, there is significant 
difference in regard to the nature of understanding. For them, an understanding of the 
subject matter is a miracle of human language. It is an event that presupposes that the 
truth has its own life in the dynamic process of human understanding. The subject 
matter has an ontological reality in the becoming of the human existence. There is a 
‘mystical’ origin in their proposal about the nature of understanding.21 The account 
does not offer a clear identity by whom and how the miracle takes place. It is 
assumed as an existential event, and will always happen as a mystery of human 
linguistic event. In this regard, there is a kind of ontological faith in the inner 
capacity of language to reveal meaning and truth. For Barth, on the other hand, 
understanding is a function of the inner dynamic of the Word of God. It is Barth’s 
theology of the Word that defines and provides content for his Sachkritik, i.e., how 
he understands the nature and the identity of the subject matter. The event of 
understanding is a miracle indeed, but it is a miracle with a theological identity, 
which is, the divine presence. As such the event is defined by the actualism of the 
Word of God through the text, the reader and the human author. The actuality of the 
text, author and reader is not in this case a miracle of human existence, but a 
pneumatological miracle. It is a penumatological miracle as explored in the doctrine 
of inspiration. In the next section we will explore the nature and identity of the 
subject matter through a reading of Barth’s doctrine of Scripture and the Word of 
God. Then we will explore its implication for the actualism of the text, reader and 
author through a reading of his exposition of the sense in which Scripture is and 
becomes the Word of God.  
                                                 
20 Vanhoozer, "Discourse on Matter: Hermeneutics and the "Miracle" of Understanding," in 
Hermeneutics at the Crossroads, 19. 
21 Ibid., 25. 
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2. Scripture as witness and history 
To understand the content of Barth’s sachlich hermeneutics we have to explore two 
interconnected concepts in his doctrine of Scripture. One is Scripture as the witness 
of revelation, and the other is revelation itself. Related to Barth’s concept of witness 
is the relationship between the biblical witnesses and history. On this point, Barth’s 
ontology of interpretation (chapter 4) defines the meaning and the purpose of history 
in relation to Scripture as the witness of revelation. In this part, we will begin with a 
discussion on the concept of witness, and then elaborate the relationship between 
witness and history. Specifically, we will analyse how this proposal provides a 
theological response to the modern understanding of history in biblical interpretation. 
The aim of the discussion is to clarify Barth’s understanding of sachlich 
hermeneutics in relation to an important preliminary concept: Scripture as witness 
and the role of history in Scripture.   
2.1. Scripture as witness 
Barth’s sachlicher hermeneutics is argued and elucidated through his theological 
understanding of the Bible as the witness of the Word of God. In general terms, a 
‘witness’ is not the same as the thing that it witnesses to. The term points to the all-
importance of the subject matter because a witness points beyond itself to the thing it 
witnesses to. In the case of the Bible as witness to the Word of God, witness is not 
only distinct from the thing that it witnesses about, but it also finds its raison d'être 
from the thing it witnesses.22 Yet, for Barth, the distinction does not cancel the unity 
between the witness and the matter of the Scripture, i.e., between Scripture and the 
Word of God. Barth proposes a dialectics of distinction and unity in relation to the 
biblical witness and the Word of God. Thus, for the church, “the Bible is not 
                                                 
22 CD I/2, 463. Geoffrey Bromiley criticises Barth’s distinction between the Word and the text of 
Scripture. He argues that while Barth rightly highlights the authorizing role of God (as Subject and 
Object of revelation) and directs our attention to its leading theme, Jesus Christ, Barth nevertheless 
unintentionally undermines the role of Scripture as a form of the Word of God by also differentiating 
between Word as an object of the witness and Scripture as the witness to the object. See G. W. 
Bromiley, "The Authority of Scripture in Karl Barth," in Hermeneutics, Authority, and Canon: Essays 
on Scripture and Truth, ed. D. A. Carson and John D. Woodbridge (Grand Rapids: Academic Books, 
1986), 275-94.  As we argue later on this criticism can only stand if we perceive Barth’s doctrine of 
Scripture from an essentialist point of view.  
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distinguished from revelation.”23 And yet, while the Bible is not the Word of God, as 
it is distinct from the Word of God, but it is also one with the Word of God.24 It is the 
means of grace God has chosen to speak to the church. In other words, while 
Scripture as witness is not identical with the subject matter, it sets the matter before 
the readers,25 i.e., the witness is God’s elected text to communicate the subject 
matter. The term witness denotes these double meanings, which is, the distinction 
and the unity of the Bible with the Word of God as “the basis, object and content” of 
Scripture.  
 Why is such a distinction important to Barth? First, Barth’s construction of a 
theology of Scripture is not a quest for a theory of textuality, but an elaboration of 
the church doctrine of Scripture, and in light of this, an exploration of what it means 
for Scripture to have a creaturely character. This is particularly clear when we see 
that the concrete implication of his hermeneutics is not so much a method but rather 
an ethics of reading, i.e., how church should respond to the fact that God has 
revealed and continues to reveal God-self to the human race. Barth posits, “The 
Word of God is God Himself in Holy Scripture. For God once spoke as Lord to 
Moses and the prophets, to the Evangelists and apostles. And now through their 
written word He speaks as the same Lord to His Church.”26 The object of the 
church’s obedience is the lordship of God and not the supposed religious ideas of the 
text. Thus, only in this respect “Scripture is holy and the Word of God, because by 
the Holy Spirit it became and will become to the Church a witness to divine 
revelation.”27 Scripture demands the obedience of the church on account, not of its 
moral and historical worth, but the event of God’s lordship in and through the text. 
Jesus Christ is the Lord of the church, and it is this conviction that guides the 
church’s attitude and response in her reading of Scripture. Second, the distinction 
between the witness and the matter avoids a divinization of the text. Scripture, as a 
                                                 
23 Ibid., 463. 
24 Thus while it is true that Scripture is not the Word of God (distinction) it is also true that Scripture 
is the Word of God (unity). We will argue this point later as the being in becoming of the Scripture in 
the event of the Word. 
25 CD I/2, 463. 




text, remains a witness rather than the matter itself. It is God whom the church must 
obey and not the text in isolation from God’s communicative action. The text 
remains a human text, and is determined by its location in history. It is not a supra-
historical text, but rather a historical text in the divine communicative and salvific 
action. Thus it is authentically and characteristically a human text. Third, the 
distinction highlights the humanity of the witness and the way in which a creaturely 
subject participates in the divine communication without being divinised in the 
process.28 Because of the distinction, the human side of the witness (author and text) 
is not eclipsed by the unity of the text with the Word of God. In fact, as Barth argues, 
the humanity of the witness finds its true humanity in its participation in the divine 
communicative act precisely because it is characteristically human in its witness to 
the Word of God. In sum, the distinction preserves on one side the true object of 
church’s obedience and, on the other, the historical and human character of the 
biblical texts. 
 Second, why is the unity important for Barth? First, an overemphasis on the 
distinction between the Scripture and the matter may result in an ambiguity of the 
textual location of God’s speaking. In this case an overemphasis of its humanity 
implies that the relationship between the text and the Word of God is arbitrary, i.e., 
the text’s historical meaning is unrelated to its theological meaning. If the text and 
the Word of God are utterly distinct, then there is no continuity between what is in 
the text (its historical and textual meaning) and the event of the Word of God, so 
that, it does not really matter what is in the text. An interpretation of Scripture, in this 
case, becomes completely arbitrary. Indeed, one can be theologically justified in 
ignoring the textual locality of the Word of God in Scripture and to claim that “God 
may speak to us through Russian Communism, a flute concerto, a blossoming shrub, 
or a dead dog,”29 to the extent that Scripture has no privileged place in the divine 
ordering of revelation. Without unity, there is no real difference between 
hermeneutics based on the doctrine of Scripture and a subjectivist reading of biblical 
                                                 
28 Cf. Webster, Holy Scripture: A Dogmatic Sketch, 23. 
29 CD I/1, 55. Not that Barth refused the possibility, if God wants to. But this is merely a possibility, 




text. Second, unity preserves the integrity of the text in its humanity (historically and 
textually) from its conception, its development, and to its elucidation by and in the 
church. It does not adopt Scripture at a certain stage in its history, either by political 
decision or by ecclesiastical authority. If the text only begins to be the Word of God 
at a certain stage of church history or at certain moment of the church’s activity, with 
or without regard to its natural history, then its humanity is only ornamental. The 
creaturely history and textuality of Scripture is crucial for understanding the subject 
matter of the text. It is true that its meaning is bound to the event of the Word of God 
and to the divine communicative freedom in the church’s reading, but this does not 
deny the fact that God does not act in an arbitrary way.  
In this regard, it is crucial to bring Barth’s later ontology to renovate the 
sense of utter discontinuity in Barth’s theological unity in distinction between 
Scripture and the Word of God.30 The election of Christ to be God for humanity in 
the divine eternal decision defines eternally the freedom of God in the event of 
church. In other words, Trinity and election already define eternally the path of the 
freedom in God’s communicative action to the church. The way of God’s ontological 
being determines the economy of God’s communicative action. God’s elected being 
is the history of the Son of God in the far country; the way of God’s humanity in 
Jesus Christ is the way of both true God and true humanity. In other words, the mode 
of God’s freedom is Christological. The freedom of God is defined in the history of 
Jesus Christ. In this history, the unity of the witness (the humanity of Scripture) and 
the subject matter (the Word of God) is maintained through an ontological ordering 
of God who gives God-self to humanity. In this ordering God is faithful to the human 
witness of the Word of God. God’s freedom is expressed through God’s faithfulness 
                                                 
30 Klass Runia misconstrues Barth’s emphasis on distinction as a discontinuity in his theology of 
revelation that necessitates the Holy Spirit having to make the Bible become revelation again and 
again, and places the church in a difficult situation as to where and when the Bible becomes the Word 
of God. He goes on to posit, "In our opinion, one of the greatest weaknesses in Barth's early works is 
that he has place for the reality only and not for the continuity." See Klass Runia, Karl Barth's 
Doctrine of Holy Scripture (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1962), 128.  There is some justification in this 
criticism if we see Barth’s theology of Scripture without employing being in becoming and the 
doctrine of election. However this criticism lose its power when Barth’s doctrine of Scripture is 
rightly construed in his later theological ontology. 
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to the text of Scripture that is realized ever anew to the church through the work of 
Holy Spirit.31 
 The theological relationship between the text and the subject matter in 
Scripture is defined by the distinction-in-unity of Scripture to the Word of God. The 
subject matter is witnessed by a collection of human texts. Its humanity, i.e., its 
language and history, is important to the status and function of the text as the witness 
of revelation. As a theological text, the Bible must be read historically if one takes 
seriously its theological character as a human witness of revelation. But history is not 
a privileged field of the church. As the term indicates, it is a public sphere, mixing 
church events and the events of the world. What is, then, the relationship between the 
Word of God and the event of history? This is a significant theological question that 
requires more space than what is possible here. In what follows we will only sketch 
an outline of Barth’s answer to this question, i.e., in what sense the Bible as a witness 
to revelation must shape the church’s understanding of history, specifically, in 
relation to history as a field of critical study.32 We will propose in what ways Barth’s 
theology of history is different from modern historiography and how it can contribute 
to construe a theological view of history in relation to Scripture. The main concept is 
history as a witnessing history.  
2.2. A witnessing history 
At a basic level, Barth’s theology proposes that the unity of Scripture and the Word 
of God does not cancel the historical meaning of the Scripture, i.e., its meaning is not 
a supernatural or anti-historical meaning. Barth is clear that as a human document the 
Bible consists of human discourse “uttered by specific men at specific times in a 
                                                 
31 In this regard, the faithfulness of God to Scripture is not because God bound God-self to the text of 
Scripture but because God has decided to be God in Jesus Christ. In this decision, God has history, 
i.e., history of Jesus Christ that defines the communicative presence of God in the word of Scripture. 
As such Scripture is bound to the faithfulness of God to human being in God’s election. We posit, 
Barth’s theology is more robust than the suggestion of Mark D Thomson who in his criticism of Barth 
suggests that God decides to bind Himself to the Scripture and thus in this sense commissions the 
prophets and the apostles to write on His behalf. Mark D. Thompson, "Witness to the Word: On 
Barth's Doctrine of Scripture," in Engaging with Barth: Contemporary Evangelical Critiques, ed. 
David Gibson and Daniel Strange (New York: T&T Clark, 2008), 168-97.  
32 In a sense, the whole Church Dogmatics is Barth’s answer to such a question. Our exploration thus 
is rather limited in ways in which the relationship between history and Barth’s doctrine of the Word of 
God enlightens a constructive proposal of theological hermeneutics.  
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specific situation, in a specific language and with a specific intention.”33 At this point 
Barth’s proposal is not problematic, but if we explore further the relationship 
between the historical locality of Scripture and God’s revelation, there is something 
about Barth’s answer that will not comfortably sit with modern historiography. 
Barth’s contention is that Scripture’s historicity is a function of its theological 
identity as a witness to revelation. Scripture is not only a document of history, 
certainly not in the modern sense of the term, but rather a witnessing history. Thus if 
we were to ask Barth, which one defines which (history or revelation), Barth’s 
answer is that its historical character must be understood in the light of its subject 
matter (revelation) and not the other way round.34 It is its function as a witness that 
defines its nature as a historical document. Scripture is not a human document for the 
sake of historiography (a writing of a history), but a historical document for the sake 
of witnessing revelation.35 Although it remains a historical document, it cannot be 
subsumed under a modern presupposition of history. In this regard, Barth proposes a 
bold theological revision of what is history. Barth posits,  
If the word "historical" is a modern word, the thing itself was not really 
invented in modern times. And if the more exact definition of what is 
"historical" in this sense is liable to change and has actually changed at times, 
it is still quite clear that when and wherever the Bible has been really read 
and expounded, in this sense it has been read "historically" and not 
unhistorically, i.e., its concrete humanity has not been ignored. To the extent 
that it has been ignored, it has not been read at all. We have, therefore, not 
only no cause to retract from this demand, but every cause to accept it strictly 
on theological grounds.36   
Barth proposes that the historicity of Scripture needs to be approached strictly from a 
theological point of view. Barth is critical of a privileged definition of history by any 
era because of its temporary character as an intellectual construct. It is, as such, 
                                                 
33 CD I/2., 464. 
34 This concept is something of a lasting one in Barth’s theology. Even since his day in Göttingen, 
when Gogarten suggests to him that he must define history before talking about theology of 
confessions and the Bible, Barth has had a different opinion. Barth posits, “For me it was quite the 
other way round: first of all I wanted to study the Heidelberg Catechism and the Epistle to the 
Ephesians. Only then did I want to try to understand what ‘history’ is”. Busch, Karl Barth, His Life 
from Letters and Autobiographical Texts, 135. 
35 Barth engages in an attempt to redefine the meaning of history in this regard, an idea that we will 
treat in the later part of this chapter. 
36 CD I/2, 464. 
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always a subject of continuous revisions and reformulations. On the other hand, even 
though it is true that the historical character of Scripture is not there simply for the 
sake of historical interests, does not Barth’s proposal reduce the role of history in his 
theology of Scripture? Is it justifiable that Barth characterizes his contemporary 
historical study as that which “consists only in an exposition of the biblical humans 
in their historical reality”37 and disregards the subject matter? Can he ignore the 
decisive role of historical situatedness that shaped biblical men and their theological 
ideas? While it is true that biblical humans are witnesses that point toward someone 
beyond themselves, are not historical circumstances also decisive in forming the 
discourse on the subject matter? To answer these questions, we have to explore two 
themes: Barth’s theological understanding of history as an academic discipline and 
his view of history as a theological locus of revelation. 
 First is how Barth understands history as an academic discipline. Although 
there are many levels where Barth’s proposal does not fit easily within modern 
historiography, we propose that the crux of the problem is his interpretation of the 
meaning of history in contrast to modern consensus.38 Francis Watson notes that “in 
contemporary usage, ‘history’ is construed as a single, neutral, homogeneous space, 
itself without origin, telos, limit or meaning, which constitutes the field within which 
particular trains of events occur in a manner that is neither predictable in advance nor 
entirely devoid of a coherence and rationality which the historian may retrospectively 
identify.”39 In this context, to speak of history as having ultimate meaning is easily 
judged as intellectual hubris. It is seen as a universalization of a historical 
particularity. In contrast, history is generally understood as a series of contingent 
events bound to the particularity of its causality. The modern mind shows little 
conviction beyond the immanent causality of time-space continuum, a causality 
generally interpreted through a principle of analogy.40 History is bound to 
perspective, interpretation and rational construction. Truth is not a sphere of 
                                                 
37 Ibid., 466. 
38 Cf. Benjamin Myers, "Karl Barth as Historian: Historical Method in the Göttingen Lectures on 
Calvin, Zwingli and Schleiermacher," Zeitschrift für Dialektische Theologie 23, no. 1 (2007): 96-109. 
39 Francis Watson, "The Quest for the Real Jesus," in The Cambridge Companion to Jesus 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 164. 
40 Murray Rae, History and Hermeneutics (London: T&T Clark, 2005), 17. 
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historical analysis. When this insight is applied to Scripture, it prescribes a separation 
between history and theology. Barth is troubled by the theological implication of this 
sort of historiography, especially when it is uncritically applied by the church to its 
biblical interpretation. Theology becomes unrelated to historical events. Its truth can 
be established on other grounds than the historical witness of Scripture. Barth posits, 
“The philosophy of religion of the Enlightenment from Lessing by way of Kant and 
Herder to Fichte and Hegel, with its intolerable distinction between the eternal 
content and the historical ‘vehicle,’ can only be described as the nadir of the modern 
misunderstanding of the Bible.”41 In this philosophy, the truth of the Bible is only 
illustrative of the universal truth, which can be established independently of 
Scripture, e.g., rational, moral or aesthetical grounds. One form of the 
(mis)understandings is a construct of theology as merely ethical, i.e., moral 
principles that can be established, critically, and independently of the Scripture.42 In 
this principle, historical exploration serves theology for an illustration of ethical 
lessons rather than theological explorations.43 The question is driven by an inquiry on 
moralities that can be learned from the past. Historical study is still seen as an 
important counterpart of theology, and might be regarded more suitable for the 
culture of modernity than dogmatics, but its truth is separated from its contingency as 
a historical event. The price to be paid is that the truth of Christianity must be 
redefined as a non-doctrinal form of religious lessons.  Jesus and Christianity are 
explained as part of the immanent realities, fully within the grasp of the 
methodological tool of historical study. Christianity, as a historical phenomenon, is 
exhausted by historical analysis. The distressing effect is that theology is deemed to 
be more suitable when explored by other means of analysis.  The essence of the 
matter is that God is not knowable as an object of historical inquiry, and 
consequently, the Christ of the Gospels is external to the grasp of historical method. 
If theology is about Christ and his salvation, then it is not possible to establish such 
claims on the basis of history. Theology has little to do with the Jesus of history, i.e., 
                                                 
41 CD I/1, 329. 
42 Barth agrees that dogmatics is inherently ethical, as we will argue in the next chapter, but he is 
troubled by the sense that it is merely ethics without doctrine. 
43 Eg. See Ernst Troeltsch, Religion in History: Ernst Troeltsch trans. James Luther Adams and Walter 
F. Bense (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1991), 11-32. Cf. B. Buunk, "Karl Barth and the "Jewish Question" 
- Elements of a Controversy," Etudes Theologiques Et Religieuses 80, no. 3 (2005): 16. 
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the historical figure behind the text of the Gospel.44 In short, the study of history, in 
the modern sense of the word, has little to do with the faith of Scripture. Theology 
and history are two different species with different aims, purposes and characters. 
The deeper problem of this disjunction is the presupposition that governs its 
historical explanation.45 It presupposes that God’s existence is redundant for 
explaining historical events. In this view, history is defined as an immanent human 
event independent of divine agency. Historical continuity and plausibility can be 
fully explained by human agency and natural explanations. Any external agency will 
be regarded as suspicious. Analogy supplies the reasons for development or story in 
the historical narrative within an atheistic or deistic space-time continuum. There is 
little room left for God and revelation. History is not part of God’s creation or a stage 
for God’s redemptive act. 
Barth senses this project as theologically anaemic, which is catastrophic for 
the church’s theological interpretation of Scripture. While it is true that historical 
study cannot prove the reality of God, it does not mean that theology and history 
explore two different time-space continuums. It is the same history that theology and 
history explore. The difference is the interpretation of history and the presupposition 
about the role of the theological explanation of history. Behind modern 
historiography there is a myth of objectivity and a bias against theological 
convictions. It sidesteps theological interpretation as ‘dogmatic’, i.e., ideologically 
biased. Barth proposes that a theological recovery of historical study needs to work 
under a revised paradigm of reality in which the divine agency is not excluded. More 
to the point, the reality of God is decisive to what is historically immanent.46 Barth 
elucidates this point in CD I/2, §14 “The Time of Revelation,” where Barth provides 
three criticisms of modern historiography. First, modern historiography fails to “see 
that in answering this question [the relationship between history and revelation] we 
                                                 
44 Inter alia: Martin Kähler, The So-Called Historical Jesus and the Historic, Biblical Christ trans. 
Carl E. Braaten, Seminar Editions (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1964), 46-51; Bultmann, "Liberal 
Theology and the Latest Theological Movement," in Faith and Understanding, 28-52. 
45 Rae, History and Hermeneutics, 4-21. 
46 Donald Wood rightly argues that “in place of the sovereignty of modern reading subject, whose 
presumptions regarding this hermeneutical self-sufficiency he regards as neo-Pelagianism, Barth 
speaks of God’s prevailing authority in Scripture… a claim that evokes the self-forgetful attentiveness 
of faith.” Wood, Barth's Theology of Interpretation, 99. See also Hans Madueme, "Theological 
Interpretation after Barth," Journal of Theological Interpretation 3, no. 1 (2009): 99. 
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cannot start with the general phenomenon of time, or, as it is preferably called, 
history.”47 The reason for this is because we cannot assume that we know revelation 
“on the basis of comparative observation, and then go on to ask whether and how far 
the phenomenon of revelation discloses itself, perhaps, to the said comparative 
observation at a specific point.”48 Revelation cannot be deduced from a general 
observation of human events. Revelation comes to history with the sign of 
exteriority. History, on the other hand, cannot explain something that is exterior to 
what it constitutes. Barth argues that revelation cannot be inquired from a thought 
system that has no room for revelation, but he does not retreat from seeking to 
understand how revelation and history relate to each other. Barth posits, “There has 
been failure to see that the event of Jesus Christ as God's revelation can be found 
only when sought as such, i.e., when we are seeking what we have already found.”49 
In other words, should history open itself to revelation it can only be construed as a 
theological history, and not a system of historical revelation. Thus, Barth argues, 
thirdly, “there has been a failure to see that if revelation is revelation, we cannot 
speak of it as though it can be discovered, dug up, worked out as the deeper ground 
and content of human history.”50 The historical exploration of Scripture will not 
necessarily confirm the presence of God in the biblical history. The reason for this is 
because, “Revelation is not a predicate of history, but history is a predicate of 
revelation.”51 Thus, revelation is not disclosed by history independent of divine 
action. Barth agrees with modern historiography that historical study cannot grasp 
the divine. Nevertheless, Barth argues that revelation has the capacity to enter history 
and has concretely entered history in which God as a subject within history is made 
known. God is the creator of the space-time continuum, and able and willing to 
reveal God’s self in history. More importantly God has decided to do so. The truth is 
not, for Barth, a possibility of revelation, but the actuality of God’s revelation in 
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history. Revelation not only can have history as its predicate, but God has chosen to 
have history predicated to revelation. 
In an important sense history, as a theological construct, will not be so 
different from a modern understanding of history. There will a clear continuity and 
analogy of historical events. But, in another crucial sense, there is also a 
discontinuity. It is not in a crude sense that a theological history is open toward 
miracles and divine stories (or mythical narratives). The point is a theological 
history, as witnessed by Scripture, confesses that God’s revelation alters the fabric of 
history. The marks of this alteration have their locus in general history, but faith that 
perceives the marks of this alteration is not a natural knowledge, universally 
available independent of God’s action. As Murray A. Rae rightly comments that “the 
alterations to the fabric of history wrought by the incarnation are not unveiled as 
revelation except as the Spirit gives eyes to see and ears to hear.”52 The continuity 
does not undermine the need of faith and the work of the Holy Spirit to open the eyes 
and the ears of faith. A theological history does not claim a perspective from no-
where (or from everywhere, as an omniscience perspective), but a faith perspective 
that is not only open but crucially guided by the theological presupposition of reality, 
i.e., a theological ontology. In the New Testament, especially in the Gospels and the 
Book of Acts, the resurrection alters the fabric of reality and shapes the course of 
history according to the plan of God by the work of the Holy Spirit. The decisiveness 
of the resurrection provides an analogy for understanding the presence of God in 
Scripture’s theological construct of history. This historical presupposition, as a guide 
to the historical study of Scripture, proposes a different historical approach to biblical 
interpretation. 
There are further implications of this theological approach to the historical 
study of Scripture.  Barth argues, first that, the historical-critical study needs to know 
its limits, and place upon itself a self-critical consciousness about its methodological 
boundaries. The Word of God is a subject matter that is beyond the historians’ 
methodological capacity. The theological subject matter of the Bible is a subject of 
God’s free communicative action. The historical-critical approach can be a worthy 
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ally of the church once it is maintained self-critically in relation to its theological 
limitations. Barth posits,  
The so-called historico-critical method-of handling Holy Scripture ceases to 
be theologically possible or worth considering, the moment it conceives it as 
its task to work out from the testimonies of Holy Scripture (which does 
ascribe to revelation throughout the character of miracle), and to present as 
the real intention, a reality which lacks this character, which has to be 
regarded as reality otherwise than on the basis of God's free, special and 
direct act.53 
In this regard, historical critical study needs to admit that there are certain narratives 
in the Bible that tell events beyond the scope of positive affirmation or negation of its 
historical method. Among these are the stories of creation, resurrection, miracles and 
divine speech. Barth, in many places, uses the terms legend and saga to describe the 
proper way modern history may describe these stories.54 Even in this regard Barth 
argues that the negation of the story is just a matter of probability and as such must 
not be decided conclusively for the reason that, theologically speaking, historical 
criticism must be aware of its methodological limitations. 
Second, Barth’s historiography provides a revision of what is a historical 
event from a theological perspective. Observing the modern practice of biblical 
scholars Francis Watson notes that, all historians, including Christians who 
personally believe in Christian doctrines, “will be subject to the constraints of [the] 
methodologically atheistic worldview- unless they are prepared to rethink what 
‘history’ is, on the basis of theology.”55 We posit that to think of history on the basis 
of theology, with and after the manner of Barth, is to understand the histories in 
                                                 
53 CD I/2, 64. 
54 CD I/1, 327; I/2, 51, 509. Barth asserts “Saga or legend can only denote the more or less intrusive 
part of the story-teller or story-tellers in the story told. There is no story in which we do not have to 
reckon with this aspect, and therefore with elements of saga or legend according to the general 
concept of "historical" truth. This applies also to the stories told in the Bible. Otherwise they would 
have to be without temporal form. Yet this fundamental uncertainty in general historicity, and 
therefore the positive judgment that here and there saga or legend is actually present, does not have to 
be an attack on the substance of the biblical testimony. For (1) this judgment can in any case concern 
and contest only the general historicity of a biblical record, (2) even in the clearest instance it is by 
nature only a judgment of probability, and (3) even saga or legend is in any case meant to be history 
and can thus be heard as a communication of history irrespective of the "historical" judgment. So long 
as this is so, the question of the particular historicity of the story at issue is at least not answered 
negatively.” CD I/1, 327. 
55 Watson, "The Quest for the Real Jesus," in The Cambridge Companion to Jesus, 164. 
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Scripture as a function of its witness of revelation. It is a witness in its humanity. 
History is to be taken seriously because the church must take seriously the humanity 
of Scripture. Barth posits, “When we do take the humanity of the Bible quite 
seriously, we must also take quite definitely the fact that as a human word it does say 
something specific, that as a human word it points away from itself, that as a word it 
points towards a fact, an object.”56 While the relationship between history and 
Scripture remains a complex matter, the fact that Scripture witnesses the Word of 
God is not disreputable by the lack of historical proofs. Its historical narrative is a 
function of its humanity that is necessitated by its temporal form. In this regard the 
doctrine of the Word of God defines the relationship between the witnessing history 
and the subject matter of Scripture. The Sache of the Scripture is the Word of God, 
and its history is the human form of witnessing to the identity and the content of the 
Word of God. This point brings us to the heart of the matter: What is the Sache of 
Scripture? What is the Word of God? It is to this exploration that we will assign the 
next section. 
3. The Sache of the Scripture: the threefoldness of God’s speaking 
What is the Sache of the Scripture?  Barth’s answer to this question is both simple 
and complex.57 It is simple because it is the divine presence in the communicative 
act, that is, the Word of God. In its basic form it means “God was with us, with us 
His enemies, with us who were visited and smitten by His wrath. God was with us in 
all the reality and fullness with which He does what He does.”58 This is the simplest 
form of the Sache of Scripture. Yet, it is complex because the divine economy is 
determined by the ontological decision of God, shaped by Barth’s understanding of 
divine actualism and construed in a real dialectic of divine-human faith encounter. 
                                                 
56 CD I/2, 464. 
57 Burnett gives two reasons for the difficulty of defining the word Sache: linguistically and 
theologically. From a linguistic point of view it is difficult to find a translation for the adjective 
sachlicher and the noun Sache in English. But more importantly, the theological meaning of the Sache 
which point to God, makes it difficult to delineate it since God as the object of the Scripture is at the 
same time the subject who speaks. See Burnett, Karl Barth's Theological Exegesis: The 
Hermeneutical Principals of the Römerbrief Period, 75. Our answer to this question will focus on the 
theological meaning of Sache in Barth’s theology and elucidate it by an exposition of the doctrine of 
the Word of God. 
58 CD I/1, 105. 
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Barth posits, “Revelation is itself the divine decision…”59 and, “All revelation, then, 
must be thought of as revealing, i.e., as conditioned by the act of revelation.”60 What 
sort of description has to be made so that we take seriously the real subject matter of 
the Scripture, which is, God in communicative presence? Our elaboration of this 
question offers a threefoldness of God’s speaking (revealed, written and proclaimed) 
as Barth’s response to such inquiry. It is by connecting the threefold dimensions of 
the Word of God that the meaning of the Sache of Scripture can be understood in 
relation to human speech in general (proclamation) and to human text in particular 
(Scripture). There will be some repetition of the theme here on the relationship 
between history and the Word of God, but in this context the theme will be seen from 
a different angle, i.e., from the point of view of human language in general and the 
text of Scripture in particular. On the other hand, this section picks up one question 
that is still unanswered in the previous section: what is the precise relationship 
between the humanity of the Scripture and the Word of God? In other words, how 
can this humanity (history, language, text) be theologically accounted as an event of 
the Word of God, and in what ways and by what capacities can the witnessing of the 
humanity of Scripture become a witnessing of the Word of God? 
3.1. The Word of God in human discourse 
In CD I/1 §4 on “The Word of God in its Threefold Form,” Barth explains that the 
one Word of God has three different forms in the life of the church. It is not three 
Words of God but one in threefold form. In the exposition of the proclaimed Word 
Barth provides important insights on the relationship between human words and the 
Word of God. According to Barth, church proclamation by and in itself is a human 
occasion, but it becomes an event of the Word of God by the work of Holy Spirit in 
the life of the church.61 He points out that the presence of the Word of God (the 
subject matter of proclamation) is comparable to the presence of Christ in the 
Eucharist. In this regard, Christ is truly present in a way that does not undermine the 
                                                 
59 Ibid., 118. 
60 Ibid., 119. 
61 The emphasis here is on the event rather than on the becoming of the Word of God although the 
becoming of the Word of God is equally important. 
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human sign of the sacrament. The sign of wine and bread is not simply a designation, 
but a seal of the event.62 Similarly, the proclaimed Word is a seal of the Word of 
God that becomes reality following four theological principles: commission, theme, 
judgement and event.63 According to Barth, 
Where Church proclamation takes place according to this will of God, where 
it rests on the divine commission, where God Himself gives Himself to it as 
its theme, where it is true according to His judgment, where, in short, it is 
service of God, there on the one hand its character as an event that can be 
seen and heard on earth is not set aside.64 
In this context, the true content of church proclamation is not determined by human 
theological reflection. Human reflection is not set aside. Proclamation is, by 
definition, a human reflection of the Word of God, but what is decisive is the act of 
God in self-giving and providing the true content of the Word of God proclaimed. 
Colin E Gunton rightly comments, “Central to this is that there is no proclamation 
without, or apart from relying on, a prior reality: proclamation is only there if there is 
something prior ˗ and that is God.”65 Because of God’s presence, the Word of God is 
the object of church proclamation. It is the act of God, not a human determination, 
which makes it possible in the first place, and realises it in the life of the church.  
On the other hand, human words do not have power to capture the Word of 
God. So how is this possible? Barth argues that what happens in proclamation is the 
Word of God captures human words.66 The act of capturing human words by the 
Word of God makes possible, and realizes, that the church proclamation has the 
Word of God as its object. Thus the Word of God is generated neither by a homiletic 
strategy nor by human collective religiosity. The church can never ascertain its 
reality, but only seek it on the basis of God’s promise. Thus the Word of God 
preached is a “human talk about God on the basis of the self-objectification of God 
which is not just there, which cannot be predicted, which does not fit into any plan, 
                                                 
62 CD I/1, 88. 
63 Ibid., 89. 
64 Emphasis added, Ibid., 95. 
65 Gunton, The Barth Lectures 72. 
66 CD I/1, 92. 
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which is real only in the freedom of His grace, and in virtue of which He wills at 
specific times to be the object of this talk, and is so according to His good-
pleasure.”67 Since proclamation is human talk about God, the fact that it has God as 
its object, which is, the becoming of the Word of God in proclamation, is a miracle. 
It remains a human discourse on every level, but it really does proclaim God, as 
God’s act makes it so. In the church’s proclamation, there is a subject matter that 
reveals itself. What makes it profound is that it is not just a human attempt to 
communicate the Word of God, as it really is a communication of the Word of God. 
How does Barth’s theology understand the role of human discourse in 
communicating the subject matter? Specifically, if it depends on the will and work of 
God, does human discourse matter? Or is it just an empty vehicle? To answer these 
questions, we will begin with Barth’s use of Christological analogy. Barth posits, 
“The willing and doing of proclaiming man, however, is not in any sense set aside in 
real proclamation. As Christ became true man and remains true man to all eternity, 
real proclamation becomes an event on the level of all other human events.”68 
Proclamation is a discourse among other human discourses, and could be understood 
merely from this point of view.69 It can be seen as religious education, social 
propaganda or even, in extreme misinterpretation, a community’s collective delusion. 
This is certainly a misunderstanding of the church’s proclamation, but in Barth’s 
view, for this misunderstanding to be possible and indeed happen in the life of the 
church, it shows that proclamation is genuinely a human discourse. Human words are 
not an empty vessel. People can refuse the Word of God in the proclamation of the 
church, but when people refuse it, it is not simply human proclamation that is 
rejected but the Word of God in the life of the church. However, as Barth explains 
further, “as Christ is not just true man, so it is not just the willing and doing of 
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68 CD I/1, 94. 
69 See on this issue various important papers in Carl E. Braaten and Robert W. Jenson, Reclaiming the 
Bible for the Church (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1995). In his paper, Brevard S. Childs, pp 14-17, 
laments the attitude of the biblical guild to restrict their work from expounding the subject matter 
itself. It is along the line of Childs’ proposal that we argue for a more theologically rigorous reading 
of the Scripture, including exploring its historical facticity. 
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proclaiming man. It is also and indeed it is primarily and decisively the divine 
willing and doing.”70  
How can we understand the becoming of the Word of God in church 
proclamation? Does it mean that it depends on the subjectivity of the church as a 
collective being? Or does proclamation become the Word of God without a 
necessary dependence on human words? As we argued in chapter four, Barth’s 
ontology cannot be understood in essentialist terms. In Barth’s actualism, human 
words become ‘necessary’ to the Word of God, but the term ‘necessary’ must be 
defined strictly from Barth’s theological ontology. It is ‘necessary’ not because the 
existence of the Word of God depends on human words, but because God chose to be 
the God of the human world. It is a divine actualism shaped by the doctrine of 
election, i.e., God does not want to be a god without human beings. Barth, however, 
does not see the relationship of word and Word in terms of a mutual cooperation of 
the human and the divine. The subject matter itself is decisively a divine willing, but 
it is communicated in and by human discourse, and decisively so, because God’s 
eternal decision to be with and for human beings in God’s relationship to the world.  
Although Barth’s earlier treatment of the human dimension of the Word of 
God may be interpreted as suggesting the human word as not necessary, Barth’s later 
ontology clearly suggests human words are necessary for God’s speaking to the 
church. However, the necessity of human discourse is a necessity decided by God’s 
election of God-self to be the God of humanity. God’s election necessitates human 
discourse to be the form in which the Word of God addresses the church in 
proclamation. The mark of this relationship is one in which the lordship of God is 
acknowledged. The freedom of humanity in response to God’s decision is not denied 
but finds its real freedom and actuality in the obedience to God. One might question 
Barth’s notion of freedom at this point, but we will pursue this theme in the next 
chapter. At this point we will only note that Barth has a particular understanding of 
true humanity in relationship to the divine decision, one that is not defined by a 
concept of arbitrary freedom but defined by a Christological obedience that choses to 
fulfil human vocation by giving up freedom. Human free obedience to God’s 
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command is articulated as a reiteration of the Christological decision of giving up 
God’s freedom to be God for humanity.71 In this context church proclamation is the 
Word of God that is realized by the faithfulness of God to divine communicative 
ordering to speak to the church in and through human discourse.  
The theology of divine self-election, as God for humanity, provides the 
ontological basis for the reality of the Word in the word. The human word is not 
adopted into the divine realm, nor is it an empty vessel of the Word of God. It 
becomes the Word of God in the event of proclamation, but it is so not because of a 
phenomenological relationship between Word and words, as if language, in and by 
itself, is a necessary condition for God to speak through human words. It is so 
because it actualizes God’s eternal decision in relation to humanity. God’s election to 
be the God for humanity necessitates the human discourse as the form of the Word of 
God in the church. We must add that this ontological decision is at the same time a 
moral decision, i.e., to be the God of love, and in this regard to be the God of 
reconciling and communicative presence in the life of the church. 
3.2. The Word of God in human writing 
In exploring the subject matter of Scripture we begin with Barth’s basic conviction 
that the same Sache is in Scripture as in proclamation. It is not two Words but one; 
the one Word of God in threefold form. The difference lies in its respective 
relationship to the Word of God: the expectation of the future revelation 
(proclamation) and the recollection of the past revelation (Scripture).72 In calling 
Scripture a ‘recollection’, Barth relates the Word of God to specific historical 
antecedents.73 The event of the Word of God stands in continuity with past history.  
The way human writing witnesses to the Word of God follows the same theological 
principle as in proclamation. It is based on the actuality of God in human writing and 
reading of Scripture. This, however, requires a further clarification in relation to the 
                                                 
71 A more precise way to say this is that God elects as his freedom takes the form of a freedom for 
humanity. This does not mean that there is a different freedom exist in God that is changed by this 
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72 CD I/1, 99. 
73 Ibid., 109. 
182 
 
continuity of the content of the writing in the witness of the author of Scripture and 
in the reading of the church. How does Barth account for this relationship? 
As in the case of proclamation, we will also begin here with Barth’s use of 
the analogy of the incarnation. In Scripture the Word of God takes a created form as 
a collection of texts. There is, however, a crucial difference between the Word of 
God in Scripture and Christ’s incarnation. In Scripture, there is no unity of person 
between God and its human authors. As such, the human authors, in contrast to 
Christ, are not glorified to assume the divine nature. “It cannot independently reveal, 
but only attest, the revelation which did and does take place in the humanity of Jesus 
Christ. …Scripture… stands in that indirect identity of human existence with God 
Himself, which is conditioned neither by the nature of God nor that of man, but 
brought about by the decision and act of God.”74 Ultimately, “The Bible is God's 
Word to the extent that God causes it to be His Word, to the extent that He speaks 
through it.”75 This sentence can be misunderstood.  It might be seen as a deficit of 
real human participation in the Word, but what Barth wants to emphasize is the 
actuality of Scripture as an event of the Word of God in the life of the church. In this 
event, human participation is not set aside, but embraced in the fullest and uplifted 
by God, without becoming part of the divine being. This actualism of Scripture, we 
contend, will be better construed through Barth’s later theological ontology.  
What is the precise relationship between Trinitarian ontology and the 
actualism of the Scripture? How can this be understood ontologically in relation to 
Scripture as a text (as a human artefact of cognitive-aesthetic determination) and the 
understanding of readers (who are distanciated from the text by complex processes of 
historicity and differing cultural plausibility)? In response to this question we will 
not pursue a comprehensive answer. What is offered here is a theological reflection 
based on Barth’s theological ontology. As we have previously argued, Barth’s 
Trinitarian ontology of God’s being offers an ontological construal for reality. For 
                                                 




Barth, as McCormack comments, “everything that is has its being in becoming.”76 
Barth’s ontology is not a concept of being applied to God’s nature. It is the doctrine 
of the Trinity that provides the material and formal criteria of Barth’s actualism, and 
we will apply this ontology to an actualistic construal of Scripture, particularly in 
relation to the authors and the text of Scripture.  
First, Barth’s actualism does not have the same import for everything. This is 
particularly important when we compare Barth’s actualism of God and human 
beings. While everything has its being in becoming, the being in becoming of God 
does not have the same meaning as that of the human.77 Barth posits, “What is real in 
God must constantly become real precisely because it is real in God (not after the 
manner of created being). But this becoming (because it is this becoming) rules out 
every need of this being for completion. Indeed, this becoming simply confirms the 
perfection of this being.”78 In other words, God’s being in becoming is absolute; 
God’s self-determination decides for God his being for eternity.79 On the other hand, 
human being is a relative being; human being is not a self-determining subject.80  
At this point we must bring in Barth’s later ontology. In this perspective, the 
ontology of human being is grounded in God’s eternal decision as the elect of God’s 
covenant partner.81 The election of the human to live in a covenantal relationship 
with God is crucial for understanding the being in becoming of human being. As 
McCormack comments, God’s eternal decision “encompasses and surrounds human 
self-determination, limiting it and giving it its true character.”82 Human freedom is a 
gift from God, and has its proper theological meaning as God’s covenant partner. On 
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77 Ibid. 
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the other hand, the human can ‘choose’ otherwise, i.e., human freedom can be an 
expression of a covenant breaker, though this is against its reality as freedom in 
grace. To live as a covenant breaker is impossible in regard to the true being of 
humanity, but it is possible in regard to the nature of the covenant as a relationship of 
two parties (an impossible possibility). Nevertheless, whichever determination is 
decided, either as covenant breaker or covenant partner, a human being will never 
cease to be what he/she is in relation to God’s eternal covenant. The human being 
has her being in becoming, and her true being is the being in becoming of a covenant 
partner of God.  
In this context there are two ways in which we may differentiate the 
ontological reality of God and the human being, and in turn clarify the human being 
in becoming as the author and reader of Scripture.83 First, God is Creator, while the 
human being is creature. This means God is a self-determined being from eternity, 
while the human being receives their being by God’s eternal election.84 There is “an 
infinite qualitative difference” that separates God’s being and the human’s being. 
Second, the presence of sin in human life is a ‘reality’ that continues to threaten 
human existence to become something that is contrary to the existence of elect 
humanity.85 As McCormack comments, “what the human subject is essentially is a 
relation; or, more concretely, it is the divine act of relating to him or her in election. 
In that the fallen sinner seeks to use his freedom to become something other than 
what he is essentially, a dissonance is introduced into his being-in-becoming.”86 In 
short, the being in becoming of the human is different from God because of the 
nature of created-being and the theological condition as a fallen being. The limitation 
of human being as created being makes its being relative to God’s absolute being, 
and the fallenness of human nature defines its condition as a covenant breaker, and in 
this regard, as a creature who is in need of God’s grace.  
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 Second, what is the relationship of the ontological being of the human to the 
being of Scripture as a text? We must note that Barth never talks about the being in 
becoming of the text in an abstract way, i.e., text as a text. This is a very important 
theological viewpoint that avoids a phenomenology of a text strictly as text. This 
phenomenology will mystify the event of understanding. If a text has an independent 
life in isolation to human’s or God’s determination, then the text becomes the source 
of its own mystery. In contrast to this, the being of becoming of a text is seen in its 
relationship to the being in becoming of God and human being. When Barth 
discusses the text, it is the concrete reality of Scripture in the church he is 
expounding. The Bible as a phenomenological artefact is a text or a compilation of 
texts, but what is important to recognise is the difference between the being of the 
Bible as inanimate object and human being as person.87 Scripture, as a text, does not 
have a will in itself independent of its interaction to a person. The being in becoming 
of Scripture is animated by the act of divine communication or a reading of human 
person in faith of God’s communicative action. McCormack rightly argues, 
The Bible is not a person, as God and human being are persons… [Scripture] 
stands between two radically unequal but nevertheless competing wills: the 
will of God (which determines its true being as Word of God) and the will of 
the fallen human interpreter (which seeks to hear in and through the texts of 
which it is composed everything but the Word of God)…. This inequality has 
the following consequences. First, what the Bible is, is defined by the will of 
God as expressed in his act of giving it to the church. And this means that 
where and when the Bible becomes the Word of God, it is only becoming 
what it already is. But, second, where and when the Bible does not become 
the Word of God, there God has chosen provisionally, for the time being, not 
to bear witness to himself in and through its witness to this particular reader 
or this particular set of readers of it.88 
In this context there are two conditions in which the being in becoming of the 
Scripture as the Word of God takes place.89 One is in the being in becoming of God 
in giving Scripture to the church, and the other is in the being in becoming of 
Scripture in relation to the faith and obedience of interpreter.90 In these aspects, we 
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are dealing with God in his relationship to the author and the reader of the Scripture. 
If this analysis is correct, then the being in becoming of Scripture can never be 
understood as a human text in itself. A theological understanding of Scripture as the 
Word of God, which is in the form of a text, can only be analysed in relation to the 
will and the act of God for and in the church.91 As a theological document it is not in 
and by itself the subject matter. It presents the subject matter as the function of the 
communicative will of God to and for the church. 
This has a crucial implication for the practice of exegesis in the church’s 
reading of the Bible. The Bible cannot be abstracted from its relation to the divine 
will. That is to say, it is theologically deficient to treat the Bible as a document in 
itself, either as a historical document or piece of literature that limits the exegetical 
approach through methodological norms that refuse to acknowledge Scripture’s 
theological being. The being of Scripture as a text is a being in becoming in relation 
to the being in becoming of the authors and the readers of Scripture. The authors of 
Scripture can be witnesses to the Word of God only in their becoming witnesses of 
the Word by the act of God’s grace. The readers of Scripture can become the true 
readers who understand and grasp the word of God in the becoming of their being as 
the church by God’s grace. To construe the matter in this formula is less recognisable 
to the historical doctrines. What Barth argues in this regard is discussed under a more 
familiar term as the doctrine of inspiration and divine illumination. More to the point, 
this brings to light that what is crucial for understanding Scripture is the illumination 
of the Holy Spirit. The being in becoming of the author, text and readers for Barth is 
precisely the divine inspiration of Scripture. 
3.3. Divine Inspiration 
The concrete reality of the textual actuality of Scripture finds its material description 
in Barth’s doctrine of inspiration. In CD I/2, Barth elucidates the doctrine of 
inspiration by exploring two important passages of the New Testament (2 Tim 3:14-
17 and 2 Pet 1:19-21). Barth has a unique view of inspiration in which he does not 
differentiate the relationship of the text and its subject matter, from the inspiration of 




the first witnesses (prophets and apostles) and the illumination of the subsequent 
readers (church). For Barth, there is a difference between Scripture as the canon and 
the church as the community of the canon,92 but the way in which the Holy Spirit 
actualizes the text, to witness to the subject matter or to be understood by the church, 
is not differentiated. The decisive point is the act of the Holy Spirit in the 
actualization of the human’s determination for the Word of God and, in particular, in 
the appointment of the prophets and apostles for special roles in the writing of 
Scripture; both are explained through the actuality of the Word of God.  
While Barth argues that Scripture stands in a different order from 
proclamation, he insists that the event of divine illumination does not require a 
necessary difference between the act of divine illumination in the writing and reading 
of Scripture.93 The work of the Holy Spirit is to reveal the subject matter both in the 
composition of and in each new reading of Scripture. The concrete form of the 
illumination is the gift of faith to the church in the event of the Word of God. Barth 
posits, 
We have to recognise that faith as an irruption into this reality and possibility 
means the removing of a barrier in which we can only see and again and 
again see a miracle. And it is a miracle which we cannot explain apart from 
faith, or rather apart from the Word of God in which faith believes. Therefore 
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the reality and possibility of it cannot be maintained or defended at all apart 
from faith and the Word.94 
 
According to Barth, the inspiration of the Holy Spirit is to lead the human authors to 
“the special attitude of obedience in those who are elected and called to this 
obviously special service.”95 However, the Spirit-breathed thinking and writing of 
the human author “did not mean any abolition of their freedom, their self-
determination.”96 The human authors obeyed God in their freedom, which is the 
fullest sense of human freedom.97 Barth maintains the tension between faith and 
freedom in regard to the church as the readers of Scripture. To believe in Scripture is 
to accept its content in the fullest sense of human freedom, not because of any 
external force of institution or person, but because it has proven itself to be the Word 
of God in the event of faith. However, the event of faith means that, instead of the 
human grasping of the Word, it is the human being that is being grasped by the Word 
in the divine illumination.98  
 What is then the theological meaning of the text of Scripture? We have 
argued that, for Barth, the freedom of the human in the inspiration of Scripture is 
conditioned by the freedom of God. The freedom of God precludes, in Barth’s 
theology, the notion of the objective locus of divine inspiration in the text. But does 
not this entail a subjectivity of textual meaning? Does it not entail that the locus of 
meaning of the text is to be found only in the subjectivity of the author or the reader 
of the text? On the contrary, for Barth, there is such a thing as the objective locus of 
divine inspiration. The objectification of the divine inspiration is located in the act of 
divine self-revelation (an actualistic objectification). It does not entail the notion of 
revealed-ness of the text as human writings or the notion of subjective 
meaningfulness in human perception. It excludes any notion of revealed-ness, i.e., 
textual revealed-ness or historical revealed-ness. If the notions of revealed-ness were 
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accepted, the interpretation of Scripture could be limited as an exercise in textual 
explication or historical investigation. It would not necessarily need the work of Holy 
Spirit, or the work of the Holy Spirit would be limited to the illumination of biblical 
ideas for contemporary application.  On the contrary, for Barth, exegesis (as the 
principal work of theology) is a spiritual exercise of understanding the subject matter 
of Scripture i.e. the Word of God. It is a spiritual exercise (it does not exclude 
contemporary application of the biblical message) because it purports to let the text 
speak as the Word of God without disregarding the importance of the textual and 
historical investigations. The inspiration of the Holy Spirit does not diminish the full 
participation of human authors and readers, but defines, fulfils and empowers them. 
The doctrine of inspiration means that the textual and historical investigations of 
Scripture are seen as a spiritual exercise in view of human participation in the divine 
inspiration. 
What is the precise relationship between the text and divine inspiration? The 
basic conviction of Barth’s doctrine of inspiration is that Scripture is the Word of 
God and as such has priority over all other writings. Barth defines very strictly the 
meaning of the words “is” and “has” in this formula.  The double attestation of ‘is’ 
and ‘has’ must be defined through Barth’s actualistic ontology. Scripture is the Word 
of God by divine decision and action. Thus, it is not the Word of God in an objective 
sense, i.e., in the inspired-ness of the text of Scripture. Scripture ‘is’ the Word of 
God means concretely Scripture ‘was’ and ‘will be’ the Word of God in the life of 
the church by the inspiration of the Holy Spirit.99 In the same way, God’s freedom in 
actuality qualifies the ‘has’ as the ‘had’ and the ‘will have’ in relation to the priority 
of Scripture over all other writings. Scripture has priority over all other writings 
because Scripture had been and will be the Word of God in the life of the church. 
This explication, nevertheless, does not cancel its priority, as it clarifies that the 
formula refers to the actual presence of God in the divine inspiration.100 
This means Scripture as a human text has a capacity for error, particularly if it 
is seen from a modern point of view. Barth, however, differentiates between errors 
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and capacity for errors of the Bible.101 The first is an objective judgment based on 
human evaluation; the second is a theological evaluation based on the doctrine of 
inspiration that the humanity of the authors is not circumvented. Barth refuses that 
the inspiration means that apostles and prophets must be inerrant in every word of 
the scriptural text.102 On the contrary, in a very bold statement Barth argues, 
“[prophets and apostles] can be at fault in any word, and have been at fault in every 
word, and yet according to the same scriptural witness, being justified and sanctified 
by grace alone, they have still spoken the Word of God in their fallible and erring 
human word.”103 Barth maintains the humanity of the authors of the Scripture is a 
real humanity, i.e., humanity in particular historical, cultural and linguistic contexts; 
and it is within these contexts that they speaks as the witnesses of revelation. Barth 
posits, 
The prophets and apostles as such, even in their office, even in their function 
as witnesses, even in the act of writing down their witness, were real, 
historical men as we are, and therefore sinful in their action, and capable and 
actually guilty of error in their spoken and written word.… Their existence as 
witnesses, as it is a visible event in Holy Scripture, is therefore the existence 
of real men (and therefore not at all crowded out by the existence of God or 
hampered by any kind of magic in the fulfilment of their existence), men who 
                                                 
101 Barth’s position in this regard raises serious criticism from evangelical readers. It seems for some 
that Barth does not take seriously the question of biblical inerrancy, that Barth seems to uphold that 
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Scripture Is in Becoming," in Evangelicals & Scripture: Tradition, Authority, and Hermeneutics, 56-
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stumbling-block which cannot be avoided or can be avoided only in faith.” CD I/2, 509-10. 
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as such, in the full use of their freedom and within the limits posited by it, 
have to speak to us the Word of God.104 
 
This does not mean that an interpreter has to differentiate between the form 
and the content of Scripture, between the word of man and the Word of God in the 
Bible, i.e., between errors and truth in the text. Barth posits, “The miracle of God 
takes place in this text formed of human words.”105 The inspiration of the Scripture 
means, “If God speaks to man, He really speaks the language of this concrete human 
word of man.”106 The task of exegesis is to stay close to the text, that is, “to let the 
text speak to us as it stands, to let it say all that it has to say in its vocabulary and 
context, to allow the prophets and apostles to say again here and now to us what they 
said there and then.”107 On the other hand, the event of the Word of God is the 
decision of God. No one can force this event to happen. Barth posits, “We are 
absolved from differentiating the Word of God in the Bible from other contents, 
infallible portions and expressions from the erroneous ones, the infallible from the 
fallible, and from imagining that by means of such discoveries we can create for 
ourselves encounters with the genuine Word of God in the Bible.”108 Because the 
Word of God is not within the power of human action and determination, the church 
must expect and pray for the event of the Word of God to happen. What the church 
must do is to be “seeking, asking and praying” for the Word of God to happen. “The 
door of the Bible text can be opened only from within…the existence of the biblical 
text summons us to persistence in waiting and knocking.”109 
3.4. Conclusion  
We have defined the identity of the Sache. The subject matter of Scripture is the 
Word of God. In this regard we explored Barth’s theology by an inquiry into the 
concrete reality of the Word of God in the life of the church, and, in this context, 
what the theological relationship is between the Word of God and human discourse 
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in general, and the Word of God and biblical text in particular. The result of this 
analysis is a description of the event of the Word of God in the church, examined 
through Barth’s actualistic approach to the divine communicative presence. Church 
proclamation has the Word of God as its content, and the text of Scripture speaks of 
the Word of God in the divine ordering of God’s speaking. This divine decision has 
its ontological origin in divine election, but is also an ever new divine action in the 
life of the church. It must be understood as grace, and invoked by the church in faith 
and prayer. The specific doctrinal locus of this description is Barth’s theology of 
inspiration. It is the work of the Holy Spirit in the life of the church that makes 
concrete the divine ordering of God’s speaking.  
In the next section we will explore the dynamic of the Word of God as it comes 
to address the church. The Word of God comes to the church as power, like a double 
edged sword, it is like fire, wind, light etc. The coming of the Word of God is 
explored by Barth in CD I/1 §5 on the nature of the Word of God. For our purposes 
we will explore this chapter through a different angle. We will look at it as a 
description of the inner dynamic of the Sache of Scripture. The Sache of Scripture is 
described here through three interconnected themes: speech, action and mystery. 
4. The inner dynamic of the Sache : the threefoldness of God’s speech 
In the previous section we have argued that the Word of God is the Sache of the 
Scripture, and we elaborated this theme in relation to the presence of the Word of 
God in human proclamation (proclamation) and writing (Scripture). In both cases 
Barth emphasizes the actualism of the Word of God in which it is active, alive and 
binds the church to the revelation of God. This brings us to the question of the third 
form of the Word of God which is not another predicate of the Word of God as in the 
previous two but the Word of God in itself, that is, the nature of the event of the 
Word of God as it comes to the church. There are various phrases and words Barth 
uses to express the event itself: “revelation”, “God’s Word”, “Deus Dixit”, “Jesus 
Christ”, “God with us”, “it is finished”, “the occurrence of revelation”, and “the 
becoming of the Word of God”. However they basically express the same complex 
idea, the concrete event of the Word of God in the life of the church. The event is 
based on the decision of God in freedom in which the act of God brings into reality 
what is testified to in Scripture and proclaimed in the church. “Revelation is itself the 
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divine decision which is taken in the Bible and proclamation, which makes use of 
them, which thus confirms, ratifies and fulfils them. It is itself the Word of God 
which the Bible and proclamation are as they become it.”110 
In CD I/1 §5, Barth provide a detailed discussion on the nature of the Word 
of God.111 Specifically, the nature of the Word of God is explored under the themes 
of speech, act and mystery. The word nature does not carry an essentialist 
denotation. Over against the essentialist approach, Barth proposes the question: 
“what is the nature of the Word of God?” which he carefully qualifies 
theologically.112 An exploration of its nature is not analysis of the biblical language 
from a philosophical, rhetorical or hermeneutical point of view. For Barth, the nature 
of the Word of God must be epistemologically construed on the basis of God’s act of 
making it present to the church.113 Accordingly there is no philosophical category 
where the nature of divine action can be properly described. Barth suggests that 
theology must investigate the question, avoiding abstract exploration, indirectly from 
the concrete event of the Word of God, i.e., proclamation and Scripture. Barth 
argues, “We can certainly say what God's Word is, but we must say it indirectly. We 
must remember the forms in which it is real for us and learn from these forms how it 
is. This How is the attainable human reflection of the unattainable divine What. Our 
concern here must be with this reflection.”114 Only in this context, Barth claims, can 
we describe the nature of the Word of God.  
The description will help us to understand further the meaning of Barth’s 
sachlicher approach. It is here that the Sache itself is described as the Word of God 
in a threefold inner dynamic. While we must keep the description of its nature in the 
concrete life of the church, we can take this description as a further elaboration of the 
Sache of Scripture. This will provide further conceptual content for construing 
Barth’s sachlich hermeneutics, i.e., by describing the Sache as inner dynamic of 
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speech, act and mystery. In what follows we will reflect on what this means for 
Barth’s sachlich approach.  
4.1. The Word of God is a speech 
In what sense is the Word of God a speech? It means, quite simply, “God speaks,” 
addressing the church, that it says something about something to the church. The 
event of the Word of God is the event in which God’s speech comes to the church. 
Barth, however, elucidates the concept of speech in further detail. “It implies first of 
all the spiritual nature of the Word of God as distinct from naturalness, corporeality, 
or any physical event.”115 However the spirituality of the speech of God does not 
exclude physical reality; it is a spiritual event in physical reality. As the reality of 
Jesus Christ in the Eucharist is a spiritual-physical event, the event of the Word of 
God is a physical event in its spirituality.116 The spiritual nature of the speech means 
the Word of God is an address of one reason to another reason; a person to another 
person. On this basis this spiritual speech is a rational event; it is not irrational or 
mystical.117 But its physical dimension means the Word of God relates to the human 
activity of hearing, understanding and obeying, as set within the framework of faith. 
It does not deny human rhetoric. The truth of the Word of God has the power of 
rhetoric, but the nature of its rhetoric is the spiritual power of truth. Thus, in contrast 
to the tendency of human rhetoric to hide its true intention, the Word of God is 
marked by its clarity and simplicity, expressing the truth in spiritual and natural 
realms.118  
Second, the speech of God is not a possibility of communal interaction, but a 
fulfilled reality in the life of the church. It is not a perceived truth among many truths 
but as the One and only truth which is experienced as the speaking subject and the 
spoken object.119 In other words, the speech of God is not different from Jesus Christ, 
the Revealer and the Revelation of God. In this regard, the Word of God is not 
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merely an expression of God’s being; God’s being and the Word are identical.120 His 
being does not stand behind the Word and the act of God; the Word of God is the 
being of God in speech and act. On the other hand, the being of God is not, as such, 
directly present to the church, but only through Scripture and proclamation, but it is 
really the being of God that is present, and not a representation of God.121 The 
presence of Jesus Christ is personal, and it means that, as speech, the Word of God is 
not only a speech of logical-propositional utterance but a theological-ethical 
challenge from a speaking Subject. 
Third, as a speech, the Word of God is purposive. It comes to speech to 
address the church. It is directed to the human reality of the church; it does not come 
to speech for the sake of speaking in isolation from the life of the church.122 Barth 
argues that the Word of God comes to speech not on account of addressing itself, but 
on account of addressing the church. This does not mean the Word of God in God’s 
inner Trinitarian relation depends on the church’s existence.123 God’s speech is not 
driven by any necessity outside of God; it comes to speech only on account of God’s 
freedom.124 It is a divine decision, but while it is directed to the human being, it is 
not conditioned by human circumstances.125 It is marked by the utter otherness of the 
Speaking Subject. “Encounter with the Word of God is genuine, irrevocable 
encounter, i.e., encounter that can never be dissolved in union. The Word of God 
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always tells us something fresh that we had never heard before from anyone. The 
rock of a Thou which never becomes an I is thrown in our path here.”126 Not only is 
it purposive, it also has a quality of seriousness. It is not a concept to be adored and 
praised for its subtleties and geniuses. On the contrary, it aims at the deepest 
existence of the human being. It strikes at the sinfulness of human beings; it smites 
their self-sufficiency. It points to the hopelessness of the human being as created 
being before the creator, but it is a judgement for the sake of the Gospel. It comes as 
a message of comfort and peace. It is a comforting address of the Reconciling God in 
which God renews God’s original relationship to the human being.127 As purposive 
speech, it is serious speech; it smites and comforts.128 In this dialectical sense, the 
Word of God is speech with a very definite objective and with a very specific calling. 
The Word of God as speech is marked by the spirituality of speaking subject 
in purposiveness. The Sache of Scripture is the spiritual presence of Jesus Christ that 
addresses the church with the Gospel of reconciliation. It comes as a surprise because 
the Sache of the text is not a general proposition to be considered, but a purposive 
address. It is a message that specifically speaks to this particular community, at this 
particular life-setting. To understand the Word of God in this specific way, we posit, 
will imply a radical re-ordering of the ways in which the church must read Scripture.   
4.2. The Word of God is an action 
The Word of God as speech is a challenge and a comfort. To be effective, it must be 
understood also as an action. Barth argues that the Word of God is an action which 
transcends the dichotomy between speech and action.129 The primary character of 
this action is creativity. First of all, the action of God creates reality (history); it 
generates reality in its ultimate sense.130 Only by the act of the Word of God does 
there exist true reality.  It does not mean a replacement of present reality, but it at 
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least involves an alteration of the fabric of human existence.131 Barth posits that 
God’s “self-expression is as such an alteration, and indeed an absolute alteration of 
the world, whose passio in history is as such action.”132  
Barth provides three implications for his proposal that the Word of God is an 
action. First, as the act of God, the Word of God has the character of “contingent 
contemporaneity.”133 This phrase needs to be unpacked. Barth argues that there are 
three different times in which we may speak of God’s action: the time of Jesus 
Christ, the time of witnesses (Scripture) and the time of the church. The difference is 
not merely chronological. They are times “distinguished by different attitudes of God 
to men.”134  Thus, in the first, Jesus is the time of unity between revelation and God; 
in the second, is the time of apostles and prophets, who are given unique offices to 
deliver the Word of God; and the third, is the mediated time, in which through the 
Scripture the church listens to God’s revelation.135 Barth argues that the threefold 
time of revelation overcomes Lessing’s dictum of incompatibility between the 
accidental truths of history and the necessary truths of reason.136 Barth believes that 
because the church locates the revelation in God (not in history) and frames the 
method as by God (not by discerning history’s inner truth), the church should not be 
worried by Lessing’s ugly wide ditch between accidental and necessary truths.137 The 
‘accidental’ truth becomes superfluous because God acts again and again in the life 
of the church as God has acted in Jesus and through the prophets and apostles. In this 
regard, the Word of God as an action means that in the event of the Word of God, the 
church has contingent contemporaneity with Jesus (the first action) and prophets and 
apostles (the second action). “The problem of the Word of God is always, then, a 
wholly specific, once-for-all and distinctive problem, and regarding this problem one 
can only say that it is solved by the Word of God itself as the Word of God spoken 
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by the mouth of God is contemporaneous illic et tunc and also (i.e., as spoken illic et 
tunc) hic et nunc.”138 
The threefold times of God’s action have an important hermeneutical 
ramification.139 God does not leave the church in solitude as an interpreter of history. 
Biblical interpretation is not a quest to relive a dead past or an attempt to resurrect 
the spirit of past history. This interpretative theory would end up, in Barth’s 
estimation, as an act of self-understanding which dissolves the distinction between 
God’s revelation and human inner-experience.140 It also fails to answer Lessing’s 
challenge.141 However, the problem of the accidental truths of history, as Lessing 
argues, is solved by Barth’s theology of the Word of God as an act. The church, as an 
interpreter of Scripture, does not need to resurrect dead history because God 
continues to act for the church here and now, as there and then.142 The Sache of 
Scripture is not past history for the church. It is by the act of God a contemporary 
speech that addresses the church as it addresses people of past history. 
Second, the Word of God as an action implies power.143 As God’s action, the 
Word of God is the power of the Lord. It is a ruling power.  It claims God’s lordship 
over the church. The Word of God does not only come as a collection of knowledge, 
not even as knowledge of the power, but as a real power that is encountered. Barth 
argues that as power it has dialectical qualities, i.e., power that protects and punishes, 
pacifies and disturbs.144 The concrete identity of this power is the Holy Spirit whose 
presence is the power of God’s action, i.e., “the power that lives in and by the 
Word.”145 As God’s power, the Word of God is effective. It brings change and a real 
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transformation in human reality.146 Thus the promise, the claim and the judgment of 
the Word of God is not an empty rhetoric which depends on the church’s faith to 
generate its effectiveness, but in and by itself, confronting, transposing, 
commandeering and bringing forth a fresh reality.147 Faith that receives the promise 
and believes in the judgement is a recognition and confirmation that the act of God 
takes place.148 The effectiveness of the Word does not depend on human response. 
The Word of God is effective; it does not fail to be effective because it is the power 
of God. Through the effectiveness of the Word of God in the church, it impacts the 
whole sphere of creation through the church.149 In the church, as she confesses the 
power of the Word, people encounter God’s revelation and the true power that rules 
the whole creation.150  
Third, the act of God is decision.151 The actualism of the Word of God is not 
a bare event. In general, an event is caused by external factor(s), but the event of the 
Word of God is not caused by external factors; rather, it is effective by the decision 
of God. Barth argues that the Word of God is a decision first, then reality second. It 
means the event of the Word of God as a history is subsequent to God’s decision.152 
The Word of God is firstly a divine act in eternal decision, then secondly, in the light 
of this, as a history of human event. Thus, the event of the Word of God is the 
realization of the decision of God.153 The decision of God is a decision to place one 
in a particular situation, in which one is judged or justified, but one can only know 
one’s position on the basis of the encounter. Barth maintains the tension between the 
possibility of belief or unbelief as an expression of human free-will and the 
decisiveness of the divine choice in virtue of which alone one’s faith is decided.154 
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Nevertheless, it is the action of God as power that creates the reality of faith through 
which the church experiences the reality of the Word.  
These three characteristics: contingency, power and decision, provide further 
elaboration of the inner dynamic of the Sache. As God’s action, Barth’s description 
of the Word of God echoes various biblical references to the Word of God, 
prophecies, and biblical promises, both in Old and New Testaments. The dynamic of 
God’s speech as the Sache of Scripture is not a matter of language and meaning. It is 
not words and actions as a philosophical construct that understands linguistic 
function as effective action, e.g., in speech-act theory. While the theory contributes 
insightful reflections for how humans do things through words, the action of the 
Word of God is beyond the description of speech-act philosophy. It is an action with 
power and decision. It is an effective action because God’s act is threefold: in Jesus, 
in the prophets and apostles, and in the church through Scripture and proclamation. It 
is the power of God in action that changes reality. It is the realization of God’s 
decision in eternity in human history. The event of the Word of God, as an action, 
entails the church reading of Scripture is a spiritual action. It is a reading that should 
be regarded more as a prayer, encompassing far richer human faculties than any 
cognitive apparatus. It surely involves critical reflection but, even more importantly, 
spiritual discipline of discernment, meditation and wisdom. 
4.3. The Word of God is a mystery 
The final term qualifies the nature of the Word of God as speech and act. The speech 
and action of God is ultimately a divine mystery. This concept is a critique against 
any self-confidence in the church’s interpretation of Scripture.155 The term ‘mystery’ 
is defined in a specific way. It is not used merely to highlight the notion of something 
beyond human conceptuality.156 Barth’s use has a dialectical feature. He defines 
mystery as “the concealment of God in which He meets us precisely when He 
unveils Himself to us, because He will not and cannot unveil Himself except by 
veiling Himself.”157 It is a mystery because the Word of God is revelation in 
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hiddenness. No human being can differentiate the Word of God from what is not in 
the event of Scripture and proclamation except by the work of God. For the church, 
the distinction of the Word of God from everything else remains a matter of the 
mystery of God. “It distinguishes itself by giving itself to us in this way and this 
alone; not in such a way that we can arrive at a triumphant distinction, but in such a 
way that there is reserved for it the right to distinguish itself.”158 Barth elaborates 
further on the meaning of the Word of God as mystery by employing three themes: 
secularity, onesidedness and spirituality.  
First, “The speech of God is and remains the mystery of God supremely in its 
secularity.”159 Barth notes that the Word of God always has a secular form, and the 
form in which it addresses the church can be understood by this term, i.e., the early 
church is a sociological group, the New Testament proclamation is a human address, 
Jesus was a Jewish rabbi, and the ideas of biblical theology have affinities with 
ancient philosophies.160 Thus it is not recognisable either directly or indirectly from 
the form it takes,161 but while the form conceals the Word of God, it is at the same 
time only revealed in its form.162 The form of God's Word, then, is in fact the form of 
the cosmos which stands in contradiction to God. It has as little ability to reveal God 
to us as we have to see God in it.”163 Thus revelation is God’s miraculous act, where 
God reveals Himself, through deficient mediums, which conceals revelation and 
reveals in concealment. 164 God’s revelation implies a tearing down of creaturely veil. 
On the other hand, because it is secular, it can address the human world in its 
secularity. Without its mystery in secularity it would fail to address humanity in its 
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means the indirectness of God self-communication. Luther provides two reasons for God’s indirect 




secularity.165 Barth posits, “If God did not speak to us in secular form, He would not 
speak to us at all. To evade the secularity of His Word is to evade 
Christ.”166 Furthermore, secularity is not the barrier that God must overcome to 
reveal God-self. It is the elected path of God’s communication.167  
The hermeneutical implication is clear. Interpretation of Scripture is not a 
penetrative analysis to pierce through the veil of God’s mystery.168 It remains a 
matter of God’s grace and mercy, as Barth argues, that “in its very secularity it is… 
in every respect a Word of grace.”169 In the prayerful act of spiritual discerning, 
exegesis must faithfully explore Scripture in all its secularity. The church’s exegesis 
cannot sidestep the secularity of Scripture to discern its spiritual message but must 
come again and again in the prayerful act of reading by exploring the text as a text 
with all of its secular characteristics because God’s revelation is a revelation in 
secularity. 
Second, “the speech of God is and remains the mystery of God in its 
onesidedness.”170 This onesidedness means that by the divine decision, the Word of 
God is either veiled or unveiled. It is not partly veiled or partly unveiled. The Word 
of God is either veiled or unveiled in the reading of Scripture and church 
proclamation. It depends solely on the act of God. In its secularity, without any 
difference in itself, and without any difference in the way one responds, the veiling 
                                                 
165 Ibid. 
166 Ibid. 
167 Ibid., 169. 
168 Ibid. 
169 Ibid. Barth makes a serious clarification in relating the immanence of God and the humanity of 
God’s revelation by way of the freedom of God. In his response to critique of the catholic theologian, 
Erich Przywara (who was accusing Barth of identifying God’s immanence as God’s revelation), and 
Gorgarten (who suggests a dissolvent of God’s immanence and God’s revelation to human beings), 
Barth insists that in the humanity of Christ the immanence of God and the economy of God’s 
revelation is connected only by the freedom of God. The two are differentiated as the starting point 
and the ending point, but not in any way dissolved into one speculation of God’s being (Speculatio 
Maiestatis), as Przywara suspects Barth had done, and as Gorgarten suggested to Barth to be done. In 
this matter Barth believes he has avoided the trap to fall into the theology “from below up-ward” or 
the theology “from above down-ward”. This is achieved by his emphasis on God’s free grace in the 
mystery of His decision. 
170 CD I/1, 174. 
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of the Word of God can change into unveiling, and the unveiling into veiling.171 
Barth argues that there is no way to achieve either isolation or distinction of the form 
from the content of the Word of God in Scripture and proclamation. One cannot 
isolate its secular form from the content nor can one find a solution to solve the 
dialectic of the form and content.172  Barth argues that the proper Christian response 
to the mystery of the Word of God is faith that seeks God in trust and humility. 
Invariably, then, faith is acknowledgment of our limit and acknowledgment 
of the mystery of God's Word, acknowledgment of the fact that our hearing is 
bound to God Himself, who now leads us through form to content and now 
from content back to form, and either way to Himself, not giving Himself in 
either case into our hands but keeping us in His hands.173 
Faith means to go back, again and again, to Scripture, and always begin again from 
the beginning, and to find revelation in none other than God alone through a reading 
of the Scripture and its proclamation.174 
Third, the Word of God is mystery in its relation to human spirituality.175 The 
event of the Word of God is a mystery in relation to its effects in an individual life.176 
The spirituality that is brought by the Word of God is not a result of human 
determination in isolation from God’s mysterious work to communicate and 
implement the truth of Scripture. “The Lord of speech is also the Lord of our hearing. 
The Lord who gives the Word is also the Lord who gives faith. The Lord of our 
hearing, the Lord who gives faith, the Lord by whose act the openness and readiness 
of man for the Word are true and actual, not another God but the one God in this 
way, is the Holy Spirit.”177 The mystery of the spirituality cannot be generated by 
any spiritual method. It does not exclude method but it cannot be guaranteed by any 
method. The mystery cannot be found in any corresponding human experience or in 
                                                 
171 Ibid. 
172 Ibid., 175. 
173 Ibid., 176. 
174 CD I/1, 179. 
175 Ibid., 181. 




the mystery of the human spirit but “in all circumstances only through the Holy 
Spirit, in all its indirectness only directly from God.”178 
 The Word of God is a mystery in its secularity, onesidedness and human 
spirituality. The Sache of Scripture in the church’s interpretation is in the form that 
cannot be separated from the content. Different interpretations of Scripture are 
inevitable, but it is not primarily on account of the different ways interpreters 
approach the text, though this also has important roles. The primary reason is that the 
Word of God is a mystery, and it comes in the form that conceals its mystery, and 
reveals its mystery in concealment. The church understands the mystery of the Word 
of God as the determination of divine election rather than as the result of a method of 
interpretation. The mystery is recognized through faith, which is the spiritual 
realization of the Word of God in the life of the church. Even in this regard, the 
Word of God is also a mystery of human spirituality. It does not come into 
realisation as human spiritual potential, but as the gift of grace that can only be 
explained as the mysterious work of the Holy Spirit. 
5. Conclusion: Barth’s Sachlich Hermeneutics 
The general argument of this chapter is that Barth’s hermeneutics is a sachlich 
hermeneutics. We then qualified the term by suggesting that it is useful only if we 
give careful attention to Barth’s theology, which provides the content for the term 
rather than borrowing from philosophical concepts to find affinities of approach with 
modern hermeneutics. We found, in this way, that Barth’s hermeneutics is truly 
distinct. The uniqueness is not so much on a methodological level, but rather on 
defining the meaning of Scripture and its interpretation: what is Scripture, where 
does it come from, what is its purpose, what does it say, and what does it mean for 
the church to read the Bible as Scripture? In answering these questions, Barth’s 
reflections are consistently shaped by church doctrines. In addition, it shows a strong 
opposition against philosophical insights and a strong conviction that doctrines can 
provide a perfectly adequate answer to hermeneutical questions.  
In this regard, we proposed Barth’s theological hermeneutics as the 
implication of his doctrine of Scripture, interpreted in the light of his doctrine of the 




Word of God and understood from a theological ontology of the doctrine of election. 
These two interconnected theological loci, we proposed, are the material content and 
the formal criteria for a constructive reading of Barth’s sachlich hermeneutics. The 
complex relation between Scripture and the Word of God provides the material 
insights and the formal criteria for theological reflections on the relationship between 
the text of Scripture and its Sache (subject matter). We employed for this purpose 
Barth’s concept of witness to elucidate ways in which text and Sache related to each 
other. We analysed the problem through various angles, that is, through the 
relationship of the Word of God to history (biblical history), to church proclamation 
(human discourse and language in general), and finally to the text of Scripture. In all 
of these, we proposed the importance of Barth’s ontology, particularly his actualistic 
ontology, to highlight the eventfulness of the Sache of Scripture. But more 
importantly than a conceptual approach to ontology is the role of the doctrine of 
election in Trinitarian relationship for rendering the decision, the purpose and the act 
of God in making the church’s reading of Scripture meaningful. The result of our 
analysis shows that for Barth the Sache of Scripture is not concepts, ideas, or stories; 
not even a theology. It has a strong relationship to all of these, but ultimately the 
Sache of Scripture is the communicative presence of God in addressing the church 
through the Scripture. This communicative presence has its ontological root in divine 
immanence and is decided in God’s election to be God in Jesus Christ, i.e., God of 
and for humanity that elects and embraces our humanity in the act of reconciliation. 
In this context, the act of giving out God’s self in communicative presence to the 
church is the basis of church reading of Scripture. This act we proposed takes place 
in human history and language, in the full humanity of her created being.  
The relationship between the Word of God and the humanity of Scripture is 
highlighted in our discussion of history, language and text. Employing the term 
witness as the main concept to the discussion, we maintained the history, the 
language and the text of Scripture as theologically construed. The ontological root of 
this theological reflection is the incarnation of Christ. But the crux of the problem is 
the concrete realisation of God’s election of humanity in the life of the church. In this 
regard we defined the humanity of God in relation to theological understanding of 
Scripture’s history, language and text. History in this context is a witnessing history. 
It is a history that has its continuity and discontinuity with secular history, but one 
that is ultimately defined by the resurrection of Christ. Barth’s approach proposes a 
metacriticism against modern presuppositions of historiography. In its place, Barth’s 
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theology offers an approach that acknowledges the presence and the act of God in 
history. A similar case is offered in relation to human language. The impossibility of 
human language to grasp the Word of God is maintained, but at the same time the 
concrete act of God in grasping the language in church proclamation is offered as a 
paradigm of the way in which language and the subject matter can be understood 
theologically. Finally, we offer an understanding of text in the concrete fashion. Text 
is not an abstract entity that has a life in itself. In contrast, the text of Scripture is 
determined by the being in becoming of God and of the human readers. In this 
regard, we propose that the theological locus of this actualism is Barth’s reflection on 
divine inspiration of Scripture. The concrete reality of inspiration is not text in itself 
(inspiredness), but the author and the reader of Scripture in which the Holy Spirit 
illumines and breathes meaning into the human author and reader. The text has its 
being in becoming, and as Barth famously argues, the Bible becomes the Word of 
God, in the divine actualism of being in becoming. 
Our discussion of the threefoldness of God’s speech was an attempt to give 
justice to the various dimensions of the Word of God in the context of the humanity 
of Scripture. The Word of God is divine utterance, comes with power and is 
encountered by biblical witnesses as the mystery of revelation. In these three terms 
(speech, act and mystery) there are various biblical echoes that are combined in the 
threefoldness of God’s speech. The inner dynamic of the Sache as it addresses the 
church comes as speech, action and mystery. The description provides a very rich 
idea of the inner dynamic of the subject matter of Scripture as it becomes event in the 
life of the church. The subject matter is encountered as the One who speaks. It is not 
a self-reflection of a human reader, but as something utterly Other. It calls, repents, 
encourages and transforms the readers. As such, it is not simply a speech, but an act. 
It has power. How this speech works in such a powerful way, and why it is not 
experienced as such for many readers, are a mystery of divine decision. Ultimately, 
Barth’s theology does not speak of it as a Sache of a text, but as the speaking 
presence of God in Scripture. In the final analysis, the subject matter of Scripture is 
the communicative presence of God in and through the text in and for the church. 
  What is the concrete form of Barth’s hermeneutics for the contemporary 
reading of Scripture? What is the ‘methodological’ implication of such 
hermeneutics? We have indicated in this chapter the importance of faith in response 
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to the divine illumination of Scripture. Because the event of the Word of God is 
grace, from beginning to end, we propose, that it has little to do with a method of 
interpretation. It does not mean that it has no concrete implication for the theological 
task of reading the Scripture, i.e., theological exegesis. Our thesis is that, for Barth, 
the concrete form of the church’s response to the task of reading the Scripture does 
not come in the form of a manual or guideline for biblical interpretation.  Given the 
specific emphasis on divine decision, speech and action in the event of the Word of 
God, it is not difficult to see why a reflection on the method of interpretation will 
have no significant role in Barth’s hermeneutics. What is the concrete application of 
Barth’s hermeneutics for contemporary reading of Scripture? We propose that this 
will not come in the form of method but rather in the form of ethics. The concrete 
form of Barth’s theology of interpretation is the ethics of interpretation in faith as an 
anticipation and response to the event of the Sache of Scripture. The constructive 
exploration of the shape and content of an ethics of interpretation of Scripture is the 




Chapter VI: Toward an Ethics of Interpretation 
 
This chapter argues that instead of a method of interpretation, the concrete form of 
Barth’s theology of interpretation is an ethics of reading. In the previous chapters we 
have argued that Barth’s hermeneutics is an attempt to give justice to the church’s 
faith in God, specifically, the communicative presence of God in the church reading 
of the Bible. In this chapter, we will show that such a faith is quite accommodating in 
regard to a method of interpretation. More importantly, it is integral to the faith, as a 
particular form of ethics for the task of interpreting the Bible as Scripture. The 
ethical dimension of Barth’s hermeneutics is not a practical implication of a theory, 
nor is it an appendix to a primary exploration of Barth’s ‘theory’ of interpretation, 
rather it is a dogmatic exposition of the theological ethics for performing the 
church’s task of reading the Bible as Scripture. 
Barth’s ethics of reading does not consist of principles and laws but a 
morality that is shaped by his theological ontology of reality and the theological 
description of the Word of God. Theological ontology provides an understanding of 
the moral sphere in which the church’s interpretation takes place. It is not an 
academic setting in which method will take the central role to fit the culture of 
intellectual exercise or to maintain the epistemological integrity of the institution. It 
is not defined by the social locus of the church as religious institution. But as we 
have argued in chapter three, it is defined by the election of God to be God in Jesus 
Christ, and as such, church self-understanding has placed itself, primarily, as the 
creature of the Word of God. In this regard, as we have argued in chapter four, the 
church’s interpretation of Scripture is shaped by a self-understanding that it is God 
who speaks in and through the text. God is at the same time the Object and the 
speaking Subject of the Bible. The result of our argument in the previous two 
chapters is an ethics of interpretation that is determined by the moral ontology of the 
reality in which the church’s interpretation takes place and the theological identity of 
the subject matter of Scripture. Our reading of CD I/2, particularly §19 which forms 
the main bulk of the chapter, is shaped by the conclusions we have reached in the 
previous two chapters. As such what appears to be Barth’s longest reflection on the 
theory of biblical interpretation (§19.2, “Scripture as the Word of God”) will be read 
as an ethics of interpretation. The result of this methodological decision is that this 
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reflection is not understood as a method of reading that guarantees the church’s 
interpretation of Scripture. It is rather a morality of interpretation that is born out of 
certain dogmatic convictions of the being in becoming of Scripture as the Word of 
God. 
This chapter begins with an observation on the moral claim in the historical 
and literary method of biblical interpretation, i.e., the ethical convictions in the 
reasoning of critical studies. Our purpose is not to provide or to explore a common 
ground of ethics of interpretation in scholarship but to highlight how the moral claim 
is integrated to a method of biblical interpretation. We argue that at a deeper level, 
different methods of interpretation are closely connected to different ethics of 
interpretation. Having established the significance of the ethics of hermeneutics, we 
will argue that Barth’s understanding of the process of interpretation is best 
understood as an ethic rather than a method, and this ethic forms the way in which 
the church must read the Bible as Scripture in Barth’s theology. The chapter will 
provide an outline of Barth’s moral theology, and how his ethical reflection shapes 
and informs the particular ways he understands the church’s reading of the Bible. 
The rest of the chapter will elaborate the form and the content of Barth’s ethics of 
interpretation under three themes: freedom, obedience and responsibility, and how 
these themes inform and form the basic structure of biblical interpretation. 
1. Moral Claim in Interpretation 
Our first argument will consist of a claim that the morality of interpretation plays an 
important role in the method of interpretation. The critical reflection on the 
relationship between ethics and biblical interpretation is a considerably recent 
development in the study of ethics. While, in one sense, ethical reflection is an ever 
present challenge in performing biblical interpretation, as a systematic study, it is 
still in the stage of exploration. The ethics of biblical interpretation is usually 
differentiated from the ethics of the Old Testament or of the New Testament, or with 
more specific biblical ethics such as the ethics of Paul, Jesus, or Luke etc., which 
discuss the ethical content of particular text(s). In one of the explorations, the ethics 
of interpretation is defined as “a second order methodological reflection on the ethos 
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and morals of biblical studies.”1 It is a view that underlies the ethical questions that 
pertain to the decision of method and its application to a text.2 A choice of a method 
is not only an instance of an epistemological decision but also a deliberation of 
ethical conviction. In its concrete form it asks how one can ethically interpret a 
biblical text in relation to one’s socio-political-religious context and the historical-
literary content of a text. Since one of the characteristics of a biblical text is its 
inherently ethical intent and content, there is a circle of dialogue in the act of 
interpretation. One’s ethical presupposition shapes one’s reading of a text, and the 
ethics of the text will in turn affect one’s understanding of the text. The critical 
questions that are generally proposed in such a context are as follows: how can one 
be ethically responsible when one performs a biblical interpretation? And how can 
one be ethically responsible when one interprets a text and disseminates it, through 
writing, teaching and preaching, to a community of readers?3 An ethics of 
interpretation of the biblical texts involves an act of reading and also an act of 
responding to the content of the Bible. 
From a historical point of view, the morality of interpretation was an 
important concern in the development of modern biblical criticism. The initial 
motivation of historical critics was not primarily to question the content of Christian 
faith but “the will-to-truth,”4 which includes a corrective contention when one found 
good reasons to doubt the truth of the church’s doctrines.5 If the ‘truth’ of historical 
findings contradicts some of the church doctrines, then one should not conceal the 
discovery for the sake of the doctrines. Van A. Harvey argues that historical criticism 
was initially motivated by “a new morality of critical judgment that has seized the 
imagination of the scholar,” and this new ideal means honesty and integrity in one’s 
academic conclusions, even if it could raise a serious problem for traditional 
                                                 
1 Elisabeth Schüssler Fiorenza, Rhetoric and Ethic: The Politics of Biblical Studies (Minneapolis: 
Fortress Press, 1999), 195. 
2 Ibid. 
3 Cf. Patte, Ethics of Biblical Interpretation: A Reevaluation, 3. 
4 Cf. Friedrich Wilhelm Nietzsche, Beyond Good and Evil: Prelude to a Philosophy of the Future, 
trans. R. J. Hollingdale and Michael Tanner (London: Penguin Books, 1990), 33. 
5 Van A. Harvey, The Historian and the Believer: The Morality of Historical Knowledge and 
Christian Belief (London: SCM Press, 1967), 4. 
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Christian doctrines.6 He argues further that the moral ideals can be summarized in 
four basic principles. First, it means historians must be autonomous from the 
constraints of Christian dogmas.7 This ideal demands that ‘the will-to-truth’ must 
overcome ‘the will-to-believe’, or as R.G. Collingwood notes, “so far from relying 
on an authority other than himself, to whose statements his thought must conform, 
the historian is his own authority.”8  Second, historians are responsible for providing 
a sound judgement of historical claims, even if it contradicts orthodox doctrines. This 
includes a willingness to consider alternatives and give weight to various proposals 
before proposing the most convincing conclusion.9 One must not retract a hypothesis 
only because it is problematic for the church’s authority; one must be willing, as an 
expression of an intellectual honesty, to follow wherever the argument leads. Third, 
‘the will-to-truth’ must be combined with ‘the will-to-communicate’.10 This requires 
a willingness to submit one’s historical claims to the scrutiny of competent others 
who can provide critical evaluation and expert opinion. In this regard, the historian 
must justify his position and allow others to assent to the truth through a free 
conversation without any fear of repercussions. It must be based on a free conscience 
rather than an enforced opinion. Fourth, historians must use their contemporary 
common-sense view, informed by a modern scientific world-view, to provide a 
contemporary plausibility of a historical reconstruction.11 This demands one to be 
honest that the biblical world may contain some outdated interpretations and that 
these interpretations may constrain the narratives of biblical stories. In this regard, 
one has a moral obligation to point out places where the modern worldview may 
correct the biblical worldview and evaluate the facticity of biblical narratives without 
worrying about its doctrinal ramifications. 
                                                 
6 Ibid., 38. 
7 Ibid., 39. 
8 R. G. Collingwood, The Idea of History (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1946), 236. 
9 Harvey, The Historian and the Believer: The Morality of Historical Knowledge and Christian Belief, 
50. 
10 Ibid., 43. 
11 Ibid., 68. 
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Our purpose here is not to provide a thorough response to these moral claims. 
However, it is important to highlight how the moral dimension is part of an 
epistemological conviction regarding the historical-critical method and how it shapes 
its methodological structure and its rhetorical claims. It does what it does not only on 
the ground of epistemology but also on a moral conviction that it involves an earnest 
pursuit of the truth.12  It shows that an ethics of interpretation lies at the deeper level 
of its methodological practice, for once the method is formulated, it regards the 
methodology as an embodiment of its ethical norms. And yet it often overlooks how 
the method is a contextual formulation, from a particular time and place, which must 
be constantly evaluated as only relatively plausible, epistemologically and morally, 
in an ever changing intellectual milieu. 
The main problem with this old historical approach is the presupposition that 
the meaning of a text is restricted to the historical circumstances of its genesis, and to 
read it in a wider perspective through the lenses of church tradition and doctrine, 
constitutes a misreading and an abuse of the text.13 However, it is the nature of a text 
to have the capacity to transcend its historicality.14 While its genesis in relation to the 
author and the first readers can provide a continuity of its interpretation, it is not 
necessarily restrictive to its trans-cultural meaning. To stake a moral judgement for 
an interpretation that employs doctrine and tradition for hermeneutics, we posit, 
constitutes a misunderstanding of a text and its hermeneutical dimensions. 
Additionally, and more importantly, it constitutes a misunderstanding of doctrine and 
                                                 
12 In different form, literary theories also pose a moral challenge for biblical interpretation. While in 
the historical method, the historical record is the object of suspicion, in the literary theories, it is the 
text as a locus of meaning that becomes suspect. In this case the moral claim of the Bible is regarded 
as ideologically distorted by the meaning that the readers bring into the text. Kevin J. Vanhoozer, Is 
There a Meaning in This Text?: The Bible, the Reader, and the Morality of Literary Knowledge 
(Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 1998), 23-24. Cf. Stanley E. Fish, Is There a Text in This Class?: The 
Authority of Interpretive Communities (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1980), 
1-18. 
13 Watson, Text, Church and World: Biblical Interpretation in Theological Perspective, 4.  
14 Cf. Gadamer, Truth and Method, 357; Ricœur, Hermeneutics and the Human Sciences: Essays on 
Language, Action and Interpretation, 91. Whether such capacity is inherent to the text or is the result 
of three dimensional fusion of horizons between text, reader and author, is another question. Anthony 
Thiselton rightly argues that “once the text comes to occupy a place in tradition and to be read in 
times or places different from those in which it was spoken or written, further dimensions of action 
and their effects begin to emerge.” Anthony C. Thiselton, "Reader-Response Hermeneutics: Action 




a misrepresentation of the meaning of authority in the church.  Furthermore, a critical 
reflection of its moral rhetoric, show that it involves a lack of understanding of a 
wider ethical dimension in biblical interpretation. Regarding its claim to the truth, it 
constitutes a moral pretence of scientific objectivity and is based on the 
presupposition that an inquiry into the truth of Scripture is the responsibility of an 
isolated individual subject. It privileges the methodological inquiry of an 
autonomous-self, and endows it with an exclusive right for determining what a text 
means. It assumes what can be proven historically of an event in the past is the 
present significance of a text.  In contrast, by nature the Bible is a communal text, 
and its existence is inseparable from the communally lived praxis of the church, 
which requires attention to this reality for a constructed account of its theology of 
interpretation.15 The privileged place of an inquiring-self undermines the fact that the 
Bible is part of a living tradition of a community, and a reading of the Bible requires 
a consideration of its relation to the symbolic imagination of the community that uses 
and reads the text on a regular basis.16 The Bible is not only a collection of texts but 
is a living embodiment of the ethical praxis of the pastoral and missional life of the 
church. Reading the Bible is not only a matter of finding cognitive ‘truth’ but, more 
importantly, a matter of living out its theological claims and ethical commands. 
Looking at the problem from this perspective, a purely academic approach may 
entail, what Karl P. Donfried calls, ‘alien hermeneutics’ of the Bible, an enterprise 
characterized by “epistemological monism that assumes that historical knowledge is 
omniscient and that it determines theological truth.”17 Ironically, in its response to 
the ‘dogmatic’ pressure of Christian doctrine, it has its own dogmatism.18 It 
privileges a form of historicism at the cost of church’s doctrines, and disregards the 
historical wisdom, collected by centuries of interpretation, of the tradition of the 
church.  
                                                 
15 Stephen R. Holmes, "Kings, Professors, and Ploughboys: On the Accessibility of Scripture," 
International Journal of Systematic Theology 13, no. 4 (2011): 409.  
16 Schüssler Fiorenza, "The Ethics of Biblical Interpretation: Decentering Biblical Scholarship," 15. 
17 Karl P. Donfried, "Alien Hermeneutics and the Misappropriation of Scripture," in Reclaiming the 
Bible for the Church, ed. Carl E. Braaten and Robert W. Jenson (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1996), 19-
20. 
18 James I. H. McDonald, Biblical Interpretation and Christian Ethics (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1993), 169. 
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Furthermore, as E. Schüssler-Fiorenza argues, there is a posture of hidden 
dishonesty and academic pride in the moral claim.19 She posits, “The pretension of 
biblical studies to a ‘scientific’ mode of inquiry that denies their hermeneutical and 
theoretical character and masks their historical-social location prohibits a critical 
reflection on their rhetorical theological practices in their sociopolitical contexts.”20 
In other words, by claiming one’s historical findings as a pure result of moral 
deliberation there is a lack of self-awareness of one’s rhetoric and geo-political roots 
that informs one’s hermeneutics. This point of criticism is closely related to the 
communal existence of the Bible. The morality of its interpretation disregards the 
fact that every interpretation requires an ethics of responsibility that provides justice 
“not only for the choice of theoretical interpretative models but also for ethical 
consequences of the biblical text and its meaning.”21 The task of biblical 
interpretation requires not only one’s honesty in finding the truth, but also one’s 
engagement with the fact that some biblical texts have been the loci of problematic 
moral and religious deliberations. The rhetoric of truth and objectivity eclipses the 
task of providing an ethical response to the fact that texts have been used for social 
propaganda to exploit its content for justifying war, slavery, discrimination and other 
moral problems.  
 These critical evaluations show how moral questions of biblical interpretation 
move beyond the question of the truth of its content to the justice of an interpretative 
performance. However, the question of justice is not easy to answer. There are many 
ways one can construe the meaning of justice in biblical interpretation. In general, 
the proposals are usually determined by the locus of meaning in one’s theory of 
interpretation. If one argues, for example, that the meaning of a text is principally 
authorial, then one must give justice to the authorial communication, i.e., the 
illocutionary act in which an author says something about something in the text. 
Nicholas Wolterstorff argues that to do justice to the text, one has to respect the 
                                                 
19 Schüssler Fiorenza, "The Ethics of Biblical Interpretation: Decentering Biblical Scholarship," 14. 
20 Ibid., 11-12. 
21 Ibid., 15. 
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author(s) by engaging the author(s) “justly, charitably, honourably.”22 On the other 
hand if one posits that the meaning is to be found in the text, in view of its interaction 
with the readers (e.g. Gadamer, Ricoeur), then one must give due justice to the text 
or the interaction between text and its reader(s). One must give justice to the 
otherness of the text and refrain oneself from an easy interpretation of the anticipated 
meaning of pre-exegesis. In this context there is an ethical obligation of the reader(s) 
to acknowledge and respect “the other” who is encountered, the other who may 
surprise the reader in the encounter between text and reader.23 Truth is not a 
collection of propositional concepts but an ever new encounter between the text and 
its readers in the event of interpretation in which the historicality and the traditioning 
process of one’s understanding relate dialectically, and thereby contribute to the 
fusion of horizons in biblical interpretation. Finally, if the locus of meaning is mainly 
in the reader or a community of readers (e.g. Stanley Fish24), an interpretation must 
give justice to the fact that the reader(s) bring the meaning into the text, and the 
claim of the text, becomes very relative to the moral presupposition of the reader(s). 
The reader(s) must admit that her rhetoric of truth finds its origin not from the text 
but from her moral deliberation. In so far as the text makes a moral claim, it must be 
acknowledged that it is the reader(s) who uses the text for such a claim. 
Regarding theories, each claims a valid methodology of interpretation, and 
yet they arrive at different, or sometimes conflicting, conclusions. We propose that 
the reasons for this are not merely the methodological differences, but because each 
hermeneutical method has its own ethics of interpretation and its moral validation.25 
More specifically, every interpretation has an interpretative morality that is valid 
within the approach, i.e., it does not need a validation by the morality of other 
approaches. In this context, the academic culture of post-modernity prescribes an 
                                                 
22 Nicholas Wolterstorff, "Resuscitating the Author," in Hermeneutics at the Crossroads, ed. Kevin J. 
Vanhoozer, James K. A. Smith, and Bruce Ellis Benson (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 
2006), 49. Cf. E. D. Hirsch, Validity in Interpretation (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1967), 1-
23. 
23 Ben Faber, "Ethical Hermeneutics and the Theater," in Hermeneutics at the Crossroads, ed. Kevin 
J. Vanhoozer, James K. A. Smith, and Bruce Ellis Benson (Blomington, Indiana: Indiana University 
Press, 2006), 217. 
24 Cf. Fish, Is There a Text in This Class?: The Authority of Interpretive Communities, 8-17. 
25 Patte, Ethics of Biblical Interpretation: A Reevaluation, 19. 
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ideal in which one needs to be conscious about the peculiarity of one’s interpretation 
as a contextual practice which brings a particular perspective to the text. One needs 
to acknowledge that one has a perspective, and by doing so, open a dialogue with 
other interpretations. Since no one comes to the Bible with a value-free perspective, 
it is suggested that each perspective is valid, and as a result, all interpretations are 
legitimate. Any notion of “the rule of interpretation,” could only mean an oppression 
of other forms of interpretation. The ethics of interpretation is an ethics of freedom, 
and as part of academic integrity, it is a freedom with a collegial responsibility.  
 The contemporary discussion of the ethics of interpretation highlights 
important themes of truth, integrity, self-awareness, justice and freedom for critical 
engagement with the question of ethics in biblical interpretation. Much can be 
gleaned from the discussions, and the studies raise some thought-provoking 
reflections for the church’s reading of the Bible. And yet, in many analyses, it 
obscures the fact that integral to these studies are convictions about human beings 
(anthropology) which is not necessarily built on a theological anthropology, rather 
than upon concepts and presuppositions borrowed, often uncritically, from a general 
(non-theological) anthropology. More importantly, it envisions an ethical field in 
which one’s interpretation takes place as a non-theistic history which entails a 
particular view of human freedom and justice. John Webster observes that “all 
ethical reflection has implicit and explicit within it an anthropology and ontology of 
history – a construal of the moral agent and of the field in which the moral agents 
act.”26 The critical element lacking in most recent studies is an ethics of 
interpretation which considers the presence and the activity of God as an integral part 
of the church’s reading of Scripture, i.e., what it means to read the Bible ethically 
when one considers the communicative presence of God as constitutive of a text’s 
reality. This theological claim is an indispensable belief of the church, and it requires 
a particular form of an ethics of interpretation in view of Scripture’s theological 
status as the written Word of God. Barth posits, “The question about the Word and 
                                                 
26 John Webster, Barth's Ethics of Reconciliation (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), 98. 
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this question alone fulfils and does justice to the intention of the biblical authors in 
their writing.”27  
This chapter will explore this question with and after the manner of Karl 
Barth’s theology. Having argued, in the previous chapters, that Barth’s hermeneutics 
is based on a particular theological ontology and takes the shape of a particular 
theological interpretation, we propose that this theological-ontological backdrop 
prescribes a unique ethics of interpretation for reading the Bible as Scripture. In the 
next section, we will first outline the basic shape of Barth’s theological ethics. 
2. The Shape of Karl Barth’s Theological Ethics 
How can one know what constitutes a good human action? Barth believes a truly 
Christian ethical reflection cannot be separated from dogmatics; it must be integrated 
and determined in dogmatics. In one of his last writings, Barth defines ethics as “an 
attempt to answer theoretically the question of what may be called good human 
action.”28  In Barth’s theology, a general ethical inquiry is a deliberation of a human 
who takes upon herself the task of defining what is moral.29 On the other hand, by 
God’s grace, the fact a human can ask moral questions and respond to moral 
commands, is fundamental to her existence as God’s creature and elected partner of 
God’s covenant. Webster posits that Barth’s reflection is not a “reflection upon an 
immanent world of moral meaning,” but rather a “reflection upon a transcendent 
order of being and value organised around the grace of God in the Gospel of Jesus 
Christ.”30 This is the reason why Barth elucidates the form and the content of his 
ethical reflections as distinctively theological.31 Barth’s ethics is an integral part of 
                                                 
27 Karl Barth, Evangelical Theology: An Introduction (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1963), 
35. 
28 Karl Barth, The Christian Life: Lecture Fragments (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1981), 3. 
29 CD II/2, 522-23. 
30 Webster, Barth's Ethics of Reconciliation, 219. 
31 Trevor Hart, Regarding Karl Barth: Toward a Reading of His Theology (Downers Grove, Ill.: 
InterVarsity Press, 1999), 75. 
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his dogmatics,32 for as Webster notes, the Church Dogmatics is “intrinsically an 
ethical dogmatics.”33 
 The distinctiveness of Barth’s ethics is it does not start with a reflection on 
the human as a moral agent but by firstly envisioning a particular “moral ontology” 
in which human action takes place.34 Specifically, Barth’s ethics is a three-
dimensional reflection that encompasses the ethical question and the ethical agent in 
a dynamic framework in which the commanding presence of God is not only noetic, 
but also ontological and teleological.35 The Word of God generates a particular moral 
ontology, that is, a moral field that has a distinctive theological framework for 
understanding human moral action. Webster notes that Barth’s ethics is devoted 
primarily “to the task of describing the ‘space’ which agents occupy, and gives only 
low priority to the description of their character and to the analysis of quandary 
situations in which they find themselves.”36 In Barth’s theology, moral questions 
must be first set up in a right moral universe before reflecting on human action. In 
this way, Barth’s theology delays the reflection on human morality until the 
description of the creative and redemptive act of God in Christ and the sanctifying 
work of the Holy Spirit has been properly elaborated.37 The reality of God is a reality 
that is free and original, but the freedom of God is expressed in the decision of God 
                                                 
32 Barth, The Christian Life: Lecture Fragments, 3. 
33 Webster, Barth's Ethics of Reconciliation, 4. 
34 Hart, Regarding Karl Barth: Toward a Reading of His Theology, 75. Also, Webster, Barth's Ethics 
of Reconciliation, 214-30. The phrase originated from Charles Taylor, Sources of the Self: The 
Making of the Modern Identity (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1989), 8. 
35 Hart, Regarding Karl Barth: Toward a Reading of His Theology, 86. Cf. Nimmo, Being in Action: 
The Theological Shape of Barth's Ethical Vision, 6. 
36 Webster, Barth's Ethics of Reconciliation, 2. Barth’s unique approach has been misunderstood as a 
lack of ethical reflection in his theology because of the expectation of description of moral agent and 
her reflectivity in relation to ethical questions and realities isolated from Barth’s vision of the field of 
moral action. See, inter alia, Alister E. McGrath, The Making of Modern German Christology, 1750-
1990 (Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 1994), 104-05; Sheila Greeve Davaney, Divine Power: A Study of 
Karl Barth and Charles Hartshorne (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1986), 16, 23, 44. Some complain 
that Barth’s theology itself lacks of space and content to engage with the reality of ethical-political 
questions, see inter alia, Reinhold Niebuhr, Essays in Applied Christianity (New York: Meridian 
Books, 1959), 172-87; Charles C. West, Communism and the Theologians: Study of an Encounter 
(Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1958), 211-22. Cf. George Hunsinger, Karl Barth and Radical 
Politics (Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1976), 181-92. 
37 Webster, Barth's Ethics of Reconciliation, 2. 
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to be God of humanity, i.e., to be in covenantal fellowship with humanity.38 God is 
true God in God’s movement to reach out to humanity.39 But precisely because 
theology is understood as a church’s reflection on God in relation to humanity, 
human action takes place in the history of God’s dealing with humanity, both in view 
of God’s eternal election and the historical act of God. A Christian moral 
deliberation in this context is a human action in correspondence to God’s grace that 
elects sinful humanity as God’s covenant partner.40 
 What is the presupposed moral field in Barth’s theology? We propose it is 
God’s election that situates human life in a definite ethical field. The centre of the 
problem is not a noetic question about good human action. The primary problem, 
rather, lies in the moral discrepancy between the good that has been revealed and the 
moral reality of elected human beings. Humans are sinners who decide and act in a 
way that denies their own being. In God’s eternal election, God takes upon God-self 
the responsibility that must be carried by the human and in this way establishes, 
upholds and completes the human’s justification and sanctification.41 Concretely, this 
has taken place in Jesus Christ as the elect human in whom all humans are included 
in God’s eternal election.42 In Jesus Christ, as Trevort Hart notes, “the truth about all 
other humans is a function of the relationship which they have to this one man and 
his history which has become their history.”43 God’s election of Jesus Christ is the 
moral field within which human ethical action takes place.  
 In this moral ontology, believer and unbeliever alike are placed under the 
grace of God, in which Jesus Christ fulfilled for them what God requires from 
                                                 
38 CD II/2, 7. 
39 Cf. “‘Theology’, in the literal sense, means the science and doctrine of God. A very precise 
definition of the Christian endeavour in this respect would really require the more complex term ‘The-
anthropology’. For an abstract doctrine of God has no place in the Christian realm, only a ‘doctrine of 
God and of man’, a doctrine of the commerce and communion between God and man.” Karl Barth, 
The Humanity of God (Richmond: John Knox Press, 1960), 11. 
40 CD II/2, 512. 
41 Barth, The Christian Life: Lecture Fragments, 16. 
42 Ibid., 11. 
43 Hart, Regarding Karl Barth: Toward a Reading of His Theology, 80. Cf. Gerald P. McKenny, The 




humanity. The ethical world where the church lives and reads the Bible is a world 
where the moral demand of being human is defined by the man Jesus Christ, and 
fulfilled in his life, death and resurrection. In Jesus Christ God brings humanity to 
the true telos of its existence.  Human morality finds its proper good in its 
correspondence and identification with the moral life of Jesus Christ, i.e., his 
obedience and submission to the will of God. By implication, an ethics of reading the 
Bible is characterized by obedience or disobedience that corresponds to the 
faithfulness or contradiction of human action to the very being of the human as 
defined and fulfilled in the history of Jesus Christ. The gospel of election determines 
the calling to live out the true being of humanity as it has been revealed and 
actualized by Jesus Christ.44   
Yet this obedience is not an obedience to a particular set of rules and moral 
principles, nor is it a literal imitation of Jesus’s ethical life.45 The concrete form of 
ethical life is a response to the divine vocation and command in a specific time and 
place. This is understood actualistically as an ever new creative event of Christian 
life. Ethical obedience is not an obedience to a set of rules or a pattern of life as 
instructed or exemplified by Jesus Christ or biblical characters. Rather it takes the 
form of divine address that encounters a human being at this particular time and at 
this particular locality and the human’s response to it. Barth posits, 
The concept of the command of God denotes a dynamic reality. The 
command is that of the living God. Thus the concept speaks of God's action 
to the extent that this is also a specific Word directed to man. The expression 
"the command of God" means that the gracious God, acting as such with and 
for and on man, does not keep silent but says something to man, telling him 
what he wants from him, what he for his part is to do. The concept speaks of 
the directing and demanding and ordering of God which takes place in and 
with his action and with which he appeals to the freedom that he has given 
man as his Creator and Reconciler. The command of God is the event in 
which God commands. It is a specific command of God in each specific form 
of his dealings with man, in each specific time, in relation to the 
                                                 
44 Hart, Regarding Karl Barth: Toward a Reading of His Theology, 81. 
45 CD IV/2, 553. Cf. Paul T. Nimmo, "Barth and the Christian as Ethical Agent: An Ontological Study 
of the Shape of Christian Ethics," in Commanding Grace: Studies in Karl Barth's Ethics, ed. Daniel L. 
Migliore (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2010), 233. 
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presuppositions and consequences of each specific existence of each man. It 
is the one very definite thing that God demands from this or that man.46 
 Ethics is not a matter of general principles for special application but of 
discerning and obeying the divine command in a specific time and space precisely 
because God has a will for the church in this particular situation. Barth posits, 
Ethics, however, can point to the event of the encounter between God and 
man, to the mystery of the specific divine ordering, directing, and 
commanding and of the specific human obeying or disobeying. It can give 
instruction in the art of correct asking about God's will and open hearing of 
God's command. It can do this because, for all the specificity of his 
commanding here and now, it is always the gracious God who in the situation 
of the covenant which now commands our interest encounters the man who is 
responsible to him as such. Thus the mystery of his encounter with man is not 
one of a darkness in which anything might be possible and might become 
actual. The very specific thing which the free God wants done here and now 
                                                 
46 Barth, The Christian Life: Lecture Fragments, 33. This form of theological ethics has attracted 
many criticisms. Some object because Barth’s ethics entails a kind of moral ‘occasionalism’ that fails 
to give proper account of a right ethical reasoning; some regard that such an approach fails to provide 
continuity of moral action, and in this regard, its moral deliberation entails an arbitrary moral 
principle; and others criticise Barth because he fails to give a proper account of non-theological 
factors in ethical reflection. See, inter alia, Nigel Biggar, The Hastening That Waits: Karl Barth's 
Ethics (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1993), 19ff; Robert E. Willis, The Ethics of Karl Barth (Leiden: 
Brill, 1971), 183, 421; James M. Gustafson, Can Ethics Be Christian? (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 1975), 160. Cf. Webster, Barth's Moral Theology: Human Action in Barth's Thought, 
1. The common weaknesses of these criticisms is that they fail to give justice to the moral ontology of 
Barth’s theological ethics. Specifically, the first charge, fails to give justice to the fact that Barth does 
not to retreat from all forms of reasoning but from a specific kind of reasoning, that is, an ethical 
reasoning deliberated by an independent ethical agent. For Barth, even if a reasoning is based on a text 
of Scripture, if it fails to give justice to divine commanding presence it constrains theological ethics 
from a living encounter with God. A system of ethics, even if the system is an open system that can be 
modified according to a contextual situation, for Barth, fails to give justice to the divine commanding 
grace that requires not only moral reasoning but human obedience. Barth assumes the moral problem 
is primarily ontic, not noetic. Against the charge of a lack of continuity, we believe that the criticism 
fails to grasp the full logic of Barth’s ethics. It is true that an ethics of obedience where the content of 
the obedience is morally problematic (such as a conviction that one is commanded to harm others) can 
raise a serious moral question. But the charge fails to account for the fact that in Barth’s theology, the 
divine-human relationship is not only a moment but also a history. The command of God as an ever 
new event (discontinuity) is part of an ongoing relationship between God and humanity in which the 
history of the relationship provides continuity of the divine-human encounter. God’s command is not 
an arbitrary command, but a command in the history of relationship that has its roots in eternity, 
realised in the life, death and resurrection of Jesus, and consummated in the eschaton. Finally against 
the charge that Barth’s ethics lacks consideration of non-theological factors, we posit that such a claim 
is a misunderstanding, because for Barth, what can be accounted as a theological factor is inclusive of 
social-political factors. In fact, given the specificity of God’s command, the historical facticity and 
contextual factors of ethical reasoning are an integral part of divine commands, precisely because the 
command is the command of God who places the church in a particular context with ethical 
responsibilities. Cf. Hart, Regarding Karl Barth: Toward a Reading of His Theology, 85. 
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by free man, the content of his command, is wholly and utterly a matter of his 
particular disposing.47 
 If this is the shape of Barth’s theological ethics, it is not difficult to 
understand how the form of ethics of interpretation is that of obedience and 
responsibility. If Scripture is the conduit of God’s commanding grace, then it is quite 
logical that obedience and responsibility are the concrete forms of Barth’s ethics of 
interpretation. But how, in this context, can one talk about the freedom of 
interpretation, as a theme of paramount importance in the discussion of an ethics of 
interpretation? Interestingly, when Barth discusses the three moments of 
interpretation (explicatio-meditatio-applicatio),48 he frames the discussion within the 
context of freedom. In other words, it is an ethics of freedom that provides the 
framework of the ethics of responsibility and obedience in his hermeneutics. In what 
follows we will first discuss the meaning of freedom and what it means to exercise 
an ethics of freedom in the church’s reading of the Bible as Scripture. Then, in this 
context, we will elaborate the meaning of responsibility and obedience in Barth’s 
ethics of interpretation.   
3. The freedom of interpretation  
What is the meaning of the freedom of interpretation? Specifically, what constitutes 
the meaning of interpretative freedom in the church’s reading of Scripture? More 
concretely, can we derive any meaning from a text or is there a constraint of 
interpretation, and in what ways does such constraint give justice to the text?49 
In some modern theories, as discussed above, freedom of interpretation is 
viewed in opposition to authority. However, this perception is a serious 
misunderstanding of both freedom and authority.50 We can trace this 
                                                 
47 Barth, The Christian Life: Lecture Fragments, 34. 
48 CD I/2, 723-40. 
49 Cf. Kevin J. Vanhoozer, "Imprisoned or Free? Text, Status, and Theological Interpretation in the 
Master/Slave Discourse of Philemon," in Reading Scripture with the Church: Toward a Hermeneutic 
for Theological Interpretation, ed. A. K. M. Adam (Grand Rapids: Baker Academic, 2006), 53. 
50 Cf. “…within enlightenment, the very concept of authority becomes deformed…opposed to reason 
and freedom… But this is not the essence of authority. It is true that it is primarily persons that have 
authority; but authority of persons is based ultimately, not on the subjection and abdication of reason, 
but on recognition and knowledge–knowledge, namely that the other is superior to oneself in 
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misunderstanding in the development of the Enlightenment.51 Freedom is defined as 
the courage of using one’s autonomous reason to differentiate what is right from 
what is wrong, and to act on this basis. Constitutive of practical reason, freedom is a 
necessary presupposition of the ethical life. One must obey the moral law because 
one has the ability to do it, and in this recognition, one identifies human freedom and 
moral obligation.52 On this account, only with the presupposition of human freedom, 
is the sense of morality is meaningful. In this construal, authority is a constraint 
against human freedom.  It is the opposite of freedom.  
The difference between this philosophy of freedom and Barth’s theology of 
freedom lies primarily in the ontology of morality that Barth perceives as the field of 
human action in which freedom can be understood. For Barth, a libertarian notion of 
freedom depends on an anthropological construal of absolute human freewill and a 
field of moral action that sees humans like “Hercules at the cross-roads” who can 
will and decide for himself what is right and wrong.53 In contrast to this notion, Barth 
proposes that freedom is a gift from God who reveals and enables humans to know 
and to obey God’s command. It is a freedom in and for God rather than a freedom 
from God. Barth posits, “Freedom is not an empty and formal concept. It is one 
which is filled out with a positive meaning. It does not speak only of a capacity. It 
speaks concretely of the fact that man can be genuinely man as God who has given 
                                                                                                                                          
judgment and insight and that for this reason his judgment takes precedence…” Hans-Georg Gadamer, 
"The Historicity of Understanding," in The Hermeneutics Reader: Texts of the German Tradition from 
the Enlightenment to the Present, ed. Kurt Mueller-Vollmer (New York: Continuum, 1985), 263.  
51 One of the examples is Immanuel Kant who defines “enlightenment” as a movement that is driven 
by a spirit of human autonomy against external authority because of the risk that authority can deprive 
one of the freedom of making truthful judgement. Immanuel Kant, "What Is Enlightenment?," in 
Critique of Practical Reason and Other Writings in Moral Philosophy, ed. Lewis White Beck 
(Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press, 1949), 286-92. Cf. Harvey, The Historian and the Believer: The 
Morality of Historical Knowledge and Christian Belief, 39-42. At that time this conception was a 
revolutionary claim, and it helped the church to rethink the proper place of authority and how it relates 
to church authority. Such rethinking helps to recover the true meaning of authority and how it can 
provide a theological basis of freedom in conjunction with church authority. 
52 John Macken, The Autonomy Theme in the Church Dogmatics of Karl Barth and His Critics 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), 6. Macken does not acknowledge the substance of 
human action in Barth’s ethical reflection and interprets Barth’s theological ethics dissolving human 
activity into divine activity. Nevertheless, as we argue, Barth’s theology explores the theme of divine-
human partnership through a specific theme of human participation in the act of invocation, and in the 
act of invocation we can interpret a real participation of human being in the command of God. 
53 CD IV/2, 494.  
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him this capacity can in His freedom be genuinely God.”54 God’s freedom defines 
human freedom, and human freedom derives its meaning and reality from God’s 
freedom. Barth proposes that freedom does not necessarily contradict true authority, 
i.e., God’s authority. Authority need not denote an enslaving power from above upon 
irresolute humans. In Barth’s account, God’s authority is divinely majestic, “it has 
nothing in common with tyranny”; rather than enforcing its power against human 
freewill, it is “the power of an appeal, command and blessing which not only 
recognises human response but creates it.”55 
In this theological construal, the human, in and by herself, has no capacity of 
true freedom. The demand to be free without God is the sign of her bondage to her 
sinful being. In and by himself, only God is truly free. Barth believes God is free 
even in regard to the freedom of God’s being.56 Human freedom is derivative of 
God’s freedom, and for the human to be truly free, she has to be initiated, sustained 
and completed by the act of divine grace. The divinely endowed freedom is an 
actualistic freedom that does not belong permanently to the human, but always and 
everywhere, an event of grace that God bestows ever anew. Barth posits,  
Human freedom is, therefore, neither something which is already proper to 
man, nor a freedom which man assumes in reaction to the Word of God. It is 
an event,… Because this happens, and happens within a human gathering, 
and therefore happens to men, it results in an emancipation of these men, in 
their being endowed with a possibility which they did not have before and 
which they could not have from their own resources.57 
 In this account interpretative freedom is an event by the grace of God. It is 
not based on so called human freedom that enables one to interpret Scripture 
according to one’s free-will. Only the freedom of the Word of God can enable a 
human reader to have a genuine freedom.  Barth assumes that it is not Scripture that 
is constrained by human temporality, but the human who is constrained by her 
sinfulness and creatureliness. While, as a human text, the Bible is marked by the 
humanity of its authors, it does not need to be freed from its humanity because it is 
                                                 
54 Ibid. 
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56 CD II/1, 307-08. 
57 CD I/2, 697. 
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God’s election that Scripture remains a human text. When God speaks in and through 
Scripture, it is genuinely as a human text that Scripture speaks to the church as the 
Word of God. In contrast, Barth believes that the church, as a community of 
interpreters, need God’s grace to be free from any illusion of being free interpreters; 
any illusion that one is the master of the text; and any illusion that one can dissect 
Scripture as an object of examination. To borrow an insight from Paul Ricoeur, it is 
the human interpreters that need to be free from the “pretention of consciousness in 
setting itself up as the origin of meaning.”58  
This is one of the profound insights of Barth’s theology. The recognition that 
the Word of God is the real source of freedom, and in this regard has the power to 
disenchant its readers from the illusion that they are the originator of textual 
meaning. It calls, to borrow another phrase from Ricoeur, “a true ascesis of 
subjectivity, allowing… to be dispossessed of the origin of meaning.”59 But in 
contrast to Ricoeur, Barth recognises clearly that one cannot achieve this virtue by 
one’s own self-determination but only by the grace of God. Only the freedom of the 
Word can enable the freedom of reading the Scripture as the Word of God. 
Concretely, the theological fact of being in Christ and the work of the Holy Spirit 
create the true freedom of the church in reading the Bible as Scripture. A Christian 
ethics of interpretation must be based on the conviction that Scripture is free, and it 
remains free in spite of any human attempt to constrain and to distort its message and 
significance.  
 What is, then, the expression of human action in this ethics of freedom? More 
specifically, how can the church read the Bible as a free human response to the fact 
that it is Scripture as the Word of God and is free and able to initiate and maintain 
the freedom of its readers? Barth argues that if we understand the freedom of 
Scripture we will realise “we cannot read and understand Holy Scripture without 
prayer, that is, without invoking the grace of God.”60 But how can prayer be a 
                                                 






genuine expression of human freedom? In what sense can we understand that prayer 
is a real freedom in the interpretation of Scripture? 
Barth’s argument consists of a theological claim that the act of invocation is a 
distinctive form of freedom in the God-human relationship. He posits, “Prayer is 
literally the archetypal form of all human acts of freedom in the Church, and as such 
it must be continually repeated in all other acts of freedom.”61 How does Barth 
understand this? Barth believes invocation constitutes a genuine partnership in the 
God-human relationship. Invocation, as an act of freedom, is not simply an 
emanation of God’s action in a human being, but a real and concrete ethical action in 
which the real freedom of the person as ethical agent is maintained and the human 
truly becomes God’s partner.62 Theologically, the partnership is a two-party 
participation because, in invocation, “man finds himself empowered … by the free 
grace of God,” but at the same time, invocation is “an authentically and specifically 
human action, willed and undertaken in a free human resolve… No less serious in his 
place than God in his, man must be present and at work in it according to the 
measure of his human capacity.”63   
In one sense prayer is an act of self-surrendering to the grace of God rather 
than an action of a free agent.64 Barth elucidates this notion when he posits that 
prayer is like opening our ‘empty hand’ to God, in which we have “nothing either to 
represent or to present to God except himself as the one who has to receive all things 
from Him.”65 However, in invocation, “man as a Christian acquires his freedom, and 
in it consists the exercise of this freedom: his conversion and decision. It is the work 
of his faith and gratitude.”66 In the context of grace, invocation is a real participation 
in God because human ethical action is given room by divine self-limitation.  
                                                 
61 Ibid., 698. 
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We cannot speak of the human action-and this is what gives it its force and 
dignity˗without immediately thinking of its continuation on the other side, on 
God's side. As God frees his children to take sides with him, so when they are 
obedient to what he commands he for his part is active on their side as their 
Father. … He does not just work on and for them. As the Founder and the 
perfect Lord of this concursus (cf. CD III, 3 § 49, 2), he wills their work as 
well. He for his part will not work without them. He will work only in 
connection with their work.67 
In the divine ordering of human participation, though God remains free, yet the self-
limitation of God creates a space within which human participation is truly 
authentic.68 In this way there is a real difference between divine initiative and the 
human’s corresponding action.69 Invocation means human involvement in taking 
responsibility according to human capabilities and possibilities.70 Accordingly, those 
who invoke are claimed for action and for taking responsibility upon the content of 
invocation. In this regard, the action itself is a concrete demonstration of the prayer. 
 The Christian expression of interpretative freedom is prayer. This ethos does 
not simply mean that the church (or individual) reading of the Bible must always 
begin and end with a prayer. It ultimately means that the whole process of 
theological exegesis is a form of prayer. It is a spiritual exercise, a human exercise of 
freedom in God’s gracious presence. It is an act of worship. To understand it this 
way means that, as an ethical action, it poses a challenge to human misuses of 
interpretative freedom, that is, it is rife with the risk of irreverence to God’s 
communicative presence. The church’s reading of Scripture is an invocation that is 
based on the understanding that humans are free to interpret the Bible without any 
constraint whatsoever, but that this freedom is not based on a “Herculean” freedom 
that the human can, will, and do what is right. Rather the freedom is expressed in the 
church’s faith in the freedom of the Word who will enable her to be a free reader, 
and in this regard, she invokes, anticipates and celebrates the freedom of Scripture to 
speak again and again in each new context and era, in any system of thought, in any 
cultural-linguistic context, and in any new challenge that the church faces. The 
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church is free to interpret Scripture because Scripture has the power to free the 
church from the captivity of sin. It is not the church that has power to free Scripture 
from human captivity, but it is Scripture that has the power to free, and will always 
succeed to free, the church from the captivity of sin. This is a statement of faith, and 
it is the church’s faith that believes that to perform an interpretative freedom, it must 
rely on the power of the Word in her reading and proclamation of the Gospel.   
 If the ethics of freedom takes the form of human invocation of God’s grace, 
and this invocation is a real human participation in the divine grace, we propose the 
second form of the ethics of interpretation, and following logically from the first, it is 
an ethics of responsibility.  
4. An ethics of responsibility 
The second ethos is rooted in the conviction that a true freedom generates 
responsibility. Since true freedom is a divine gift, it is a sanctified freedom. Freedom 
entails a disciplined practice, because only those who exercise discipline live in a 
genuine freedom. Undisciplined practice is a sign of bondage, and undisciplined 
interpretative practice is a sign of a constrained hermeneutics. The form of 
theological freedom is invocation, and the concrete realisation of invocation is the 
church’s responsibility in reading Scripture theologically.  Since the event of the 
Word is divine grace, and the church will never have the Word as her possession, it 
must seek, hope and pray for it again and again in the act of invocation. 
Responsibility is part of the invocation itself; responsible reading is an act of 
prayer.71 
As freedom under the Word, Barth defines the interpretation of Scripture as 
“the assumption of responsibility for the interpretation and application of Holy 
Scripture”.72 This responsibility is given by Jesus Christ to the church as a whole and 
to each individual member. It is the responsibility of the church to read the Bible and 
encourage its members to read for themselves, and on this basis to witness to the 
world. Thus, the process of interpretation is closely related to the calling and the 
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mission of the church as a whole and of all individual members.73 The ethics of 
responsibility consists of a twofold responsibility. Barth posits,  
[The] testimony of Scripture cannot be received unless the members of the 
Church are willing and ready, in its interpretation and application, to listen to 
each other. Correspondingly, we must [also] say that this testimony cannot be 
received unless those who accept it are ready and willing themselves to 
assume the responsibility for its interpretation and application.74  
In relation to the first, the ethics of reading entails a dialogue with the church’s 
confessions75 and with the church fathers as the first teachers of the church.76 In 
relation to the second, the church should not only listen and learn from others but 
must also take the responsibility of interpreting and applying Scripture for herself 
according to the challenges and the needs of her time and place. 
Why does an ethics of responsibility take the form of not only individual but 
also communal responsibility? Barth’s ethics of interpretation is shaped by his 
understanding of the nature of humanity, i.e., the human is, by nature, a person in 
relationship. Our personal encounter with the Word is relational because our 
existence in Christ is ontologically relational.77 Human relationality is not subsequent 
to one’s being a human or contingent upon one’s willingness to relate to others but is 
the ontological reality of the human as a person in Christ, as elected in God’s eternal 
decree. Barth posits, 
Humanity which is not fellow-humanity is inhumanity. For it cannot reflect 
but only contradict the determination of man to be God's covenant-partner, 
nor can the God who is no Deus solitarius but Deus triunus, God in 
relationship, be mirrored in a homo solitarius. As God offers man humanity 
and therefore freedom in fellowship, God summons him to prove and express 
himself as the image of God-for as such He has created him….He wills that 
man's being should fulfil itself in the encounter, the relationship, the 
togetherness of I and Thou. He commands him, invites him and challenges 
him not merely to allow his humanity as fellow˗humanity to be his nature, but 
to affirm and exercise it in his own decision, in action and omission. He 
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commands him to be what he is. But this means that He takes man so 
seriously in his vocation to be in covenant with Him that He calls him to 
freedom in fellowship, i.e., to freedom in fellowship with others.78 
This relational ontology forms an ethics of interpretation that situates the act of 
reading in both a communal and a personal event, and challenges the notion that the 
interpretation of the Bible is a solitary event. The event remains the event of the 
Word in the church and in an individual’s life, but in so far as it is an event in an 
individual’s life, it is individual as a being-in-relationship-with-others. In this 
context, Barth proposes an ethics of responsibility as a reading with the 
accompaniment of the church’s confessions and the teachings of the church fathers 
(including the reformers). 
What is the relationship between the interpretation of Scripture and the 
church’s confessions? And in what ways can the confessions help the church in her 
reading of Scripture? In his discussion about authority in the church, Barth does not 
believe the confessions stand above or alongside Scripture, but under it.79 The 
confession derives its authority from the fact that it contains “the formulation and 
proclamation of a definite ecclesiastical understanding of the revelation attested in 
Holy Scripture.”80 Confessions are a commentary on Scripture which attempt to 
speak of the content of Scripture “in its own words, in the words and therefore in the 
speech of its age.”81 Confession is a universal act, i.e., it is directed to the universal 
church, but its universality must be understood in a spiritual rather than in a legalistic 
way. In principle, since the church’s confession is a commentary, Barth posits,  
It cannot replace Holy Scripture itself. It cannot replace our own exposition 
and application of Holy Scripture. It cannot be the only commentary 
which˗because we have to read Scripture in the Church-we allow between 
ourselves and Scripture. But as the voice of the fathers and brethren it can and 
should be the first of commentaries. It can and should be the leader of the 
chorus or the key witness in that series.82 
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Because the “church’s confession… is meant to be read as a first commentary 
on Holy Scripture,”83 Barth compares critical commentary and confessions as two 
kinds of biblical commentaries and even though the purpose of reading is to 
understand Scripture, the priority must be given to the confessions for guiding the 
church’s proclamation. It is not that confessions are a source of authority but the 
recognition of the wealth of the deposit the church has collected through her long 
struggles and experiences. Confession cannot replace Scripture, as it remains under 
Scripture. It must not take over the responsibility of the church to read Scripture for 
themselves. It has its place as a guide that gives direction and helps the church to 
understand the Word of God, but its nature, as a commentary, is a reminder that it is 
Scripture that the church seeks to understand and not the confessions. 
In a similar way, Barth considers the teachers in the history of the church as 
important resources for a responsible reading of Scripture. Barth posits, 
If Holy Scripture alone is the divine teacher in the school in which we find 
ourselves when we find ourselves in the Church, we will not want to find 
ourselves in this school of the Church without fellow-pupils, without 
cooperation with them, without the readiness to be instructed by older and 
more experienced fellow-pupils: as fellow-pupils, but to be instructed. And 
basically the older and more experienced fellow-pupil is simply the Church 
teacher. He is, in fact, older and more experienced in a qualified sense of the 
word. He is not only a son but a father in the Church. We have to be 
instructed by him.84  
While Barth accepts that a Christian should be humble enough to learn from anyone, 
he argues that a true teacher is a rare gift from God, and has a special place in the 
church’s reading of Scripture.85 
Barth’s theology suggests a form of sola scriptura that provides a charitable 
space for the role of tradition in biblical interpretation. While sola scriptura means 
that the church must decide for herself her understanding of Scripture, Barth regards 
confessions as a treasured commentary that can provide directions and insights for 
truthful understanding.  This ethos of reading is a powerful antidote to counter the 
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myth of modern readers from their narcissistic attitude regarding one’s personal 
interpretation as definitive simply because it is one’s own.86 An ethics of 
responsibility means an interpretation must consist of a willingness to listen and to 
learn from the testimony of the church and its teachers and not be dismissive on the 
grounds that their commentaries are pre-critical. The church’s responsibility is to the 
Word of God, but this basic theological virtue is accompanied by a wisdom that the 
event of the Word is not only a private event. Reading together with the church, past 
and present, is a true expression of the truth that the relationship between God’s 
communicative presence and the church’s reading of Scripture is both an event and 
also a history.  A responsible reading gives attention to the history of God’s 
relationship with the church through the perspective of confessions and the church 
fathers. God spoke and speaks in the Scripture, God spoke to the church then and 
there, and God will continue to speak to the church here and now. The church is 
called to listen to each other in their exposition of Scripture, but it is Scripture that 
the church reads, interprets and tries to understand. 
Second, an ethics of responsibility means “that each individual who confesses 
his acceptance of the testimony of Scripture must be willing and prepared to 
undertake the responsibility for its interpretation and application.”87 This ethos finds 
its basis in the conviction that only the authority of the Word is final in the church, 
that the church’s authority is subordinate to the Word. The implication is that while 
in the church we are called to listen to each other, one must take responsibility for 
one’s reading because the Word is the final and ultimate judge of the church and her 
convictions.88 An individual is not a person in isolation from the church, but an 
individual who listens humbly and willingly to fellow members, but remains an 
individual nonetheless.89 As such, the individual who decides for herself is an 
individual in relation to humanity as a whole, one who sees the encounter with the 
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Word as an encounter that places one as a steward of the Word who is called to share 
the gift of God with the church and the world.90 
This responsibility rests on the conviction that the Word of God does not 
need human clarification to be existentially relevant. As the Word of God, Scripture 
has an objective clarity, but because the Word takes up human words, Barth posits, 
“It has itself incurred the need of…interpretation. Our human responsibility is related 
to this need of interpretation, and thus to Scripture expressed in human words.”91 The 
exercise of this responsibility must not become an axiom that is isolated from the 
theological concept of the clarity of Scripture, which makes the freedom of 
interpretation possible in the first place. It is true that the need of interpretation 
comes from the fact that the Word assumes the form of human words.92 However, 
Barth argues, the task of interpretation is made possible only on the basis that the 
Word of God is capable of self-interpretation. Only in this context is the fulfilment of 
one’s responsibility of interpreting Scripture an expression of humility and 
obedience, and the church must seek to encourage all to participate in this calling. 
The task is not limited to an elite group of interpreters. While this responsibility 
means one has to be responsible for one’s own interpretation and also in between the 
speakers and the readers, the members of the church can be called to be a third party 
that plays the role of an intermediary in the process of interpretation (cf. Acts 
8:26ff).93 A third party stands as mediator, not of the Word, but of the promise given 
to the church that God will speak to the people. On this theological ground the 
church can appreciate the presence of scholars and gifted theologians among the 
teachers of the church who can help the church to understand Scripture better. They 
are not privileged because of their academic credentials but because of the vocation 
to take responsibility in the church’s reading of the Bible.  
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5. An ethics of obedience 
The term Barth uses to elucidate an ethics of obedience is subordination to the Word 
of God.94 Barth argues that subordination does not contradict the theological concept 
of freedom as Barth defines it. Barth emphasizes freedom, which is characterized by 
a spontaneous activity, as harmonious with the theological concept of freedom in 
subordination. This form of freedom, Barth argues, is not in any way less, and in 
many ways more, than the concept of freedom where the relationship between two or 
more subjects is characterized by spontaneous reciprocity. The point is that when the 
relationship between two or more subjects is properly one of subordination, then, 
within that relationship, freedom can be properly expressed in the form of 
subordination and super-ordination. Inability to do so may consist in a lack of 
freedom, i.e., of properly acting to the other who is worthy of one’s subordination.95 
Another way to construe Barth’s ethics of obedience is to recognize that 
obedience also means a faithful reading of the subject matter of Scripture. Faithful 
reading is a true expression of obedience because it is the Lord who addresses the 
church in and through the text. A faithful reading is attentive to the content because 
one recognises the One who speaks. This does not disregard the creative imagination 
of the reader, but to claim that, human creativity only has its proper place in the 
context of obedience. John Webster rightly comments that in the church’s reading of 
Scripture “exegetical reason is caught up in faith’s abandonment of itself to the 
power of the divine Word to slay and to make alive,”96 and in this sense the death 
and resurrection of Christ are enacted in the church’s reading of Scripture. As a 
theological activity, reading Scripture is part of the continuous history of 
reconciliation in the life of the church whereby the power of the Spirit overcomes 
human sin. In this regard, the primary challenge of a faithful reading is not a 
cognitive incompetence but rather human sinfulness, particularly the sin of idolatry 
and ignorance.97 Faithful reading is a theological response against the human 
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tendency to glorify one’s ideas and to ignore the communicative presence of God. 
Webster rightly posits, “We do not read well not only because of technical 
incompetence, cultural distance from the substance of the text or lack of readerly 
sophistication, but also and most of all because in reading Scripture we are addressed 
by that which runs clean counter to our will.”98 Reading Scripture ethically involves 
a hermeneutical conversion and a cultivation of a habit of reading in which the 
overcoming of ignorance and idolatry is understood as an event of grace.99 
Thus, rather than misunderstanding, the main challenge in good interpretation 
is insubordination, that is, a denial to place our ideas, thoughts and convictions under 
the subject matter of Scripture.100 Barth does not suggest that interpreters have to 
empty their preconceived ideas prior to interpreting, as such a process is not humanly 
possible in the first place. What it means is that the object of interpretation can 
compel one to adopt a new presupposition if that is required by the church’s 
encounter with the Word. Barth argues that “Scripture itself as the witness to 
revelation, must have unconditional precedence of all the evidence or our own being 
and becoming, our own thoughts an endeavour, hope and suffering, of all the 
evidence of intellect and senses, of all axiom and theorems, which we inherit and as 
such bear with us”.101  
The ethics of obedience is elaborated into a process of interpretation which 
consists of three moments of interpretation: explicatio, meditatio, and applicatio.102 
These moments of interpretation must not be seen as three mechanical steps which 
are independent from one another, but an expression of faithfulness and obedience to 
the Word of God that, in itself, has a self-explanatory character. Rather than construe 
it as a method of interpretation that can secure the outcome of good interpretation, 
the word ‘moment’ implies a process of faithful reading which can be recognised but 
not separated in the interpretive performance. 
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The moments of interpretation derive their meaning from a theological 
understanding that the Word of God as an event by virtue of God’s communicative 
grace. The purpose of interpretation is to live in and to live by the Word of God, as 
the process is not an epistemological tool that guarantees its result, but rather an 
ethics of reading that purports, not primarily to acquire knowledge, but to listen to 
and to obey the commanding grace of God. Furthermore, the word ‘moment’ 
indicates that this particular instance of reading is not an isolated event but a moment 
in the history of God’s loving relationship with the church. It derives its continuity 
from the historical and literary meaning of the text through the fact that, in this text, 
God spoke to people in the past and will speak again and again to people here and 
now. As such the moments of interpretation will not tolerate an arbitrary 
interpretation without regard for its natural history but, at the same time, it will 
continue to surprise the church as each moment inaugurates a fresh event of God’s 
speaking. The freedom of God in a faithful and loving relationship shapes the 
moments of interpretation as the church’s ethics of obedience is in anticipation of 
God’s commanding grace. 
5.1. The first moment: the act of observation (explicatio)  
According to Barth, the act of explicatio mainly deals with the sensus of the word of 
Scripture.103 The task is twofold, which are historical and literary investigations. In 
both Barth does not undermine the rigorous work of literary and historical research 
as exercised in general hermeneutics.104 However, the aim of the investigation is not 
to grasp the religious idea of its human author or to gain a general understanding of 
its literary-historical context, but to grasp, or better to be grasped by, the subject 
matter as witnessed by the human author.105 It aims to understand the object mirrored 
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by the language and the historical concepts of the prophetic-apostolic words.106 
Observation is not defined as a methodological investigation of compiling biblical 
data but a corresponding human task of the self-presentation of the divine Word, i.e., 
“to follow this self-presentation, to repeat it… Interpretation as presentation in an 
introductory attempt to follow the sense of the words of Scripture.”107 Webster 
rightly comments that “talk of God’s action does not compete with, suspend or 
obliterate talk of creaturely activity. Rather, it specifies or determines the character of 
creaturely activity by indicating that creaturely acts take place in the overarching 
context of the economy of salvation.”108 It is not the difference in the practical steps 
of exegesis but in the ethos of exegesis, in the spirit of the work, in the understanding 
of the interpreter that is really happening in this work. This is what makes ecclesial 
exegesis distinctively theological, and, in the end, makes a real distinction in the way 
exegesis is performed. 
We can elaborate further the distinctiveness of explicatio in theological 
hermeneutics by comparing it with general hermeneutics. In general hermeneutics, 
the plausible structure of an interpreter governs the possibility of meaning and the 
historicity of an event, and isolates the meaning within this plausibility structure. In 
theological hermeneutics, the subject matter governs the investigation, thus 
determining its reality and meaning.109 Barth argues that the weakness of general 
hermeneutics is that it pre-emptively decides the limits of possibilities in the 
investigation. Theological hermeneutics, he proposes, is open to the directions and 
possibilities revealed by the subject matter, and is truly governed by the freedom of 
the Word.110 Thus, for Barth, explicatio encompasses the freedom to consider all the 
best evidence available in the field, e.g., all literary studies, lexicography, source-
criticism, grammar, style, a comparative study of the words and concepts of an 
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author and of various authors, and their interrelation in the development of ideas, 
etc.111 As one moment in scriptural interpretation, “it will not have to fear any 
inquiry in respect of historical orientation and criticism. On the other hand, it will not 
tolerate any restrictions. It will allow the text to speak for itself, in the sense it will 
give full scope to its controlling object.”112 It opens the possibility that the subject 
matter may redefine the structure of reality within which the contemporary method 
of interpretation operates and “to be newly defined and broadened and eventually 
shattered and re-moulded, and in certain circumstances even to bring and apply to the 
task of faithful understanding possibilities which hitherto and in other circumstances 
we regarded as impossibilities.”113 In the moment of explicatio, the justification of 
the process lies not in methodological reasoning, but in the theological conviction of 
the clarity of Scripture and the freedom of the Word expressed in an ethics of 
obedience.  
5.2. The second moment: the act of reflection (meditatio) 
The second moment, meditatio (reflectio), is the middle point between explicatio and 
applicatio, but it is not a second step, independent of the first and the third, but “the 
one act of scriptural exegesis considered now in the moment of the transition of what 
is said into the thinking of the reader or hearer.”114 In this process, while it is “an act 
of human freedom” it is based on the conviction that scriptural interpretation is an 
event in which, as Barth emphasizes, Scripture explains itself.115 Since the interpreter 
remains a human, the use of philosophy to reflect upon the subject matter is a 
necessity of human existence. Barth posits that a theological exegesis remains an 
exegesis within human facticity because “we only hear with our own ears and see 
with our own eyes, we can apprehend by means only of our own understanding, not 
of that of another.”116 Since it is a necessary human condition, a philosophical 
thought-form, as a principle, is not criticised in its own reasonability, but relative to 
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its ability as an instrument for reflecting the content of Scripture. Thus, Barth is quite 
accommodating in his use of Plato or New Platonism, Hegelianism or Anti-
Hegelianism, Aristotle or Kierkegaard or the phenomenology of Husserl and Scheler 
as philosophical handmaidens.117 What is important is that one must do this “with 
great care and circumspection,” from a theological principle that it is an 
anthropological necessity that is grounded in two theological convictions:  a) that the 
human is called to understand and interpret as a sinful human being and b) that the 
Word become incarnate in this fallen world, so “we cannot basically contest the use 
of philosophy in scriptural exegesis.”118 
Rather than branding Barth’s use of philosophy as ad hoc, we choose to 
elaborate Barth’s detailed argument to prevent a convoluted understanding of an ad 
hoc use of philosophy. Barth’s use of philosophy is marked by an attitude that is both 
critical and willing to learn, and one that is simultaneously determined to learn from 
its insight but also insistent that this use must be governed by a concentration on the 
act of divine communicative presence, thus forming a special attitude toward 
philosophy.119 In this context, Barth highlights five important points of what he 
means by “great care and circumspection” in the use of philosophy. First, one must 
be self-aware of the presence of a philosophical element in one’s interpretation. The 
content of philosophy will never be the same as the content of Scripture, even when 
there are signs of similarities in the thought-forms. On the other hand, the contents of 
philosophy and Scripture will be in contrast to each other. However, since one must 
use philosophy, one cannot escape transposing the content of Scripture into the 
thought-form of a philosophy. In doing this one must be aware that there are 
differences between the transposed images and the real content of Scripture.120 This 
awareness must continue to remind one that the ethos of employing philosophical 
concepts is not creativity but obedience to the grace of the Word.121  
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Second, the use of philosophy is to formulate a hypothesis, which is 
necessary in any act of thinking; but, on the other hand, it should be noted that no 
philosophy is irreplaceable, and that one may find other philosophies more congenial 
to the task.122 As such, the church does not need to attach herself to one form of 
philosophy. Barth posits,  
On the assumption that I, with my particular mode of thought ˗ not on 
account of and in virtue of this mode of thought, but in spite of it and with it-
am a member of the Church, and that as a member I am invited to undertake 
the task of scriptural exegesis, I can and must apply this way of thought to the 
problems of Scripture, in an exploratory and experimental and provisional 
manner. It is a false asceticism if I am unwilling to do this, if I try to suppress 
and deny my mode of thought. For this can only mean either that I have to 
choose another human system of thought, or that I withdraw from the task 
imposed upon me. But as I apply myself to this task, it will be decided under 
the Word what becomes of my mode of thought, whether and to what extent 
it will be serviceable to me in this activity ˗ the activity of interpreting 
Scripture.123 
 
Barth’s argument for the hypothetical nature of philosophy calls for an openness and 
humility to accept the possibility that other philosophies may be more useful than the 
one employed, and one is called to admit that one’s philosophy needs to be revised, 
restructured, or in some cases, replaced.  This interpretative attitude is maintained by 
the theological ethics of the church reading of the Bible as compelled by an 
obedience to the commanding grace of God.124  
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A. Smith, and Bruce Ellis Benson, Hermeneutics at the Crossroads (Bloomington: Indiana University 
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Third, the use of philosophy should not become an interest in itself, separated 
from the purposes of theological interpretation. Barth warns of the danger of 
philosophy becoming a controlling concept which constrains or controls the meaning 
of Scripture, and contradicts the ethics of obedience.125 No philosophy can become a 
tool that demands a consistent use of its concepts in exegesis, as if the church were 
obliged to be an advocate of a certain thought-form. Barth posits, “Every philosophy 
which is posited absolutely leads necessarily to a falsification of Scripture because to 
posit absolutely what is man's own and is brought by him to the Word is an act of 
unbelief which makes impossible the insights of faith and therefore a true 
interpretation of the Word.”126 What is important is not the act of sorting out one 
philosophy from another, or of differentiating between good or bad philosophies, but 
an ethics of faithfulness to Scripture, in which any philosophy can be used for 
interpretation as long as one’s loyalty is not to philosophy but to Scripture in the 
event of the Word. 
Fourth, Barth admits that there are differences between philosophies, and so 
there are differences in their usefulness. What is important is that “in a specific 
situation this or that particular mode of thought can be particularly useful in 
scriptural exegesis, and it can then become a command to avail oneself of it in this 
particular instance.”127 It is always relative to its usefulness for understanding the 
subject matter, and for this reason, always under the guidance of grace.128 Barth 
warns against elevating one particular mode of thought into a normative role for all 
situations and times, and even for all types of text. The more attractive one finds a 
philosophy, and the more eager one to promote it, the more one must be especially 
guarded of its danger in diverting the church’s attentiveness from Scripture. The 
                                                                                                                                          
Press, 2006), xiii-xviii. The standard survey for various possible theories is still Thiselton, New 
Horizons in Hermeneutics. From within Barth’s ethics of interpretation the use of all these theories is 
inevitable as such, the important point is the way all they must be seen as a hypothetical device that 
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presence of God. 
125 CD I/2., 732. 
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church’s faith in reading Scripture must always rest on God’s gracious 
communicative presence rather than on the stability of a system of thought. 
Fifth and finally, its use is contributory, and its fruitfulness is “controlled by 
the text and the object mirrored by the text.”129 It is not the aim of theological 
interpretation to make philosophy speak to our mind but to let the Word of God 
speak for itself in this particular human thought-form, inasmuch as, in this particular 
thought-form one encounters the Word of God, i.e., “not resisting or evading the 
movement to which it gives rise, but allowing it to be communicated to our own 
thinking.”130 Barth emphasises the attitude of a disciple who is teachable and willing 
to listen to the Word. Concretely, it is to place one’s philosophy under the scrutiny of 
the Word of God. Barth posits, “The use of a human scheme of thought in the service 
of scriptural exegesis is legitimate and fruitful when it is a critical use, implying that 
the object of the criticism is not Scripture, but our own scheme of thought, and that 
Scripture is necessarily the subject of this criticism.”131 As long as one does not 
absolutely commit to a philosophical system, one should not be afraid to use any 
form of philosophy, and can freely appropriate it for biblical interpretation. It is in 
the spirit of the free appropriation of philosophy that Barth can claim, “Even from a 
human point of view, it is possible to regard scriptural exposition as the best and 
perhaps the only school of truly free human thinking ˗ freed, that is, from all the 
conflicts and tyranny of systems in favour of [the Word of God].”132 
5.3. The third moment: the act of appropriation (applicatio) 
The third moment of interpretation, applicatio, cannot be separated from explicatio 
and meditatio, because without applicatio “observation can be only a historically 
æsthetic survey, and reflection only idle speculation, in spite of all the supposed 
openness to the object in both cases.”133 Applicatio is a moment when “what is 
declared to us must become our very own, and indeed in such a way that now we 
                                                 
129 Ibid., 734. 
130 Ibid. 
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132 Ibid. 
133 Ibid., 736. 
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really do become conscientes (co-knower).” 134 An interpreter becomes “those who in 
virtue of what is said to them know themselves, and can, therefore, say to themselves 
and to others what is said to them, those who not only reflect on it but think it 
themselves”.135 Applicatio means assuming the role of those who have witnessed 
revelation, and the interpreter attempts to let Scripture be, not only the master of 
one’s thinking, but the master of one’s existence.136 Applicatio is not only an attempt 
to make Scripture relevant to the contemporary situations, but rather to absorb our 
contemporary lives into the world of the Scripture.  It is ultimately a transposition 
from our existence into the existence as it is defined by Scripture.137 
 Barth emphasises that the moment of applicatio “can only be our activity in 
view of the free, and indeed the most proper and the most intimate activity of the 
Word of God itself in the form of impartation.”138 The use of Scripture cannot be 
seen as a human using a text as an object, applying its concepts for practical life, or 
turning theoretical knowledge into practice. Barth insists that such a dualism of 
theory and practice contradicts the nature of Scripture as the Word of God. The fact 
that Scripture is the Word of God, means it cannot anticipate what is the message 
relative to one’s feeling and ideas. It is in this attitude that one expects the light of 
Scripture to fall upon the reader, not because one expects questions, struggles and 
life-contexts to be answered by Scripture but by letting the word of Scripture bring 
the questions and concerns to one’s life. In this way, it provides the true light to 
one’s life. This mode of theological reflection can only be a matter of obedience and 
faith in God, because in Scripture just as God spoke to the first readers, God still 
speaks His Word to the contemporary church. In this regard, there is a continuity of 
the Word between then and now, and the testimony of Scripture becomes the 
responsibility of the readers. Barth closes the chapter claiming strongly that, 
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By faith we ourselves think what Scripture says to us, and in such a way that 
we must think it because it has become the determining force of our whole 
existence. By faith we come to the contemporaneity, homogeneity and 
indirect identification of the reader or hearer of Scripture with the witnesses 
of revelation. By faith their testimony becomes a matter of our own 
responsibility. Faith itself, obedient faith, but faith, and in the last resort 
obedient faith alone, is the activity which is demanded of us as members of 
the Church, the exercise of the freedom which is granted to us under the 
Word.139 
6. Conclusion 
This chapter has argued that Barth’s dogmatic description of the church’s reading of 
the Bible entails a description of an ethics of interpretation. We have contrasted this 
ethics with methods of interpretation by elaborating a metacriticism that criticises 
modern methods of biblical interpretation at the level of its ethical presuppositions. 
The main argument of the chapter is that Barth’s dogmatics provides a special form 
and content of interpretative ethics that is shaped by the freedom of the Word and the 
theological claim of the clarity of Scripture. These claims result in a distinctive form 
of an ethics of interpretation that is elaborated under the themes of freedom, 
responsibility and obedience. In the next chapter we will conclude our exploration 
with the achievements of the study and some important implications of the study for 
current discussion on the theological interpretation of Scripture and for the church’s 
practice of reading Scripture. 
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Chapter VII: Conclusion 
 
This thesis has demonstrated the distinctiveness of Barth’s hermeneutics through a 
new analysis of the structure and coherence of his theological ontology. As a 
contribution to Barth’s scholarship, it offers a new way of reading Barth’s account of 
biblical interpretation in the light of his later theological ontology. As a contribution 
to broader discussions on textual interpretation, it offers Barth’s theological insights 
in coordinating several theological loci to provide a complex account of meaning and 
understanding. A proper understanding of Barth’s hermeneutics must therefore give 
due attention to the material distinctiveness of his dogmatics and the development of 
his theological ontology. Through a thematic reading of the Church Dogmatics and a 
close examination of its key sections, it has been shown that Barth’s theology of 
interpretation is formed and informed by his theological ontology of the doctrines of 
Trinity, Christology and election. This ontology offers a theology of divine 
communicative presence that has a disruptive effect to modern hermeneutics, 
specially its ontological presuppositions, and generates an ethics of interpretation that 
is shaped by material dogmatics content. 
In regard to Barth’s scholarship, this work offers a constructive account of 
Barth’s ontology of interpretation by utilising an interpretive approach that sets his 
later theological ontology to revise his earlier hermeneutics. While current discussion 
focuses primarily on the Trinitarian relationship between the being of God and the 
doctrine of election, this work has drawn the implications of such ontological 
revision for his hermeneutics. We have shown its relevance in relation to the task of 
the church to read the Bible as Scripture, particularly in maintaining the freedom and 
the history of God in the divine address through the text. Furthermore, it defines the 
locality of the church, which is not simply sociological, but primarily ontological and 
theological. The church is in Christ, and it means that the vision of reality within 
which the church must be seen is defined by the election of God to be God in Jesus 
Christ. This ontology defines what it means to be human, individually and 
collectively. The question about the being of humans is decided in the decision of 
God on God’s being. For the church, the true meaning and understanding are 
originated, not in the human existence, but in the Trinitarian life of Father, Son and 
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Holy Spirit, specifically, in the designation of the Son as the Word of God. A 
theological interpretation of Scripture as such is not original but derivative of the 
divine life. It is not an existential event isolated from the divine life, but a re-
enactment of the Trinitarian life in the life of the church.  
In regard to the study of hermeneutics, this work offers a new reading of the 
distinctiveness of Barth’s hermeneutics. In Barth’s theology, the dynamic of meaning 
and understanding is located in the being of God while also closely related to the text 
of Scripture and the reality of the church. The ontology of God’s being in becoming 
shapes a dogmatic approach to hermeneutics as a living embodiment of God’s speech 
and action. By delineating the reality of God’s communicative presence as a speech 
and an action, this study provides a theological description of the relationship 
between the presence of God in the church and the communicative action of God. 
But this communicative action is also a divine mystery that cannot be controlled by 
human method and epistemology. Yet it is not arbitrary because the mystery of 
divine decision is eternally determined by the history of God’s relationship with the 
world in Jesus Christ. This complex understanding of theological ontology is capable 
of standing and functioning as a proper hermeneutical description for what is really 
taking place in the church’s reading of Scripture at the ontological level, thus 
disregarding the need for an elaborate theory of human understanding as found in a 
general hermeneutic. This however does not necessitate the isolation of theological 
hermeneutics from general hermeneutics, but rather, an approach that consistently 
coordinates several doctrinal loci in its engagement with the questions of general 
hermeneutics. 
This work defines Barth’s hermeneutics as a sachlich hermeneutics. While 
this is not a new designation, this work provides a clear criterion of Barth’s sachlich 
hermeneutics through a reading of his doctrine of the Word of God, and particularly 
draws its meaning from the threefold Word of God and the nature of the Word of 
God as speech, action and mystery. The term sachlich hermeneutics is simple enough 
to delineate the essence of Barth’s approach, and, at the same time, the elaboration of 
the Sache of Scripture as the Word of God provides a complex understanding of the 
relationship between the Sache with human language, history and the problem of 
textuality. In the context of modern hermeneutics, this designation can help the 
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church in handling the temptation of the new frontiers in hermeneutics. Barth’s 
hermeneutics focuses on the subject matter of the Scripture, that is, what is the real 
point of the text without burdening itself unnecessarily with the discussions of the 
author, reader and text in relation to meaning and understanding. But at the same 
time it can engage the complex undertaking of such discussions from the point of 
view of the doctrine of the Word of God. In this regard, the discussions of the 
humanity and the textuality of the Bible are set within the doctrine of Scripture and 
the work of the Holy Spirit in the church. Barth’s hermeneutics shows that the church 
can have confidence in her doctrine by providing a proper guide for a contemporary 
theological hermeneutics of the Scripture.  
This works has argued that the implication for such construal is an ethics of 
interpretation. Within this construal the church’s act of interpreting the Bible is a 
performance of a distinctive sort of theological hermeneutics. Interpretation of 
Scripture is an invocation for knowledge and strength to understand and to obey the 
communicative and commanding presence of God in and through the Scripture. It is 
an act of worship. This thesis not only confirms recent proposals that ethics is 
integrative to Barth’s dogmatics but more importantly delineates the concrete form 
and content of such ethics in the context of his hermeneutics. Reading the Bible as 
Scripture is not distinctive because of the different method of interpretation, but 
because of a particular ethics of reading in view of the being of the church and 
Scripture. This line of reasoning avoids an over-extended discussion of the role of 
method for church reading of Scripture and highlights the practical nature of such 
activity for the life of contemporary church. Reading Scripture is a simple act that 
suits everybody from different walks of life, but it is also a complex and serious 
activity in which one encounters the living and commanding presence of God. It is 
the disruptive presence of God that the church encounters, a presence that is 
communicative and commanding.  This presence requires both her understanding and 
obedience. 
The results of this study have several implications for a contemporary 
application of the church’s reading of Scripture. The church needs to understand, 
above all, her theological location is in Christ. The reality of Christ is the most 
defining dimension of her existence. The strength of Barth’s theological 
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hermeneutics is its insistence on placing the church in Christ as the most defining 
reality of her being. The contemporary reading of the Christian church must derive 
its power and insights from the reality of Christ. The Christ of the Gospel is the One 
whose life embraces all dimensions of human life. He is a cultural, a political, a 
historical, a sociological and an economic being. But, above all, he is a theological 
being. In Barth’s theological ontology, this is decided in eternity by God’s election. 
It is by realizing her being in Christ that the church is able to perform the most 
relevant reading of the Bible. In this way, church can read the Bible politically, 
historically, sociologically and culturally through her conviction of the being of 
Christ. The most important task of the church in reading the Bible is not to extract its 
textual meaning for contemporary application, but to believe in Christ as the true 
being of the church. By being faithful to this confession, the church is well equipped 
for the contemporary challenges of her faith.  
 Second, the voice of Scripture is the speech of God. The theological task of 
reading the Scripture is to listen to the voice of God who defines human existence in 
the decision of God to be God in Jesus Christ. He is the Word of God incarnated, not 
only in the eternal decision, but also in his taking sides with humanity. The reading 
of the Bible must be aimed at listening to the voice of God who in Jesus Christ 
represents the eternal voice of God in taking sides with humanity. Only the speech of 
God can truly represent the voices of human beings. Barth’s hermeneutics represents 
an insightful reflection upon this calling. 
Third, Barth’s theological hermeneutics can provide a model for an 
engagement with the current development of the theological interpretation of 
Scripture. This study shows the insightful results of coordinating several Christian 
doctrines for a constructive account of meaning and understanding. The construal of 
modern theological interpretation is shaped by the vision of reality in which one 
construes an interpretative event. In this regard, this study provides a theologically 
distinctive approach for engaging the contemporary discussion. Specifically, the 
critical point is not only conceptual, but more importantly, ontological, where one 
presupposes the interpretation is taking place, and ethical, how one should engage 
with the content and the voices of Scripture.  
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Finally, the disruptive presence of God is a presence that continues to 
challenge the life of the church in reading the Bible as Scripture. Ultimately, it is the 
Word of God that the church must understand and obey. Barth’s hermeneutics points 
out that the Word of God remains a disruptive presence that brings historical 
continuity and discontinuity between the Bible, traditions and the church’s reading. It 
is God’s communicative and commanding presence that makes the church’s reading 
of the Bible a truly distinctive act. Barth’s hermeneutics suggests that the church 
must continue to have faith that the most crucial aspect of textual meaning and 
understanding is the decision of God to speak again and again to the church. As such, 
the most crucial act in the church’s reading of Scripture is to invoke God’s mercy, 
that through a faithful reading of the text, the church can listen in a fresh new way 
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